Posted on 11/14/2002 2:28:06 PM PST by The Grammarian
THE subject now before us—the moral agency of man—is one of great interest and importance. It has been said by an excellent writer, that "The proper study of mankind is man." If this is true, as it unquestionably is, when the terms are understood to relate to the true character, moral relations, and eternal destiny of man, it is likewise true that no question ever agitated in relation to man can be of greater interest than the one now proposed—his proper moral agency.
This subject has elicited a large amount of philosophical research from the most acute metaphysicians in every age of the world, from the earliest date of philosophical science to the present day. It has presented an arena on which the master-spirits have met, and wielded with their utmost skill the keenest lance of polemic strife; but perhaps the most that has been written on the subject has tended rather to involve the matter in a maze of metaphysical intricacy, than to present the simple truth in a plain light. Could the public mind be disabused respecting the influence of the fine-spun theories, metaphysical reasonings, and endless quibbles of speculative minds, in reference to free will, moral agency, fixed fate, and philosophical necessity, it might be possible, in a small compass, to present a clear and satisfactory view of the subject in hand. As it is, we cannot feel that we have rendered merited justice without some examination of the various conflicting systems and puzzling sophisms which have been so ingeniously invented, and so liberally and tenaciously urged. We shall, however, in as clear a method as we can, endeavor to exhibit and defend what we conceive to be the true philosophical and scriptural view of man's moral agency.
The numerous and formidable disputants on this subject may all be ranged in two grand divisions—the advocates of free agency, in the proper sense of the term, on one hand, and the defenders of the doctrine of necessity on the other. That we may conduct the investigation in a clear and profitable manner, great care will be requisite, in the outset, that the terms may be clearly defined, and the real points of difference correctly understood.
I. First, then, we inquire, What is implied in the free moral agency of man?
An agent means an actor. A moral agent means an actor whose actions relate to a rule of right and wrong. A free moral agent means an actor whose actions relate to a rule of right and wrong, and who is possessed of liberty, or freedom, in the performance of his actions.
1. As regards the simple question of man's agency, we presume there will be no controversy. It is not contended that man is an agent in the sense of absolute independency. In this sense, there is but one agent in the universe, and that is God. He only possesses the power of action, either physical or moral, in an underived and independent sense. Man, and all other created beings, derived this power from the great Creator, and are dependent on him for its continuance. Yet, in the exercise of derived power, they are capable of acting. In this respect, they are contradistinguished from senseless, inanimate matter, which can only move when acted upon by external force. The distinction here presented is so clear and evident, that such as are either destitute of the capacity to perceive it, or of the fairness to acknowledge it, may at once be dismissed from the present investigation.
2. That man is a moral agent, we think will also be admitted by all who believe in the truth of revelation. The actions of man relate to a rule of right and wrong. He is capable of virtue or vice, and susceptible of blame or praise. This, we suppose, all the advocates of necessity, who believe in the Scriptures, readily admit.
3. The next point in the general definition which we have presented, relates to the freedom, or liberty, which man possesses in the performance of moral action. Here we find the main point of difference between the defenders of free agency and the advocates of necessity. The former contend that, in the exercise of his moral agency, man is not under the absolute necessity of acting as he does, but that he might act differently; while the latter contend that all the acts of man are necessary, in such sense that he cannot act differently from what he does.
It is true, there is a great difference in the manner in which the advocates of necessity choose to express themselves. Some of them, in words, acknowledge the free moral agency of man, and contend that he possesses freedom in the proper sense of the word. This is the ground assumed by President Edwards, of New Jersey, and his numerous adherents. But by this liberty or freedom they understand that man merely has the power of acting according to his will, or, in other words, that he has the liberty "to do as he pleases." This, they say, is freedom in the highest sense, and the only sense in which man can enjoy it.
The definition of liberty, as given by Locke, in his famous "Essays on the Human Understanding," is this: "Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs." Edwards defines it to be, "the power, opportunity, or advantage, that one has to do as he pleases." It will readily be perceived that the meaning of liberty, as given by Locke and Edwards, is the same. On this subject, Edwards borrowed from Locke what the latter had borrowed from Hobbes.
