Posted on 09/26/2003 6:56:56 AM PDT by SJackson
The controversies that dominate the scene of US-Israel relations revolving around such issues as the specific demarcation lines of the security fence Israel has been constructing in the West Bank and the fate of Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat should not be construed as conclusive evidence of a major rift between Washington and Jerusalem.
Despite recurrent instances of disagreement between the US and Israel on both procedural and substantive issues in the Palestinian zone, including those which reflect the parties' different interpretations of the "road map" and of the necessary preconditions for its implementation, the fact that both the Bush administration and the Sharon government have remained fully committed to a common strategic agenda in seeking to combat terrorism and reshape the regional environment according to quintessential democratic premises and values, should not be overlooked.
Indeed, the 9/11 trauma which made the Bush high-policy elite acutely sensitive to the dangers of international terrorism and radicalism (and irrevocably committed to confronting them as a springboard for reconstructing the international environment) further enhanced the bonds of solidarity and empathy already existing within the American-Israeli framework.
Against this backdrop of basic strategic compatibility which was evident from the inception of the Bush presidency, and which became even more pronounced in the aftermath of 9/11, one should distinguish between crises which unfold under such harmonious circumstances, and crises which develop in a far less benign setting, with the parties divided by irreconcilable visions of the regional landscape and the policies to be pursued, and with the atmosphere within the American-Israeli framework continuously permeated with tension and fraught with misunderstanding.
Such was the case during the 1950s, when Israel was perceived by the Eisenhower administration as a strategic liability and as a major obstacle en route to the formation of a broadly-based security system in the region (comprising both Egypt and Iraq) for the purpose of containing Soviet penetration and encroachment. This vision precipitated a highly-reserved American posture toward the Ben-Gurion government. This was predicated upon its overriding desire to win the support of all major Arab powers for the American strategic designs (which revolved around the concept of the "Baghdad Pact") by convincing such leaders as Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser of Washington's "even-handedness" in addressing the Arab-Israeli predicament.
UNDER SUCH adverse strategic circumstances, crises which erupted in American-Israeli relations (such as the Water Crisis of 1953 and the Suez Crisis of 1956) were severe, with president Eisenhower and secretary of state John Foster Dulles demonstrating an unabated willingness to resort to harsh and far-reaching coercive measures vis- -vis the Israeli government (including the immediate and complete suspension of economic assistance) in order to secure its compliance with American demands.
It was only in the early 1960s, when it became abundantly clear to American decision-makers that this initial strategy of accommodation toward the Arab world had not borne fruit, and that most principal Arab actors had defected to the Eastern sphere of influence, that this reliance upon the tools of coercive diplomacy and economic pressure toward Israel was largely abandoned.
Israel thus came to be gradually perceived as a strategic asset to the US on the basis of cold and unsentimental considerations and calculations, and only after it had conclusively proved its credentials and value to the West in a series of acutely-menacing regional crises particularly those which posed a clear and immediate danger to the Hashemite Kingdom which exposed the growing vulnerability of the remaining pro-Western strongholds in the area.
Indeed, with Egypt becoming increasingly hostile to the West in the course of the 1950s, with Syria embarking upon an equally radical and defiant course, and with Iraq tilting toward the East in the immediate aftermath of the July 1958 revolution, Israel emerged as the only viable guardian of Western interests. It was prepared to take considerable risks, as was the case during the Jordanian Crisis of July 1958, when it permitted the British and American airlift to cross its airspace en-route to Amman despite Soviet pressure not to do so, for the sake of helping to contain the advancing forces of radicalism and revolution.
IT IS hardly surprising, then, that against the backdrop of this transformed regional landscape, future administrations did not feel compelled any longer to distance themselves from Jerusalem and had little to fear from the repercussions, as by 1958 the Arab Middle East had already been largely lost to the West. It is also hardly surprising that since the Kennedy era not only did Israel become the recipient of advanced weapons systems, but that the very essence and structure of the crises which occasionally developed within the American-Israeli dyad changed drastically in juxtaposition with the Eisenhower period.
Far from directly threatening core Israeli security interests (as was the case in the 1950s), most of these crises comprised nothing more than a nuisance or a distraction which reflected transient and tactical disagreements rather than a major strategic incompatibility or rift, which could threaten the very core of the alliance.
