Within the space of a few months in 1950, the United States had taken the big leap from attaching no strategic importance to Korea to active involvement there in a major armed conflict. Its active Army of 591,000 had been focused on Soviet intentions in western Europe and occupation duty in Europe and the Far East. The four divisions under MacArthurs Far East Command in Japan were performing primarily occupation duties, and their actual readiness level for conventional combat was even lower than their marginal statistical ratings indicated. Each of MacArthurs divisions was about 7,000 men short of its authorized strength of 18,900, and none of them had received any new equipment since World War II. MacArthur had not fully supported development of the ROK Army, and in 1948 he had suggested merely expanding the ROK Constabulary. When the ROK minister of defense in 1949 requested M26 Pershing tanks from America, the KMAG argued that the Korean terrain and roads would not allow tank operations, a clearly inaccurate prediction of the Soviet T34 tanks performance in South Korea during the wars early stages. When USAFIK withdrew from South Korea in 1949, it did transfer to the ROK Army individual weapons and equipment sufficient for 50,000 men, but these small arms were incapable of repelling enemy armored attacks. America failed to anticipate the North Korean invasion, and KMAG erred in concluding that the ROK Army could withstand an invasion if it happened. Nevertheless, when the attack came the United States decided to intervene on behalf of South Korea. President Truman authorized air and naval support early in the conflict and the progressive introduction of ground troops. The defeat of Task Force Smith underscored the importance of adequate prewar training along with armored and air support in combat operations. Further, MacArthur underestimated the skill and determination of the North Koreans but recognized his error when he concluded that more than four U.S. divisions were needed to defeat the enemy. The combined efforts of the U.S. and ROK Armies led by General Walker, complemented by air and naval superiority, slowed the southward drive of the North Koreans and ended in a difficult but successful defense of the Pusan Perimeter. The fighting was intense as reflected in American casualties to mid-September 19504,599 battle deaths, 12,058 wounded, 401 reported captured, and 2,107 reported missing in action. The bitter weeks of retreat and death would soon change, however, with MacArthurs "hammer against the anvil": the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter coupled with the landing at Inchon by the 1st Marine Division and the Armys 7th Infantry Division during the third week of September. |
Holy moly!
The definitive write-off of Korea as an important strategic area came when the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that no military security guarantee should be extended to the Republic of Korea because such action would risk a major war in an area where Russia would have nearly all the natural advantages. As a result, the President, on 4 April 1948, approved a policy that stated: "The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States." From that moment, Korea was of secondary importance to U.S. planners and policy makers. [22] General MacArthur had been relieved of his responsibility for defending Korea when the last American tactical units had been withdrawn from that country in 1949.
In mid-1949 General Omar N. Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, challenged the national policy toward Korea. On the eve of the withdrawal of the last American combat troops from the peninsula, General Bradley suggested taking the Korean question again to the National Security Council. He feared that U.S. withdrawal might be followed by an invasion from the north. He had had his staff review the courses of action open to the United States in such an eventuality, and as a result he recommended that, if an invasion took place, the U.S. nationals be evacuated and the aggression immediately be presented to the United Nations Security Council as a threat to the peace. A U.N. composite military force might be considered as a last resort. [23]
Phil's phootnote: Why, Uncle Joe wouldn't take advantage of this namby-pamby admission of weakness, now, would he?
[See also, Glaspy, April: "Help yourself to Kuwait, Saddam, it's just a reeeejunul affair."]
The constitution was revised during the 10th term of the 5th Supreme People's Assembly (held in September 1998) to include a new preface promulgating Kim Il-sung as the "Supreme Leader Eternal". The revised constitution was officially termed the 'Kim Il-sung Constitution', which became the epitome of the posthumous idolization process.
In fact many enlightened political leaders believe a constitution to be such a "living document".
The apparent french-Communist candidate for president, Jean-Fraud Kommie (Twinkie-Malaisechusetts), scolded the capitalist-imperialist-militarist running dogs of the decadent west for their dangerous illusions of "freedom"--