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Port Hudson:
Site of the Longest Battle of the Civil War

The date was May 23, 1863. Just 14 miles north of Baton Rouge, roughly 30,000 Union troops faced 6,000 Confederates at the last Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, in what would turn out to be the longest battle of the Civil War.

On that day in the woods at Port Hudson, the weather must have been much the same then as now -- hat and humid. The trees must have been dripping caterpillars down the backs, under the uniforms, in the hair of young men about to kill and be killed.

While moisture hung in the heavy air, mosquitoes hummed and the sweet aroma of honeysuckle and wild Carolina jasmine mingled with the green and damp smell of the forest. The mysterious sounds of the woods preyed on the nerves of the jumpy soldiers -- a cracking and falling limb, a scurrying rabbit, a opossum foraging for food nearby. Fallen trees in the ravines cast eerie shadows and formed all manner of goblin shapes in the tense imaginations of the waiting boys and men.

Then the siege began, and the antebellum era exploded in its fury. The Union army launched ferocious attacks against the four and a half miles of fortifications protecting the river batteries near Port Hudson. Some of the bloodiest fighting of the Civil War.

Why Port Hudson?

Port Hudson was situated high on the bluffs overlooking a significant bend in the river which required ships heading downstream to reduce speed. Fighting the current upstream was always a slow, painstaking process. The terrain along the east bank with its abundance of natural ravines, could easily be adapted as a defensive perimeter, and earthworks joining the ravines could be constructed so as to make the place virtually impregnable. The Southern troops used everything at their disposal for defense. It was in this setting that Confederate forces hoped to retain control of the river after the fall of Baton Rouge in August 1862.

The guns overlooking the river were formidable, well placed, and presented a serious threat to the ships of the Union Navy. The Navy could cut the Confederacy in two if it could control the entire river, not only dividing her forces, but halting transportation of vital supplies, such as salt, cattle, and horses.

An 1863 etching shows Springfield landing during the siege of Port Hudson.

As the siege continued into July, the Confederate forces were beginning to starve, and were reduced to eating mules, horses and rats. Many casualties on both sides were attributed to disease and sunstroke, some 4,000 Union and several hundred Confederate.

There was no hope of relief; the situation was desperate. The Confederates were overwhelmingly outnumbered still. Their commander, Maj. Gen. Franklin Gardner, learning of the surrender of Vicksburg, realized that nothing could be gained by continuing the defense of Port Hudson. Surrender terms were negotiated, and on July 9, 1863, after 48 days and thousands of casualties, the Union army entered Port Hudson. The longest siege in American military history was over.

The significance of the siege of Port Hudson lies in its being the last stronghold on the Mississippi River, the control of which was a primary and critical goal of both sides, and for those 48 consecutive days, the garrison withstood the hardships with no help from the outside. It was also here that black soldiers in the regular U.S. army first participated in an assault.

A History Hike

On the trail to Fort Desperate, above the ravines, the wood air is heavy with that same humidity, honeysuckle and wild jasmine, the same damp smell of forest decay of a century ago. Guarding the battlements in a woolen uniform, in the heat, in the mud, and certainly in the fear of imminent death, must have been torture. Roaches, snakes, mosquitoes, hundreds of unidentifiable crawling things increased discomfort, and once the battle started, smoke and smell of gunpowder and death, the dire and hopeless situation must have quickly provided the name for the fort. Perhaps whoever named it knew no stronger word than "desperate."

The quiet of the woods is deafening as the imagination contrives and works out the scenario. Sticks crack as soldiers crawl through the underbrush and try to climb the steep sides of the bluffs. Mockingbirds and cardinals calling from the tulip trees and wild magnolias lull the tense waiting defenders. When the battle is joined, the smoke is blinding, fills the nostrils, the noise is indescribable and they no longer can be sure who is shooting, or at whom. The stench of disease, blood, and death, or rotting animal carcasses is violent in its strength. And yet, this must be a mild description of the way it really was. Conditions were so primitive that we cannot begin to imagine how the soldiers who survived did so.

The Final Blow

The surrender of the garrison ended a week of crushing defeat, as week of catastrophe for the Confederacy. Gen. Robert E. Lee's second invasion of the North was turned back at Gettysburg on July , and the following day Vicksburg surrendered, halting the Confederate drive through Arkansas at Helena. Port Hudson fell five days later.

It was the beginning of the end; the Confederacy would never recover. With the fall of Vicksburg, Confederate hopes of securing foreign recognition and aid to help finance the war were ended. In 1864, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, supreme commander of the Union forces, turned to the conquest of Richmond, capital of the Confederacy, and William Sherman undertook his famous march to the sea.

The city was defended by the forces locally available, about 7,000 men, and besieged by a corps that eventually totaled 40,000.

Banks lost about 5,000 men, but captured the garrison of about 7,200.

