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Posted on 03/15/2005 8:39:30 PM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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The thing that broke the back of the NVA at Khe Sanh, said General Westmoreland, was 'basically the fire of the B-52s.'  General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, chose the code name "Operation Niagara" for the coordination of available firepower at Khe Sanh. According to Westmoreland, the name Niagara invoked an appropriate image of cascading shells and bombs. Niagara would be composed of two elements. Niagara I was the comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort to pinpoint the available targets, and Niagara II was the coordinated shelling and bombing of these targets with all available air and artillery assets. The effectiveness of the firepower available to the Marines at Khe Sanh was heavily dependent on target selection--a responsibility of the intelligence section (S-2) of the 26th Marine Regiment Headquarters Company. S-2 knew the siege strategy employed by the NVA at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Con Thien in 1967, and it could predict the enemy's actions at Khe Sanh. Various sources were utilized to keep track of enemy activity around the Khe Sanh plateau. Sources outside the immediate battlefield included intelligence reports from MACV in Saigon, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters in Da Nang, as well as the headquarters of the 3rd Marine Division at Phu Bai.  Intelligence was generated locally in many ways. Hundreds of acoustic and seismic sensors were seeded around the combat base. This comprehensive sensor system cost approximately $1 billion and was credited with reducing Marine deaths during the fighting by 50 percent. By Marine estimates, the sensor system provided 40 percent of the raw intelligence at Khe Sanh. Ground and aerial observers supplied visual evidence of enemy activity, as did photoreconnaissance. Analysis of incoming rocket, mortar and artillery craters determined the likely source of the attacks. Shell/flash reports, infrared imagery and analysis of intercepted enemy communications were also used to identify potential enemy targets. Marine reconnaissance patrols, Army Special Forces, CIA personnel, and the MACV-SOG all provided input to the 26th Marines S-2. The CIA Joint Technical Advisory Detachment and SOG obtained their information from casual encounters with villagers; from regular paid agents, including Rhade and Bru Montagnards; and from locals who wanted to be agents of the U.S. intelligence community around Khe Sanh. Likely or confirmed targets were then pummeled by the available firepower, while the base Fire Support Coordinating Center (FSCC) coordinated the array of supporting arms.  After making the trip down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos, the NVA established various forward logistic bases within a few thousand meters of the combat base. At night the Communists dug shallow trenches from their supply points toward the U.S. positions. American intelligence noticed this trenching system around February 23, 1968. Once the system had been constructed close to the base, secondary trench lines branched off and paralleled the Marine perimeter. These close-in, secondary trenches were dug for the purpose of launching ground attacks against the base. Initial FSCC fire tactics were to saturate infiltration routes into the area around the combat base with artillery fire and airstrikes. This slowed down NVA trenching efforts but could not stop them completely. From a logistic standpoint, it was impossible to sufficiently saturate the trenching systems with massed artillery fire, so the FSCC altered its tactics. The NVA was permitted to dig trenches close to the base--then it was easier to pinpoint them.  The sensor system quickly proved its worth. During the night of February 3-4, sensors detected up to 2,000 NVA soldiers in the vicinity of Marine hill outposts northwest of the combat base. Defensive artillery fires were ordered against them, and sensors reported hearing men screaming in panic and the sounds of troops fleeing their assembly areas. The NVA units were completely destroyed in their assembly areas and the intended attack was effectively broken up. This is one of the earliest examples in warfare of a ground attack entirely thwarted by using remote sensor data. With crater analysis, it was possible to confirm the location of enemy batteries, assist in counterbattery fires and detect new types of enemy weapons--new calibers or new munitions. The flight direction of a projectile could be determined with reasonable accuracy from its crater, ricochet furrow or, in the case of dud rounds, soil tunnel. The particular characteristics of the soil at Khe Sanh often yielded valuable information through crater analysis. A stick placed in the soil tunnel made by a dud round would point in the direction of origin, and the angle of the stick would indicate the angle of fall. By measuring this angle and using the firing tables of enemy weapons, counterfire personnel could compute the range of the enemy weapon. Shelled areas were inspected as soon as possible after a shelling.  "Khe Sanh CAS" During the siege at Khe Sanh, Marine aviators from various squadrons scraped the tree tops at high speed to provide Close Air Support to their fellow Marines on the ground. 400 knots at 30 feet. Air support doesn't get much closer. Staff Sergeant Bossiz Harris, the acting gunnery sergeant of the mortar battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, conducted crater analysis during incoming fire, which allowed the battalion's Fire Direction Center (FDC) to direct prompt return fire. Rapid and accurate counterbattery fire could force the enemy artillerymen to seek cover and could destroy NVA guns and gun crews. To minimize the reaction time of the Marine and Army artillerymen at Khe Sanh, Colonel Lownds, the base commander, periodically entered the regimental FSCC bunker, indicated a spot on the wall map and directed the senior artillery officer to hit the marked spot. The coordinates were sent to the FDC, computed and sent to the appropriate gun crew, which adjusted its tubes. This aiming process usually took less than 40 seconds before a round was on its way. During the battle at Khe Sanh, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marine, guns fired 158,891 mixed artillery rounds in direct support of the 26th Marines.
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It looks so peaceful there now.
Good morning, Foxhole! Falling in for my Wednesday read. How are things with Sam and Snippy today?
free dixie,sw
Good Morning all.
Have to dig out some old fence posts and put in new ones this morning. Lost about a 20 foot section of fence during the storms last winter and I can't put off replacing it any more. The joys of home ownership. ;-)
I promise not to work too hard, Snippy. ;-) It's all going to depend on how easy those old posts come out.
Prayers offered for Bill, Peggy and the family. Please keep us updated on his condition.
The guided missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG 78) (right) leads the way during divisional tactics training along with the guided missile destroyers USS McFaul (DDG 74), USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS Cole (DDG 67), and the guided missile cruisers USS Cape St. George (CG 71) and USS Anzio (CG 68) in the Atlantic Ocean, on March 5, 2005. The destroyers and cruisers are assigned to Commander, Carrier Strike Group 12. DoD photo by Lt. j.g. Caleb Swigart, U.S. Navy. (Released)
AMEN!
Morning PE.
Caught me just as I was about to leave and do some "real" work. ;-)
We bought a new Saturn Relay for Msdrby Monday, she got to pick it up yesterday. This is the color she choose.
Today is Norton Update Day. Be sure to update your anti-virus software.
Do you hire out? My mom's fence needs new posts and hubby is really dreading the work.
Does it have a fun on the roof?
Does it have a GUN on the roof? You can have fun with guns, no?
This typo wasn't all my fault. Hubby just called while I was posting. Oscar Robinson was on his plane and he is tickled.
I hope he has a special place in hades.
Good morning feather.
Prayers offered. God knows his last name, we don't need to.
Ha. Who needs it.
Good afternoon Aeronaut.
Good afternoon Gail.
Thank you Mayor. Good afternoon.
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