The FReeper Foxhole Revisits The Battle of 73 EASTING - 1991 -Jan. 22, 2005

see educational sources | 1997 | Stephen A. Bourque

[snippy_about_it]

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THE CENTER OF THE LINE

Soon after the Tawakalna Division Commander's 18th Mechanized Brigade was engaged, the US attack spread to the center of his line. The Iraqi defense in this sector consisted of three mechanized battalions from the Tawakalna 29th Mechanized Brigade, and three armored and one mechanized from the 9th Armored Brigade. In addition, there was at least one battalion of the 46th Mechanized Brigade from the 12th Armored Division. There is also evidence that at least one T-62 tank battalion, most likely from the 10th Armored Division, was also assigned to the Tawakalna in this sector. Approximately nine Iraqi battalions, therefore, faced the attacking 3rd US Armored Division's ten heavy battalions. In a space of only 270 square kilometers, Iraqi defenders massed over 160 tanks, 117 BMPs, and hundreds of other combat vehicle, and fighting systems. Thousands of infantry men dismounted from their combat carriers. Once on the ground, they constructed their dug in company strong points and prepared to use their Saggers and RPGs to engage the attacking Americans. Finally, there were approximately a dozen field artillery batteries arrayed along the rear of the Tawakalna's operations zone in this sector. The Iraqi defenses were very thick and Major General Paul Funk, the 3rd Armored Division commander, had no soft or exposed Iraqi flanks to exploit in his attack. He attacked with his 2nd Brigade in the north, his 1st Brigade in the south, and his 3rd Brigade in the rear trailing the 1st Brigade.



The 1st US Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division moved in the south of the 3rd Armored Division's sector on a relatively narrow zone. At 5:02 pm, 26 February, it ran into a battalion of the 9th Iraqi Armored Brigade. The lead American company team, from Task Force 3-5 Cavalry, established a base of fire as two other company teams moved on line. Not inclined to assault hastily the center of this complex, the entire 3-5 Cavalry moved into firing positions and began to locate and shoot at Iraqi targets. Long-range tank and TOW fires, high explosive and DPICM rounds, and even COPPERHEAD rounds ravaged the Iraqi 9th Armored Brigade's battalion strong points. The Iraqi soldiers, however, continued to fight, preventing this American battalion from advancing any farther for the next 12 hours.

In the dark, around 7:20 pm, a scout platoon from the brigade's left-flank battalion Task Force 4-32 Armor, identified a T-72 tank covered with infantry heading towards them from the southeast. In a short and confused fight, the scouts destroyed the tank and scattered its passenger infantry. Soon, a platoon of Iraqi T-72s supported by dismounted infantry joined the fight. By 9:00 pm, Task-Force 4-32 Armor's fight in this sector came to an end. It had made little progress in its zone and had shot up one of its own Bradley scout vehicles, killing two soldiers and wounding two more. The Iraqi line continued to hold.


Iraqi soldiers surrender to allied forces after fleeing their burning APC, with a mine-plow equipped M1A1 Abrams in the background.

The US 4/7 Cavalry Squadron, a new unit working for the divison commander and acting independently from the 1st Brigade, screened the division's southern flank. Around 6:00 pm it ran into an Iraqi tank unit. Like other Iraqi defenders, the Iraqi unit, most likely a tank unit, was hastily dug in and was waiting for a fight. The 4/7 Cavalry's Bradleys were out of their element in such an engagement against Iraqi tanks. After more than an hour of fighting and making no progress, the 4/7 Cavalry began to pull back from the position where the Iraqis were dug in. In the confusion of the withdrawal, a US tank from an approaching unit fired at one of the Cavalry's Bradleys, killing the gunner. Another 4/7 Cavalry vehicle was engaged by the US 2nd Armored Cavalry in the south. In the middle of this confusion, Iraqi fire hit and damaged nine of 13 M3 Cavalry fighting vehicles in addition to the two hit by friendly fire. Two soldiers of the 4/7 Cavalry were killed and 12 were wounded in the battle. When given the opportunity, the Iraqi Army could inflict serious losses on the attacking American forces.

The Iraqi 9th Armored Brigade had stopped the advance of the US 1st Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division. In 12 hours and despite overwhelming fire power, this American brigade had moved forward only four kilometers. That minor tactical success, however, had little effect on the battle's overall outcome. Before 9:00 pm, Major General Funk determined that his main effort was in the northern portion of his sector of operations, and prepared a deliberate attack to destroy the Iraqi units in the 2d Brigade's zone of operations.