It is upon the above definition, with which Edwards sets out, that his entire system is based; and here, we would say, is the commencement of his grand mistake. He has unfortunately fallen into the common error of the fatalists of every school—that of confounding the liberty of the mind with the motion of the body. Indeed, the above is neither a correct definition of mental nor bodily freedom. It is rather a definition of bodily independence. The power "to act as the mind directs," or "to do as we please," can relate only to bodily action. It presupposes a mental act—a determination of the will—but has nothing to do with the power producing that act or determination. Were we for a moment to suppose the definition of liberty above given to relate to mental action connected with the will, we could not vindicate the profound and learned Locke and Edwards from the charge of having gravely presented as an important definition nothing but an insignificant truism. For, surely, to say that we may will "as the mind directs," or "as we please," is the same as to say we may will as we will.
But that the aforesaid definition, even in the mind of Edwards, had nothing to do with our will, the following quotation will evince: "What is vulgarly called liberty," says Edwards, "namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the cause of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition. In whatever manner a person may come by his choice, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." From this we may see that the notion of liberty contended for by Edwards relates to bodily motion, and not to mental action, and is perfectly consistent with the most absolute fatalism.
Again: the definition of liberty, as given by Edwards, as it does not properly apply to mental action, so neither does it properly apply to the power of bodily action as possessed by man. If liberty, or freedom, means "the power to do as we please," then none but Omnipotence can be free, for who else "can do as they please?" How Edwards could contend for the freedom of man, in his sense of freedom, is difficult to conceive; for surely a little reflection will show that, according to that definition, no man can be free. The subject may be illustrated thus: Suppose I see an individual exposed to imminent danger from the approach of an enemy, or from the burning of a house over his head. The feelings of humanity instantly lead me to will or desire to save him. I exert my utmost strength, but all in vain. Here I have not the power "to do as I please." Hence, according to Edwards, in the above case, I cannot possibly be free. I know it may be said that my immediate will is not to save the man, but only to exert myself in that way. To this I reply, that such is evidently not the case. My prime and governing will is to save him. This precedes, and is the cause of, my willing to put forth the exertions. Indeed, if I did not first will to save the man, I never could will to put forth exertions to that effect. The instance already adduced may satisfy any one that no man has the power "to do as he pleases;" and that consequently, according to Edwards, no man possesses liberty. In this respect, we humbly conceive his definition of freedom implies too much. Freedom does not imply an ability "to do as we please."
But the definition of Edwards is defective in another sense. A man may have the power, in certain cases, "to do as he pleases," and yet not be free. I will illustrate this by a quotation from Mr. Locke: "Liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will, etc. So a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm which it is not in his power by volition, or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear; nobody thinks he has liberty in this; every one pities him as acting by necessity and constraint. Again, there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. Suppose a man be carried, while fast asleep, into a room where is a person he longs to see, and there be locked fast in beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to see himself in so desirable company, in which he stays so willingly—that is, he prefers his staying to going away. Is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it; and yet, being locked fast in, he is not at liberty to stay, he has not freedom to be gone." The example here given by Locke clearly shows that a man may "do as he pleases" while he is fast bound in fetters, and can act in no other way. Consequently, in that case, he cannot enjoy liberty, unless we confound all language, and say that liberty is synonymous with bondage or necessity.
We shall now present, a view of freedom taken by Arminian philosophers and divines, which we conceive to be far more consistent with reason and common sense.
1. By a free agent is understood one capable of acting without being necessitated, or efficiently caused to do so, by something else; and he who has this power is properly possessed of liberty.
2. God is a free agent. It is admitted that God only existed from eternity. Now, as creation was produced by the act of God, when as yet nothing existed but him, it necessarily follows that he acted uncaused by any thing extrinsic to himself; hence he is a free agent in the sense just given.
3. To say that any thing is uncaused, in the proper sense of the word, except God, who only is eternal, is unphilosophical and absurd.
4. Volition in man not being eternal, must be the effect of some cause—that is, it must result from some power capable of producing it. To say that it is uncaused, or that it is the cause of itself, is absurd.
5. That an agent may act without being efficiently caused to do so by something extrinsic to itself, cannot be denied without denying to God the original power of producing creation.