In view of this durable vision of Israel as a reliable bulwark in the omnivorous struggle against the regional forces of militancy, radicalism and recalcitrance (which has remained largely intact in the course of the last four decades), occasional misunderstandings and sources of friction between the two allies have been almost invariably subordinated to, and outweighed by, these broader concerns, priorities and perceptions of the regional landscape.
It is therefore safe to predict that this basic strategic compatibility will remain essentially unchanged in the foreseeable future with tactical skirmishes unlikely to transform a highly-consensual framework into an emotion-laden, highly-charged and fractured relationship.
Israel and the US will therefore continue to bargain, disagree and occasionally even quarrel, but as true and intimate friends and without seeking to turn the clock back to the 1950s.
More specifically, the parties will continuously attempt to jointly manage and defuse sources of friction and dispute long before they threaten to escalate and overshadow the congruent and cooperative infrastructure of the American-Israeli framework. Even in the absence of an early and complete agreement on such issues as the demarcation line of the security fence, they will resort to such tactics as procrastination, obfuscation, segmentation and incrementalism in the hope that the matter in dispute will eventually subside into the background without damaging even the margins of the relationship.
The writer is professor of political science, head of the security studies program and senior research associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. His most recent book is John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel (Frank Cass under the auspices of the Jaffee Center).
Special relationship, By Zalman Shoval Political alliances, unlike (some) marriages, are not made in heaven, they are usually founded on rock-solid national interests. Personal friendships between leaders do help, of course, but only up to a point. The American-Israeli special relationship and in this case the term special is no mere adjective is not fundamentally different, though it has undoubtedly also been affected by such factors as memories of the Holocaust, domestic US politics (which is not specific to American-Israeli relations), and the shared democratic values and Judeo-Christian heritage in a generally unfriendly world.
The relationship has been growing steadily in spite of often fierce, though temporary, disagreements between Israel and almost every American administration since 1948 whether it was the arms embargo during the Truman administration, Eisenhower's opposition to the Sinai campaign, the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, or the ongoing rows over Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria.
None of the above, however, affected the steady upward path of the relationship especially since the 1967 Six Day War which, on the one hand, underscored the existential threat Israel still found itself in, while, on the other, its sensational victory turned the Jewish state in the eyes of many Americans from a strategic liability into a strategic asset (leading to the important military relationship between the two countries).
Not so long ago, especially after the end of the Cold War, there was a debate whether the relationship was essentially based on strategic interests or on shared values. But making a Manichean distinction between "values" and "strategic interests" was always misleading; as America's present troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia shows that without at least a certain degree of shared values, even the most interest-based strategic relationship is bound to crumble sooner or later.
Another important element is the US Congress. Though some Israeli leaders in the past, not understanding the rules of America's politics or constitution, erroneously believed that Israel could advance its aims by relying on the White House alone or on Congress alone the latter's solid support for Israel is indeed a factor which every administration, including the present one, will have to reckon with, not least in a situation where so many of its important policy-aims may depend on the support of that body. When some over-enthusiastic Israeli politicians declared that the American-Israeli relationship "had never been better," truth to some extent was on their side. (One remembers the "Likud" functionaries, apparently regarding this as a compliment, who proclaimed that President George W. Bush's June 24, 2002 speech, which later spawned the "road map", had made him eligible for membership in the "Likud" Central Committee )
But even without going overboard, for a number of reasons, the present Bush administration can indeed be regarded as being especially close to Israel a fact which at first took more than a few observers by surprise, though not this writer. Still, even this warm and close relationship is not immune to occasional discords, such as the present, perhaps avoidable one about Israel's proposed security fence, and in the future, almost inevitably, about certain aspects of the road map.
By comparison, the Clinton administration, though certainly not wanting in empathy, will probably go down in US-Israel history as less positive, not least because of its lack of evenhandedness during the Netanyahu government. The main blame for Israel's deteriorating situation during the Clinton-Gore administration, however, must be placed on Israel's self-made Oslo debacle.
The road map, which in its present form is probably more of a European-UN document than an American one, does bear the US imprimatur, having been fathered by Bush's June 2002 speech. Both the "map" and the speech call for the establishment of a "democratic, viable Palestinian state" living in peace alongside Israel.
Though the Israeli government has in principle expressed its support, the concept of Palestinian statehood has more than a few ingredients for wide-ranging differences. Moreover, many Israelis will ask themselves a more basic question, i.e. why will the proposed Palestinian state be all that different from most other Arab and Muslim states and what guarantee is there that "Palestine" won't be just another terror-supporting, possibly irredentist rogue-state?