Funk's main effort was in the northern portion of his sector where the 2nd Brigade attacked. Waiting less than ten kilometers behind the 2nd Brigade, was the 3rd Brigade. Its four battalions were eager to get into the fight at the first opportunity. Until 5:20 pm the 2nd Brigade moved in a wedge formation-with Task Force 4-8 Cavalry in the lead, Task Force 4-18 Infantry on the left and TF 3-8 Cavalry on the right-slowly through the Iraqi 29th Mechanized Brigade's security zone, constantly fighting isolated Iraqi vehicles. Like its counterparts in the adjacent sector, this brigade of Iraqis prepared its defenses according to doctrine. Bunkers, dug in vehicles, and pre-planned fires, backed by determined soldiers, made a formidable defense.



Funk now ordered his divisional artillery to pound the Iraqi positions with all the indirect fire he had available. Almost five battalions of artillery fired at identified and suspected targets in a nine square kilometer box. Then Funk ordered the launching of the 2-27 Attack Helicopter Battalion across the forward line of US troops and into the depths of the Iraqi operations zone. At 10:00 pm the 2nd brigade's three battalions and supporting artillery undertook a coordinated combined arms attack. For the next four hours disciplined 2d Brigade tank and Bradley crews moved through the 29th Mechanized Brigade's operations zone.

US tank companies bounded forward by platoons, using their thermal sights and stand-off range to engage Iraqi vehicles on their own terms. Out-ranged and unable to locate the source of the accurate fire they were receiving, the Republican Guard soldiers returned fire without any noticeable effect. Attack helicopters and multiple rocket launchers destroyed Iraqi artillery almost as soon as they fired. As the brigade line moved forward, Iraqi infantry forces emerged from their hiding places and tried to engage US tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from close range. These Iraqi soldiers had little chance of success as a line of infantry fighting vehicles, moving just behind the tanks, killed them with machine-gun fire.

The Iraqi 29th Brigade commander continued to resist the American advance. He directed several counter-attacks by armored and mechanized platoons and companies. Many of those were effectively targeted against the 2nd Brigade's left flank, but concentrated tank, Bradley, and artillery fire stopped these attacks before they could interfere with the 2nd Brigade's progress. It was a confusing mèlée, with rounds flying in all directions. By 2:00 am, 27 February, the 2nd Brigade had fought through the 29th Iraqi Brigade's first defensive echelon. The situation was now right for Funk to order the 3rd Brigade forward. That morning it passed through the 2nd Brigade's front line and started the 3rd Armored Division's attack at the rear of the Tawakalna Division, and beyond.



The 3rd Armored Division's battle against the Tawakalna illustrates that good tactics are just as important as good technology. Had Funk chosen to attack the Iraqi defenses without evaluating the enemy, deciding on a main effort, massing his forces and using his tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, attack helicopters and field artillery as they were designed, the outcome might have been different. At the same time that American units were overwhelming the Tawakalna's left and center, another heavy division assaulted its exposed right flank.

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Today's Educational Sources and suggestions for further reading:
www.ciar.org/~ttk/mbt/mbt/mbt.at-desert-storm.bourque.html
The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Battle of 73 EASTING - 1991 - Mar. 10th, 2003

[snippy_about_it]

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(NORTH) RIGHT FLANK

While most of the Tawakalna Division commander's attention was focused to his division's front, its right flank was about to be attacked by a fourth American unit, the 1st Armored Division. Major General Ron Griffith's primary military target had been the Medina Division about thirty kilometers father east, but one battalion of the Tawakalna's 29th Mechanized Brigade occupied positions in Griffith's 1st Armored Division's zone of operations. That Iraqi battalion lay directly in the path of Colonel Dan Zanini's (one of Griffith's three maneuver brigades) 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division.



Colonel Zanini synchronized the fight to maximize his fire power and minimize battlefield confusion. Artillery, Apache attack helicopters and mechanized infantry fired their weapons at the Iraqi defenders in order to prevent them from returning accurate fire as one of his tank battalions (Task Force 1-37 Armor) began moving in the dark towards the Iraqi defenses. This battalion's forty-five M1A1 tanks moved abreast towards the Iraqis at less than ten kilometers per hour. About 1,000 meters behind the tanks moved the battalion's infantry company mounted on its Bradleys, to help destroy any threat to their rear. As the tanks moved forward, the overwatching infantry battalion began firing illumination rounds from its mortar platoon. The brigade commander then turned the fight over to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ed Dyer.