6. The position, that every act of volition must necessarily be either the effect of an external efficient cause, or the effect of a previous act of volition, cannot be sustained without denying that God could originally have produced creation out of nothing. Before he could have exerted creating power, he must have willed to do so; and as nothing then existed but himself, that will could not have been the effect of any external efficient cause, but must have been the operation of his own self-active nature. And to deny that God could have created beings endued with self-active power, (in this respect in his own image,) is to deny his omnipotence.
7. The great question on the subject of free agency is, whether man is capable of self-action or not—not whether he can act independent of God or not, but whether, in the exercise of the power with which God has endued him, he is capable of acting without being necessitated, or efficiently caused to do so, by any thing extrinsic to himself.
8. If man be endued with self-active power, then he is a free agent and properly the author of his own acts; but if he is not thus endued, he is only a passive machine—as really such as any material substance can be—no more the author of his actions than a stock, or a stone.
In entering upon the discussion of the question of free agency, it is important, in the first place, not only to ascertain clearly the precise matter of dispute, but also to understand the peculiar sense in which any ambiguous terms which custom may have employed in the controversy are used. In addition to the definitions and general principles already presented, we think it necessary to premise a few things relative to certain terms in general use by writers on this subject. First, we remark, in reference to the term free will, that it is not philosophically accurate. Strictly speaking, the will is not an agent, but only an attribute or property of an agent; and, of course, freedom, which is also the property of an agent, cannot be properly predicated of the will. Attributes belong to agents or substances, and not to qualities. Nevertheless, the sense in which the term free will is understood, in this connection, is so clear, that we think it would rather savor of affectation to attempt to lay it aside. The mind, or soul, of man is the active, intelligent agent to whom pertain the powers or qualities of freedom and volition; and the will is only the mind acting in a specific way, or it is the power of the mind to act, or not to act, in a specific way.
On this point the writers generally, on both sides in the controversy, have been agreed. President Day says: "It is the man that perceives, and loves, and hates, and acts; not his understanding, or his heart, or his will, distinct from himself."
Professor Upham defines the will to be "the mental power or susceptibility by which we put forth volitions." He also says: "The term will is not meant to express any thing separate from the mind; but merely embodies and expresses the fact of the mind's operating in a particular way." Stewart defines the will to be "that power of the mind of which volition is the act."
We farther remark, that although volition is, in one sense, an effect, yet it is not the passive result of an extrinsic force acting so as to produce it. It is the action of the mind, uncaused by any thing external acting efficiently on the mind. It depends simply on the exercise of those powers with which man has been endued, and which have been placed under his control by the Creator.
The great question in this controversy is not whether a man can will "as he pleases," for that is the same as to ask whether he can will as he does will. But the question is, Can a man will, without being constrained to will as he does, by something extrinsic to himself acting efficiently upon him? This is the real question on which depends the freedom of the mind in willing.
Again: when we speak of a self-active power of man in willing, we are not to understand that this is a lawless exercise of power. The mind is the efficient agent that wills, but this act is performed according to the laws properly belonging to a self-moving, accountable agent. Motives and external circumstances, although they can exercise no active or efficient agency in reference to the will, yet, speaking figuratively, they are properly said to exercise an influence over the mind—that is, they are the conditions or occasions of the mind's action in willing. In this sense, they may be said to influence the will; but this is so far from being an absolute and irresistibly controlling influence, that it is really no proper or efficient influence at all.
The advocates of necessity, in their arguments upon this subject, have generally either not understood, or they have willfully misstated, the ground assumed by their opponents. They have generally reasoned upon the assumption that there is no medium between absolute necessity and perfect independency. Whereas the true doctrine in reference to the freedom of the will, and that assumed by the proper defenders of free agency, is equally aloof from both these extremes. By moral liberty, we neither understand, on the one hand, that the actions of man are so determined by things external to him, as to be bound fast with the cords of necessity; nor, on the other hand, so disconnected with surrounding circumstances, and every thing external, as to be entirely uninfluenced thereby.