In cooperation with Ulysses Grant’s offensive against Vicksburg, Banks’ army was moving upriver. His objective was the Confederate stronghold at Port Hudson; even if Vicksburg withstood Grant’s latest attack, Union control of Port Hudson would be a major victory because it would severely reduce Confederate supply shipments from the Trans-Mississippi. That was the plan as early as March 1863, but Banks felt he had to sweep through parts of Louisiana west of the Mississippi to clear out Confederate troops – a diversion which pleased Kirby Smith (Confederate commander of the Trans-Mississippi theater) as much as it dismayed strategists in Washington. They couldn’t understand how heading so far away from Vicksburg would speed up the campaign.

Assault of the Second Louisiana (Colored) Regiment on the Confederate Works at Port Hudson, May 27th, 1863

It wasn’t until mid-May that Banks brought his men back, but then they moved fast and by May 21 Port Hudson was isolated. Banks suspected the Confederates only had brigade in the fort, and thought he could overrun it without much trouble. So he started a bombardment, probed the defenses in one place, and then launched an attack on May 27. The Confederate defenses were too long for the garrison they had available – they were designed for about twice as many men – and also in the wrong place. The expectation was attacks on the southern end of the defenses, but Banks wrapped all the way around, and the Confederates were frantically digging deeper and moving guns to new positions.

It was enough; the attack was a disaster. Banks wrote long orders, but neglected vital parts, like setting a common time for the attack and making sure his subordinates would all work together. The attack on the left-center started first, with 6,000 men aiming at only 1,200 Confederates. Confederate outworks were pushed back, but the initial fighting, difficult terrain, and oppressive heat and humidity sapped the attacking Union troops. They reformed for phase two of the attack, where they had to go down through an obstacle-choked ravine, then up the far side to reach the trenches – all the time under fire. They started bravely, but only a few men reached the Confederate trenches and they were ejected by a counter attack. 14 regiments had failed; next the Union commanders tried with dribs and drabs of men. Two regiments charged, then another two, then three. A few men got as close as 50 yards before falling back – or being felled by the intense fire. Several hours later Banks finally started an attack on the Confederate right; another 5,000 men attacked, and they made good progress. But the Confederates were holding their fire; at 200 yards the artillery fired and checked the assault. Renewed efforts only raised the casualty total: about 1 in 5 of the attackers fell.

Banks had achieved next to nothing, except kill a lot of his men (about 2,000 casualties against under 250 Confederate losses). But the attack had proved something. Two of the regiments thrown carelessly forward were African-American troops, and it was the first test in battle of any African-American units. Whites hadn’t really trusted them, mainly used the volunteers as laborers, and paid them less than their White comrades. How would they react in battle? They charged through a thicket, against an intact Confederate defense. It was an invitation to suicide, but they didn’t hesitate and charged. They didn’t capture the position, but they proved to themselves, their officers, and through newspapers to the country and the world that African-Americans would fight just as bravely as anyone. There were still doubters (North and South) but most accepted the facts. It was a tremendous boost for African-American recruitment, and meant that a number of other units would have their opportunity for combat, to fight for the liberation of their race.

That was important for the future, but Banks still had the problem of Port Hudson. After a few days rest for the men, he started the siege in earnest, digging batteries and trenches, starting a constant bombardment, and continual sniping. He also pled with Grant for reinforcements, and also stripped his own Department of minor garrisons; he was enough of a strategist to know that if he bagged the Confederate forces at Port Hudson he could easily recover any particular post that was temporarily abandoned. He pulled in nine further regiments, and his strength reached 40,000, although with water short and the weather hot, the sick list meant many fewer were available for duty.

The Confederates were doing what they could to raid the Union lines. Clearly the outnumbered garrison could spare few men for sorties – especially against Banks’ sturdy siege lines. But Confederate cavalry outside the fortifications harassed foraging parties and raided camps. Banks lost 1,200 men in May and early June, which prompted him to send Benjamin Grierson out with 1,200 horsemen to sweep away the Rebels. Grierson was bushwhacked, and galloped back reporting the rebels were stronger than he was. Banks had enough of that, and sent Grierson back with an infantry division in support to smash the Confederate base at Clinton, Louisiana. They duly tore up Clinton, but a few weeks later the raids resumed with the burning of $1 million of stores at a river landing a few miles below Port Hudson.

Meanwhile the siege was wearing down the Confederates. They were short of food and short on drinking water, in the middle of a drought. Sickness and hunger led to desertions, and by mid-June Banks had excellent intelligence about the Confederate positions and strength. He decided to launch another attack, but didn’t plan this well either. Orders were sent out at the last minute, which essentially guaranteed that coordination would be bad. And it was: the first two attacks were side by side, but four hours apart. The Union infantry ran into fierce resistance, and reinforcements wouldn’t advance through the stragglers of previous attacks. There was a distinct lack of leadership – division and brigade commanders weren’t leading their men, they were ordering them forward. And the soldiers resented it. Another attack, again isolated in time and place, on the south end of the Confederate line also failed. So Banks had lost another 1,800 men and achieved nothing: the Confederates lost barely 50.