Furthermore, the above-mentioned discord about the proposed security fence brings into sharp focus not only the matter of the settlements, but the very question of the future borders between Israel and the proposed Palestinian entity.
Ideological and religious considerations aside, Israel is not going to rely on the "peace-loving" nature of the Palestinian state for its security even if bolstered by international guarantees. Israel, therefore, cannot afford to relinquish the concept of "defensible borders" and of the Camp David-based "security locations." In the past, though less so at present, American officials have expressed support, at least in part, for Israel's position in this respect e.g. president Ronald Reagan's declaration that Israel "should never be asked to return to where it was eight miles wide," or the statement that UN Security Council resolution 242 was "incompatible" with the pre-1967 "green line." Israel will thus want to feel confident that the present US administration won't allow others, including its "Quartet" partners, to lead it astray in the matter of its legitimate security concerns.
HAVING READ this far, the reader might mistakenly be led to give too much weight to possible pitfalls in Israel's relationship with the Bush administration rather than to the much more significant and concrete high-points. Actually, the reasons for the close relationship go much deeper even than the common threat from Arab-Islamist terrorism though this is an important element, especially since 9/11 both peoples understanding that whatever their political, ideological or religious motivations, terrorists cannot be assuaged, they must be destroyed.
As a result, and though not always agreeing with Israel's modus operandi, the US has basically been supportive of its anti-terror campaign. The consistent political support the Bush administration lends to Israel at the UN and other international bodies which seem to have made Israel-baiting their main pastime is significant, as are the $9 billion loan guarantees which are a vital prop to Israel's ailing economy. But the relationship also benefits from a common Weltanschaung with regards to how things are, or should be, in the world we live in, be it in the realm of strategic thinking, of economics, or of democratization, among others. Hence, the fight against terror is not only a military matter, but even more so, a joint ideological stance against those who want to destroy both America's and Israel's way of life. In the Bush administration's eyes, the world is divided between those who perpetrate and support terror and those who oppose it, and in this respect Israel is clearly on the side of the angels.
But even that's not the whole story: Wary of its traditional Arab allies, the US under Bush sees in a strong Israel an important component of its overall strategic thinking about the future of the wider Middle East, all the way to India. In other words, though moving towards a solution of the Palestinian problem is an important American aim in itself, it also fits in with her larger strategic designs a view which Israel's present leadership fully shares and supports.
Obviously, this article doesn't presume to give the whole picture not only as, contrary to the French saying that "nothing is as permanent as the temporary," in politics it's often the other way round, nothing being as temporary as the supposedly permanent. I have scarcely alluded to what Israel may be required to do so that relations with the Bush administration will remain as strong and beneficial as they are at present, indeed, perhaps the best ever.
Surely, we must try to avoid confrontations in matters which are not really vital to our interests, but it will also necessitate a great deal of active some would say proactive diplomacy on our part.
The writer, a former ambassador to Washington and Likud legislator, is chairman of the Bank of Jerusalem mortgage bank.
Reasonable doubt, By Amnon Lord If more than 10 of the terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers in Manhattan and the Pentagon had turned out to be Israelis, I doubt whether President George W. Bush would have invited the Israeli ambassador the very next day to sit with him and quietly smoke cigars on the White House balcony.
I also doubt whether, in such an eventuality, the Israeli prime minister would have been invited to an extended, intimate meeting at the family ranch at Crawford, Texas.
But, thank God, they were not Israeli but mostly Saudi terrorists. And therefore it was Ambassador Bandar and Crown Prince Abdullah who received such intimate and friendly invitations after the strategic attack on the US.
Today we also know that two weeks before the September 11, 2001 attack, the Saudis gave the American administration an ultimatum on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Immediately afterwards (August 29) President Bush issued a written promise to the Saudi crown prince, stating: "I firmly believe that the Palestinian people have a right to self-determination and to live peacefully and securely in their own state in their own homeland."
No such political commitment was given to any Arab party even by former president Bill Clinton. A short while after the September 11 attack and after the declaration of a global war on terrorism, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon apparently found out about the presidential promise to the Saudis. That was a moment of truth, and for those who remember, Sharon called a press conference at which he made the dramatic declaration that Israel would not be the "Czechoslovakia" of the war against terror. He may have retracted it after a presidential reprimand, but there has been a feeling since then that Israel is convenient currency in a policy of appeasement towards Saudi Arabia.