The controversy, therefore, between the advocates of necessity and Arminians, or the defenders of free agency, is not whether man is influenced in his will, to any extent, by circumstances, motives, etc., or not; but whether his will is thus absolutely and necessarily controlled, so that it could not possibly be otherwise. If the will of man be absolutely and unconditionally fixed by motives and external causes, so that it is obliged to be as it is, then is the doctrine of necessity, as contended for by Edwards and others, true; but if the will might, in any case, be different from what it is, or if it is to any extent dependent on the self-controlling power with which man is endued, then is the free moral agency of man established, and the whole system of philosophical necessity falls to the ground.
II. We proceed now to consider some of the leading arguments by which the free moral agency of man, as briefly defined above, is established.
1. We rely upon our own consciousness.
By consciousness, we mean the knowledge we have of what passes within our own minds. Thus, when we are angry, we are sensible of the existence of that feeling within us. When we are joyful or sad, we know it. When we love or hate, remember or fear, we are immediately sensible of the fact. The knowledge we possess of this nature is not the result of reasoning; it is not derived from an investigation of testimony, but rises spontaneously in the mind. On subjects of this kind, arguments are superfluous; for, in reference to things of which we are conscious, no reasoning, or external testimony, can have any influence, either to strengthen our convictions, or to cause us to doubt. In vain may we endeavor by argument to persuade the man who feels conscious that his heart is elated with joy, that he is, at the same time, depressed with grief. You cannot convince the sick man, who is racked with pain, that he is in the enjoyment of perfect health; nor the man who exults in the vigor of health and vivacity, that he is writhing under the influence of a painful disease.
Knowledge derived through the medium of consciousness, like that which comes immediately through external sensation, carries upon its face its own demonstration; and so strongly does it impress the soul, that we are compelled to yield ourselves up to the insanity of universal skepticism before we can doubt it for a moment. Here, then, we base our first argument for the proper freedom of the will of man, or, more properly speaking, for the freedom of man in the exercise of the will. Who can convince me that I have not the power either to write or to refrain from writing, either to sit still or to rise up and walk? And this conviction, in reference to a self-determining power of the mind, or a control of the will belonging to ourselves, is universal. Philosophy, falsely so called, may puzzle the intellect, or confuse the understanding, but still the conviction comes upon every man with resistless force, that he has within himself the power of choice. He feels that he exercises this power.
We know the advocates of necessity admit that men generally, at first view of the subject, suppose that they are not necessitated in their volitions, but they assert that this is an illusion which the superior light of philosophy will dissipate. An acute metaphysician has advanced the idea, "that when men only skim the surface of philosophy, they discard common sense; but when they go profoundly into philosophic research, they return again to their earliest dictates of common sense." In the same way, a mere peep into philosophy has caused many, especially such as are predisposed to skepticism, to assert the doctrine of fatality; but a thorough knowledge of true philosophy generally serves to establish our first convictions that we are free in our volitions. Can that philosophy be sound, or that reasoning correct, which would set aside the strongest testimony of our own senses? which would persuade us that it is midnight when we behold the full blaze of the meridian sun? No more can we accredit that mode of reasoning which would uproot the testimony of our own consciousness.
That, in my volitions, I am free to choose good or evil, and not impelled by a necessity as absolute as the laws of gravitation, is a position which I can no more doubt from my own consciousness than I can doubt my own existence. This is evident from the fact that all men have a sense of blame when they do wrong, and of approbation when they do right. Am I charged with the commission of a crime?—convince me that the force of circumstances rendered its avoidance absolutely impossible, and I can no more blame myself in the premises than I can censure the tree that fell upon the traveler as he was journeying on the highway. Remorse for the past depends upon a consciousness of our freedom for its very existence. This conviction of freedom is so indelible and universal on the minds of men, that no human effort can erase it. It may be smothered or obscured for a season in the minds of sophisticated reasoners, but in the hours of sober honesty it will regain its position, and reassert its dominion, even over the minds of such men as Voltaire, Hume, and Edwards, who have discarded it in their philosophy.
2. Our next argument for the self-determining power of the mind over the will is founded upon the history of the world in general.