As was the case with the entire Tawakalna division, the Iraqi soldiers fought hard. Many Iraqi tanks kept their engines off in order to defeat the American thermal sights. Those vehicles were often located because of the strange white spots, the tank commander's head, seemingly suspended in thin air. The Iraqi tanks that were not hit were able to turn their turrets and attack the M1s in their flanks and rear. Iraqi infantry moved in three to five second rushes in order to get close to attacking vehicles. Burning vehicles and explosions "washed out" the thermal sights and made it difficult for US forces to locate Iraqi tanks. In that confusion, the 29th Iraqi Armored Brigade knocked out four M1 tanks, wounding six US soldiers.



The Iraqi brigade, however, never had a chance. It was attacked by Task Force 1/37 Armor, the tank battalion with the best gunnery skills in the entire US Army.60 When TF 1/37 had completed its assault, the Iraqi unit was in shambles. Because of luck, training, and the effectiveness of the Abrams' enhanced armor, there were no American fatalities. In the sector swept by the 1st Brigade, two Iraqi tank companies and one mechanized infantry company (approximately 24 T-72 tanks and 14 BMP infantry fighting vehicles) had become burning hulks.

THE DEEP BATTLE

At the same time the American ground forces were demolishing the front line of the Tawakalna, US attack helicopters, jet aircraft, and artillery were simultaneously attacking the Iraqi division throughout the depth of its defensive zone. The primary targets included artillery batteries, command posts and supply depots.


Iraqi soldiers with their T62 tanks anxiously await a U.S. officer, to discuss a site for official surrender talks.

As soon as the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment made contact with the Tawakalna Division around 4:30 pm, 26 February, the battle began. Artillery from the Regiment's field artillery batteries and the 210 Field Artillery Brigade pounded the second line of Iraqi troops. Those missions destroyed troops and supply installations and interfered with the Tawakalna's command and control. The 2/1 Attack Helicopter Battalion, working for the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, struck at artillery and support areas to the rear of the Iraqi lines. It destroyed at least two artillery batteries and dozens of vehicles and support installations along the IPSA Pipeline road.

This assault continued until the 1st US Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 1/1 Attack Helicopter Battalion then attacked the 18th Iraqi Mechanized and 9th Iraqi Armored Brigade's second line of troops at 9:00 pm, on 26 February. The attack prevented the Iraqi artillery from interfering with the 1st Infantry's passage of lines. From the time the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment made contact, on the night of 26 February, until the following morning when the 1st Infantry Division cleared Objective Norfolk, the Iraqi soldiers of the 18th and 37th Brigades received no respite from constant ground, artillery, and air attack.


British troops guard captured Iraqi armor and weapons in the Kuwaiti desert.

The situation was the same in the US 3rd Armored Division zone of operations. Its constant pounding of Iraqi combat and combat service support units made Iraqi counterattacks, resupply or reinforcement almost impossible. Those incessant attacks destroyed Iraqi artillery, broke up units assembling for counter-attacks, and thoroughly disrupted Iraqi command and control. When the 3rd Brigade passed through at dawn on 27 February, there were no more Iraqi strong points to slow the attack. The Iraqi commander had no way of countering the effects of these deep attacks. He had no choice but to stand and fight or surrender. Most of the soldiers in this proud division, like its commander, fought and died.

[snippy_about_it]

CONCLUSIONS

Soon after the 1st Armored Division's attack started at 8 PM on 26 February, the 3rd Armored Division launched an attack just to the south of the 1st Division. One hour later, the 1st Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and captured all of Objective Norfolk. Franks had wanted to slam into the Republican Guards with a "three division fist." That is exactly what he did. Franks defeated the Tawakalna Division by massing six brigades and an armored cavalry regiment against it, and flanking it to the north and south with two more brigades. Attack helicopters and long range artillery systems had bombed the Tawakalna beforehand.

The Tawakalna division commander, who probably perished in the battle, never had an opportunity to maneuver, use reserves, or even use his artillery with any effect. His spirited defense, however, confirmed Frank's concern that the Republican Guard did not enter the battle already defeated. They did not run away, and fought with extreme bravery. American battle reports cite the bravery of the determined Tawakalna defenders. This division had good equipment. Unfortunately, they did not know how to use it fully. For example, they did not know how to employ their equipment to ensure that they had local security, allowing the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment to gain contact with them without discovery. The Tawakalna division was unable, regularly, to hit the targets at which they aimed with their tanks and anti-tank guided missiles. Seldom did the Tawakalna division effectively use their artillery or air defense artillery.



More important than problems in using equipment, The Tawakalna division was simply, overwhelmed. It was the application of the US Army's Airland Battle doctrine, executed by well-trained, equipped and motivated soldiers, that defeated the Iraqi forces. By dawn on 27 February 1991, the Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division had ceased to exist.