It appears that the primary goal of US policy in the Middle East has remained as it was: how to protect Saudi interests identified as American national interests without betraying Israel too openly. This is also what gave birth to the war in Iraq.
The immediate goal was to take the American bases out of Saudi Arabia and place them somewhere else in the region. At the same time, other important goals were achieved as well: removing the threat of Saddam Hussein from Saudi Arabia, encircling Iran and placing Syria under threat.
All told, two years after the September 11 attack and three years after the beginning of the Palestinian terror campaign against Israel, it appears that the moral clarity of Bush's policy against terror had no basis when it came to Israel's war.
A STRANGE formula has emerged in the way Israel and the US handle the Palestinian issue. First, both countries place a political obstacle in their own paths with their own hands. Then they move in zigzags and in roundabout ways with the goal of removing the political obstacle that obstructs the war on terrorism. So it was with the Camp David understandings in 2000, to which the current administration is committed, through Secretary of State Colin Powell, and so it is following the introduction of the road map. Minefields have been left on the ground in the form of the Mitchell paper and the Tenet and Zinni plans.
Since Sharon came to power in March 2001, Israel has gradually had to nibble away at artificial red lines in order to effectively confront Palestinian terrorism. Initially, the "A" areas of the Palestinian Authority were considered sacred, and when IDF forces first entered them, they had to withdraw within a few hours due to "American pressure." Only after a blitz of massacres, that lasted from June 2001 (the Dolphinarium) to the end of March 2002 (the Pessah massacre) were IDF forces permitted to operate for a period of some two weeks inside "A" areas.
About a month before Operation Defensive Shield, the forces operated with success that surprised all the pessimists in the heart of the terror bases in Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus and Ramallah. But the arrival of US emissary Gen. Anthony Zinni compelled the IDF to withdraw its forces well before completing its mission. The IDF paid heavily for this premature cessation in its next operation in Jenin. The futile negotiating process gave the terrorists in Jenin and in other places precious time to organize to fight in the midst of a civilian population.
But what has been proven is that when Israel initiates bold moves, ultimately the Americans stand behind it, though first we have to pay the full price in civilian lives.
On the eve of last summer's false cease-fire (hudna), there was a similar occurrence: Israel sharply increased the pressure of its targeted killings, which reached their peak in the attempted assassination of Abdul Aziz Rantisi. Bush's initial reaction was condemnation: This was, supposedly, the crossing of a red line. Within 24 hours, however, the US changed its tune and sided with Israel by declaring war on Hamas. By the time Israel attempted to kill the Hamas leadership a few weeks ago it was accepted as natural. Likewise, the policy of isolation and neutralization of Yasser Arafat was carried out gradually at Sharon's initiative, and today there is only one red line in that regard: Just don't kill him. The fate of this red line may well be the same as that of the other red lines.
IT SEEMS that the main problems in the US-Israel relationship in the last years are the result of domestic entanglements inside Israel, a lack of clarity as to its goals, and a decline in the quality of its diplomacy.
As a global superpower, the US, naturally, has a broad range of interests, many of which create internal contradictions. But when little Israel is entangled in its own internal contradictions, with different leaders and political forces, it creates many misunderstandings and convoluted trajectories that unnecessarily complicate situations.
Years of experience have taught the Israeli leadership that for domestic political survival it needs the appearance of a warm and intimate relationship with the American administration and especially the US president.
Prime ministers who led Israel on an independent path and achieved good results received cool treatment from the White House, in conjunction with political and economic pressures. Such was the case during Yitzhak Shamir's term and also at the end of Binyamin Netanyahu's term. Netanyahu got the cold shoulder from Clinton, while Arafat became a welcome guest at the White House.
It has been proven that such an attitude towards an Israeli prime minister shakes the confidence of the Israeli public, and in both these instances this led to those prime ministers' downfall. There is no doubt that this is the lesson Sharon keeps in mind, and as a result he is sometimes prepared to sacrifice Israeli interests, to avoid confrontation with the American administration, the latest example of which is the fence. The administration's behavior on this issue contradicts Bush's promise that he is committed to Israel's security.
The writer is the author of The Israeli Left, from Socialism to Nihilism and a columnist with Makor Rishon.
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