Turn your attention to any portion or to any period of the world's history, and you find among all nations, in their very language and common modes of speech, terms and phrases expressive of the power which all men possess of determining, or being the authors of their own wills. You will find men speaking of the acts of their minds and the determinations of their wills as though they were free. And you will also find terms expressive of blame and of praise, clearly recognizing the principle that when a man does wrong he is blamed, because he might and should have avoided the wrong. In all countries it is a fact that, in public estimation, a man's guilt is extenuated in proportion as the impediments in the way of avoiding the crime are increased; and upon the same principle, when the difficulties in the way of avoiding the act are absolutely insurmountable, no one is then blamed for doing the unavoidable act.
Again: the laws of all civilized nations punish the criminal upon the supposition that he might have avoided the crime. And if it could be made appear that, in the act in question, the man was not a self-willing agent, but was only a tool used by the force of others which he had not the power to resist, in this case, there is not a government upon earth that would not as readily punish the sword of the assassin as that man who was merely a passive instrument, having no power to resist.
Why, we might ask, are rewards and punishments connected with the statutory provisions of all countries, and held out before the community, if it be not to encourage to virtue and to deter from vice? And why should these sanctions be exhibited to the subjects of all civilized governments, if men have no power to influence their own wills? Will you exhibit motives and inducements to excite them to endeavor to control their wills, when they really possess no such power? I know it may be said that these motives are designed to fix, by a necessary and invincible influence, the will itself, independent of any active agency in the man. Nothing can be more absurd and contrary to fact than such a supposition. If motives are to fix the character of the will necessarily, why is the man called upon to attend to the motives, to weigh them carefully, and make a correct decision in reference to their real weight?
A farther consideration of the doctrine of motives will be assigned to another chapter. Under the present head we only add that all men, in all ages and in all places, have treated each other as though they believed they were free agents. If we discard this doctrine, and assert the principles of necessity, we must change universal customs which have stood from time immemorial, and rend the very foundations of society. If man be not a free agent, why is he held bound for the fulfillment of his promise, and censured in the failure thereof? Why is he held up as an object of scorn and detestation for any crime under heaven?
Why, we might ask, are jails and penitentiaries, and various modes of punishment, more or less severe, everywhere prevalent in civilized lands? If the advocates of necessity really believe in the truth of their system, let them be consistent, and go throughout the civilized world and plead for the destruction of all terms of language expressive of blame or praise; let them decry the unjustifiable prejudice of nations, by which benevolence and virtue have been applauded, and selfishness and vice contemned. Let them proclaim it abroad, that the robber and the murderer are as innocent as the infant or the saint, since all men only act as they are necessarily acted upon; and let them teach all nations to abolish at once and forever every description of punishment for crime or misdemeanor. Such would be the consistent course for sincere necessitarians.
3. Our third evidence of man's proper free agency is founded upon the divine administration toward him, as exhibited in the Holy Scriptures.
Here we shall perceive that revelation beautifully harmonizes with nature; and those clear and decisive evidences of our free agency, which, as we have seen, are derived from experience and observation, are abundantly confirmed by the book of God. (1) We see this, first, in contemplation of the condition in which man was placed immediately after his creation. A moral law was given him to keep, and a severe penalty annexed to its transgression. Upon the supposition that man was not made a free agent, God must have known it; and if so, under these circumstances to have given him a moral law for the government of his actions, would have been inconsistent with the divine wisdom; for a moral law, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong, can only be adapted to beings capable of doing both right and wrong.
Suppose, when the Almighty created man capable of walking erect upon the earth, but incapable of flying in the air like the fowls of heaven, he had given him a law forbidding him to walk, and commanding him to fly, every intelligent being would at once perceive the folly of such a statute. And wherefore? Simply because man has no power to fly, and therefore to command him to do so must be perfectly useless. But suppose, in addition to the command requiring an impossibility, the severest penalty had been annexed to its violation, the administration would not only be charged with folly, but it would be stamped with cruelty of the deepest dye. Suppose again, that, circumstanced as man was in his creation, the law of God had commanded him to breathe the surrounding atmosphere, and to permit the blood to circulate in his veins, and a glorious promise of reward had been annexed to obedience. In this case, also, the law would universally be pronounced an evidence of folly in the Lawgiver; and why so? Because obedience flows naturally from the constitution of man. He can no more avoid it than a leaden ball let loose from the hand can avoid the influence of gravitation. In the former supposition, obedience was impossible, for man can no more fly than he can create a world; in the latter, disobedience is impossible, for man can no more prevent the circulation of his blood than he can stop the sun in his course. But in both cases the administration is marked with folly. Thus it is seen that a moral law can only be given to a being capable of both right and wrong. Hence, as God gave man a moral law for the government of his actions, he must have been a free moral agent, capable alike of obedience and of disobedience.