With the destruction of the Tawakalna Division, Franks was able to focus the combat power of the 7th Corps towards the other heavy divisions of the Republican Guard Forces Command. Although part of the Medina Division would stand and fight against the 1st US Armored Division, the Iraqi high command ordered the Hammurabi Division to start moving north, across the Euphrates River and away from the American attack in the west. The Tawakalna Division's defense gave the remainder of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait the time it needed to evacuate most of its mechanized forces to Basra.

[snippy_about_it]

Thanks to Phil Dragoo for the following pics and text from the original thread.
The 65th Colonel of the Regiment L.D. Holder

"Today's leaders and planners must understand Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI) as a part of deployment and employment. Contingency offensives will differ substantially. They will tend toward bare sufficiency because the Army will be smaller and have fewer "troops available." The need for speed and size constraints of strategic deployments will also affect the nature of force-projection offensives. RSOI will continue directly into the offensive in many cases. Commanders of attacking forces will, therefore, have to make hard decisions of timing and will be forced to weigh greater risks than those faced by the commanders of larger forward-deployed forces. Among those are the risks of attacking too soon before the full potential of the deploying force is developed and of waiting too long, thus allowing the original aggressor to solidify his defense. The bold, decisive, risktakers, idealized by Army doctrine, will have to get even bolder (wiser, too, in all likelihood) to effectively build and track combat power."

--LTG L. D. Holder, former Commander,

Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth

[snippy_about_it]

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[Iris7]

Can't resist being #1.

How is the virus coming? Easy to sympathize with you, having just got over one.

[Diver Dave]

That tank blowed up real good! :)

[snippy_about_it]

LOL. You are #1 no matter when you get here. ;-)

I feel much better today. I'm hoping recovery continues. I'm sick and tired of being sick and tired!

Thanks for your kind thoughts. Keep 'em coming.

[snippy_about_it]

LOL. It sure did! Hiya D.D.

[Iris7]

You can bet your last dollar that the Iranians have studied 73 Easting assiduously. Don't know what that will mean. Perhaps the recent Iranian bluster is the old maskirovka (as Sun Tsu put it) "Where weak, appear strong. Where strong, appear weak."

Be nice to have the Russians along for an Iran operation. The long Iranian northern border is a natural for the Russian style operation. Make the Iranians split their forces, hey.

Don't like to see the heavy anti-Russian propaganda in the Big Media. Very not good. Comes time to, ahem, "negotiate" with China a few Russian Army Fronts on the Chinese northern border would sure be nice. Perhaps Dr. Rice can make a contribution on this one.

The "fratricide" stories are sad. Just no such thing as "friendly fire".

Once upon a time some buds and I were returning "home" way too late at night, full dark, from the enlisted man's club at a CB (Sea Bee) base. We were invited as good buds for, hmm, helping the CBs with a difficult "requisition."

Ran into a Marine mortar fire interdiction mission, a very sobering experience. The ground was so sandy that the mortar rounds were burying themselves somewhat so the fragments cleared my behind, all but one. Got a Kerry scratch out of that, but never crossed my mind to go for a Heart, like our would be Glorious Leader did. You should have seen me, trying to swim right into that sand!

[SAMWolf]

Morning Snippy.

[SAMWolf]

Morning Iris7.

Number 1 is good. :-)

[SAMWolf]

Morning DD.

Watching Iraqi armor blow up live during Operation Iraqi Freedom was satisfying to watch.

[SAMWolf]

I remember de-assing a Duece and a half in record time when we came under mortar attack. It seemed that the ground couldn't get low enough for me. It felt like I was the tallest thing around.

[Aeronaut]

Good morning Snippy.

[E.G.C.]

Good morning, snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole.

[GailA]

Good morning

[alfa6]

Saturday Morning Alberta Clipper Bump for The Foxhole

Regards

alfa6 ;>}

[mark502inf]

One of the American company commanders at 73 Easting was CPT H.R. McMaster who gained a lot of attention when he wrote of the battle in Army professional magazines. He is now COL H.R. McMaster, comander of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) at Fort Carson, getting ready to deploy to Iraq next month. McMaster gained a lot of attention within the Army again a couple months ago when he said he was taking all his armored vehicles to Iraq with the regiment. The Department of the Army guidance was to take 1/3 of his armored vehicles and mount everyone else on wheeled vehicles--primarily HMMMWVs. McMaster found the Army bureaucrats were more tenacious than the Iraqis--they fought for months, but he just won that battle, too. The 3d ACR will be deploying with all its tanks & Brads.