We think it impossible for the unbiased mind to read the history of the creation and fall of man, and not feel that in that case God treated him as a free moral agent. Upon the supposition that the will, and all the actions of man, are necessarily determined by the operation of causes over which he has no control, (according to the principles of necessity,) the administration of God, in the history of the fall of man, is represented as more silly and cruel than ever disgraced the reign of the meanest earthly tyrant! Against the administration of the righteous Governor of the universe, shall such foul charges be brought? Forbid it, reason! Forbid it, truth! Forbid it, Scripture!
Can a rational man believe that God would so constitute Adam in paradise as to make his eating of the forbidden fruit result as necessarily from his unavoidable condition as any effect from its cause, and then, with a pretense of justice, and a claim to goodness, say, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die"? Surely, most surely, not. The whole history of the Fall, in the light of reason, of common sense, and in view of all that we know of the divine character and government, proclaims, in language clear and forcible, the doctrine of man's free moral agency.
Milton has most beautifully commented upon this subject, supposing God to speak in reference to man:
I made him just and right; Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. Such I created all the ethereal powers— Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. Not free, what proof could they have given sincere Of true allegiance, constant faith, or love, Where only what they needs must do appeared, Not what they would? What praise could they receive? What pleasure I, from such obedience paid, When will and reason, (reason also is choice,) Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled, Made passive both, had served necessity, Not me? They therefore, as to right belonged, So were created—— So, without least impulse or shadow of fate, Or aught by me immutably foreseen, They trespass; authors to themselves in all Both what they judge, and what they choose; for so I formed them free; and free they must remain, Till they enthrall themselves. I else must change Their nature, and reverse the high decree. Unchangeable, eternal, which ordained Their freedom; they themselves ordained their fall."
(2) In the next place, the Scriptures everywhere address man as a being capable of choosing; as possessing a control over his own volitions, and as being held responsible for the proper exercise of that control.
In Deut, xxx. 19, we read: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." And in Joshua xxiv. 15: "Choose you this day whom ye will serve."
Now, to choose is to determine or fix the will; but men are here called upon to choose for themselves, which, upon the supposition that their will is, in all cases, fixed necessarily by antecedent causes beyond their control, is nothing better than solemn mockery.
Our Saviour, in Matt. xxiii, 37, complains of the Jews: "How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" Again, in John v. 40, our Lord says: "Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life."
These, and numerous other passages of a similar import, refer expressly to the will of men as being under their own control. And to put the matter beyond dispute, men are here not only held responsible for the character of their will, but they are actually represented as justly punishable on that account. In the instance of Christ lamenting over Jerusalem, and complaining, "How often would I have gathered," etc., "and ye would not," the punishment is announced in the words which immediately follow: "Behold your house is left unto you desolate." Now, the question is, can the Saviour of the world, in terms of the deepest solemnity, upbraid men for the obstinacy of their wills, and denounce against them the severest punishment for the same, if the whole matter is determined by necessity, and no more under their control than the revolutions of the planets? According to the notion of President Edwards and others; the will is as necessarily fixed by antecedent causes as any effect whatever is by its appropriate cause. If so, the agency of man can have no influence in determining his will, and consequently he cannot in justice be held accountable and punishable for the same. But as we have shown the Scriptures hold man accountable and punishable for his will, consequently it cannot be determined by necessity, but must be, in the true sense, dependent on man's own proper agency.
(3) In the last place, we argue the proper freedom of the human will from the doctrine of a general judgment, and future rewards and punishments, as set forth in the Scriptures.
Here we need not enlarge. That all men are responsible to God for all the determinations of their will, and that in a future day they will be judged, and rewarded or punished accordingly, are matters expressly taught in the Scriptures. Now, according to the necessitarian scheme, how, we ask, can these things be reconciled with the divine attributes? As well might we suppose that an all-wise and merciful Being would arraign before his bar, and punish, or reward, the water for running downward, or the sparks for flying upward. As well might he punish the foot because it is not the hand, or the hand because it is not the eye. As well might he reward or punish the fish for swimming in the sea, or the birds for flying in the air! If such a procedure would universally be pronounced absurd in the extreme, we ask, upon the supposition that the will of man is determined by antecedent or external causes, as necessarily as the laws of nature, where is the difference? Every argument that would show absurdity in the one case, would, in all fairness, show the same in the other.
(4) In conclusion, upon this part of the subject, we think it proper briefly to notice the absurdity of attempting to reconcile the doctrines of necessity with the proper freedom and accountability of man.
This, President Edwards and many others have labored hard to accomplish. They have contended that, although the will is irresistibly fixed by necessity, yet man is properly a free and accountable moral agent, merely because he has a will, acts voluntarily, and is not, by natural force, constrained to go contrary to his will. The names by which things are called cannot, in the least, alter their nature. Hence, to load man with the ennobling epithets of moral agency, freedom, liberty, accountability, etc., while we bind him fast with the cords of necessity, can never tend in the least to slacken those cords, or to mend his condition.
To say that a man enjoys freedom merely because he has liberty to obey his will, when that will is fixed by necessity, is as absurd as to contend that a man enjoys freedom in a civil sense merely because he is at liberty to obey the laws under which he is placed, when those laws are enacted by a cruel tyrant over whom he has no control, and are only a collection of bloody edicts. Would any man contend that because he had the privilege of acting according to such a system of laws, thus arbitrarily imposed upon him, he was therefore in the enjoyment of freedom in the most rational sense? Far from it. And why? Simply because the oppressed subject would require an agency in making those laws. So long as this is denied him, and he feels upon his neck the galling yoke of tyranny, in vain might you endeavor to solace him by enlarging upon his exalted privilege of obeying the law. You might assure him that no natural force could constrain him to go contrary to the law, and that consequently he is possessed of freedom in the proper sense, but all would be in vain. He would only feel that you were mocking at his chains!
We now appeal to the candid mind to determine if this is not precisely the kind of moral freedom which President Edwards allows to man, on account of which he strongly pleads that he is properly a free agent and justly accountable. Most unquestionably it is. He contends that man is a free moral agent because he may do as he wills, when his will is as unalterably fixed by necessity as the pillars of heaven. Such liberty as the above can no more render its possessor a free, accountable moral agent, than that possessed by a block or a stone.
Indeed, there is no difference between the liberty attributed to man by the learned President of Princeton College, and that possessed by a block of marble as it falls to the earth when let loose from the top of a tower. We may call the man free because he may act according to his will or inclination, while that will is determined by necessity; but has not the marble precisely the same freedom? It has perfect liberty to fall; it is not constrained by natural force to move in any other direction. If it falls necessarily, even so, on the principle of Edwards, man acts necessarily. If it be said that the marble cannot avoid falling as it does, even so man cannot avoid acting according to his will, just as he does. If it be said that he has no disposition, and makes no effort, to act contrary to his will, even so the marble has no inclination to fall in any other direction than it does. The marble moves freely, because it has no inclination to move otherwise; but it moves necessarily, because irresistibly impelled by the law of gravitation. Just so man acts freely, because he acts according to his will; but he acts necessarily, because he can no more change his will than he can make a world.
And thus it is plain that, although necessitarians may say they believe in free agency and man's accountability, it is a freedom just such as pertains to lifeless matter. If, according to Edwards, man is free, and justly accountable for his actions merely because he acts according to his own will, when he has no control over that will, upon the same principle the maniac would be a free, accountable agent. If, in a paroxysm of madness, he murders his father, he acts according to his will. It is a voluntary act, and necessitarians cannot excuse him because his will was not under his own control; for, in the view of their system, it was as much so as the will of any man in any case possibly can be. The truth is, it is an abuse of language to call that freedom which binds fast in the chains of necessity. Acting voluntarily amounts to no liberty at all, if I cannot possibly act otherwise than I do.
The question is, not whether I have a will, nor whether I may act according to my will, but What determines the will? This is the point to be settled in the question of free agency. It is admitted that the will controls the actions; but who controls the will? As the will controls the actions, it necessarily follows that whoever controls the will must be accountable for the actions. Whoever controls the will must be the proper author of all that necessarily results from it, and consequently should be held accountable for the same. But man, say necessitarians, has no control whatever over his will. It is fixed by necessity just as it is, so that it could no more be otherwise than the effect could cease to result from the cause.
According to this, we may talk as we may about free agency, the liberty of the will, accountability, etc., but man, after all the embellishment we can impart, is a free, accountable agent, just in the same sense as the most insignificant particle of lifeless matter. Here we will close the present chapter by calling to mind what we have endeavored to exhibit.
1. We have endeavored to explain what is implied in the proper free moral agency of man.
2. We have endeavored to establish that doctrine by the evidence of consciousness; by an observation of the history of the world; and by an appeal to the divine administration as set forth in the Scriptures. Let the reader decide.
Looks like a good one!
This is the next chapter in the Ralston's Elements. It deals with Calvinistic and necessitarian objections to moral free agency.
I could, with the weapons of a rigorous and precise Logic, easily enough dissect each and every paragraph of the author's locquacious flim-flammery -- as though to gorge myself in a feast upon his thousand logical vulnerabilities.
But it seems to me, that same rigorous Logic impels me to (at least temporarily) ignore the adiaphora of the author's many other weaknesses, and strike directly at the heart of what I adjudge to be the most Heretical and Damning Error in his entire convoluted chain of thought:
Hmmm.... Yet again we see the truth of the matter: Scratch the surface of an Arminian heretic, and underneath you are all-too-likely to find a sacrilegious "Open Theist". Do you agree, with the author, that "the most beautiful comment" made in support of his thesis is the contention that God DID NOT FORESEE the Fall of Man?
THIS is your "option C"?? Egads. Like Arminianism itself, it is Blasphemy most foul.
If NOT, then I would remind you: you have a question to answer:
A, or B. Pick one, and we'll proceed.
No, my little schoolboy; the most damning and heretical error in the piece was Ralston's quotation of the Arminian John Milton's Paradise Lost.
Milton's Fall from Presbyterian Calvinism is well-known enough.
Now go do your homework.
I stand corrected. I have my own copy, however, and Ralston abridged it. The full text is less open to your attacks. Book III, lines 103-128:
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have giv'n sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where only what they needs must do, appear'd,
Not what they would? what praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil'd,
Made passive both, had serv'd necessity,
Not mee. They therefore as to right belong'd,
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Their maker, or their making, or their Fate;
As if Predestination over-rul'd
Their will, dispos'd by absolute Decree
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less prov'd certain unforeknown.
So without least impulse [impelling] or shadow of Fate,
Or aught by me immutably foreseen,
They trespass, Authors to themselves in all
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I form'd them free, and free they must remain,
Til they enthrall themselves: I else must change
Their nature, and revoke the high Decree
Unchangeable, Eternal, which ordain'd
Their freedom, they themselves ordain'd their fall.
You do yourself too much credit. I just got tired of explaining the same points over and over again.
Oh, that's what you were doing. I thought you were just being petulant.
I'll agree that the Full Text is less open to my attacks.
But at best -- that excuses Milton of the charge of Heresy, not Ralston.
You would have us accept the argument of a Heretic who butchered John Milton's Paradise Lost into a Denial of God's Foreknowledge of the Fall of Man... and then had the audacity to call his HERETICAL mutilation of Milton "a most beautiful commentary" in support of his thesis!!
Incidentally, Ralston horrifically botches the nature of God's Omniscience in his second Essay, also. And like his first essay, it is easy enough to blow his entire argument completely out of the water by the evisceration of a single Damning Error.
But I'm hardly disposed to waste my time and intellect upon this Fool's (I use the term in the Proverbial sense) subsequent Error when he has so butchered John Milton as to endorse an outright Blasphemy, and called this blasphemy a thing "most beautiful", in his very first, foundational Essay.
Counterpoint: Does God justify those whom he has died for?
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