A gully used by Federal troops as a siege camp. The horizontal line at the base of the standing trees is a series of Confederate earthworks.

It was back to siege warfare, this time pressed with more vengeance than before. The infantry dug and sniped, the artillery dismounted every Confederate gun at least once. Engineers dug mines below rebel salients, preparing to blow them to kingdom come as part of a final assault. The only Confederate hope was Joe Johnston, who was hovering east of Vicksburg trying to save the day there. If he could get down to the Port Hudson area he probably could have beaten Banks’ weakened (and ill-led) army. But Vicksburg was a higher priority, and the supply routes down to Louisiana were terrible – that was part of Grant’s objective in capturing Jackson Mississippi before encircling Vicksburg. Banks planned his final attack for July 11, but Vicksburg fell on the 4th. News arrived on the evening of the 7th, and the Union cheers and bands playing told the Confederates what had happened. But Gardner was made of stern stuff, and wanted to see proof; Banks showed him Grant’s dispatches and it was enough. After 48 days of siege, the longest siege in America, the Confederate flag was lowered. Banks paroled all the enlisted men, but kept the officers as prisoners for later exchange.

The battle and the campaign were over. After over two years the Mississippi was opened for the Union, and closed to the Confederacy. There was still plenty of fighting ahead, but the South had been dealt a crippling blow.

Fellow Foxhole Freepers... I'd like to pass the torch on the item below. In addition to the brave patriots of this weekend, all across America who met the opposition head on, I can't think of a better bunch than you to present our views to this filmmaker. I'm looking specifically for folks in the Chicago area who might consider a role in this project, who have participated or support our Support our Troop and Commander in Chief demonstrations. Sam, I'll leave it to your to ping likely candidates. Deal?

Just FYI, we've heard back from Ross... any thoughts after reading his reply?
See previous post: 18 posted on 02/18/2003 0:27 AM PST by comwatch

From: <Rosslyons1@---.com>
To: ""Dave Jenest"" <dave@patriotwatch.com>
Sent: Tuesday, February 18, 2003 11:16 AM
Subject: Re: Documentary

Dave,

I apologize for my lack of explanation in the use of pro-war. I simply
want all views, from all walks of life. When I say 'pro-war', what I mean
is the belief that we shouldn't just sit around waiting during what seems to
be a hide and seek game with arms. That our military presence in Iraq is
what we need for the goal of peace. A lot of people believe that the only
way to achieve peace is to take out what threatens its existance. The media
has made the division of pro-war and anti-war. I'm looking for the extremes
and everything in between. I was just keywording with the use of 'pro-war'.
Not meaning it quite so literally. This will be a film with everyone's
views. And I'm looking for exactly what you said in your reply. Because I
feel that you speak the same as the majority of Americans. And that is one
of the messages I want to send out. This weekend I'm filming an Anti-war
domonstation, and will be getting their views. But to achieve the goal of
this project, I need people with the same voice as yours. I would greatly
appreciate anything that you can help me with. Once again, I apologize for
not explaining my term better.

Sincerely,
Ross Lyons

Thank you Ross...

I am sharing our communications with a very special group of people. The
attached photo, reprinted with permission, is a sample of ordinary people,
exercising extraordinary effort, to offer a differing viewpoint on the
crisis in Iraq.

Brad Cloven protests outside the Peace Prize Forum, saying it's time to "take Saddam out" and free the Iraqi people from his rule. (MPR Photo/Bob Reha)

"I want people to understand that peace is good but freedom is better,"
Cloven says. "The Iraqis deserve freedom, and cowering in fear of their
impending nuclear weapons isn't freedom for us either. It's time to take
Saddam out."

This weekend, another of our colleague left the comfort of his warm car
because of a poor cell-phone connection. He stood outside in blowing snow to
share his New York City "Support our Troops" experience in the midst of the
Ant-War protests with a west coast talk radio host on KFSO San Francisco.
His friend joined us last night for a follow-up report on KFBK's Mark
Williams show here in Sacramento.

I realize you probably have some time constraints to work around. Our folks
would probably like some examples of your previous works or help you if you
are an emerging filmmaker. Fair enough? Feel free to call me anytime: (916)
448-1636 We'll circulate your email address after you next reply, if that's
alright. Thank you for your clarifications today.

Dave Jenest

Today's classic warship, USS San Juan (CL-54)

Atlanta class light cruiser
Displacement: 6,000 t.
Length: 541’6”
Beam: 53’2”
Draft: 20’10”
Speed: 31.8 k.
Complement: 820
Armament: 16 5”; 16 1.1”; 8 20mm; 8 21” torpedo tubes; 2 depth charge tracks; 6 depth charge projectors

The USS SAN JUAN (CL-54) was laid down on 15 May 1940 by the Bethlehem Steel Co. (Fore River), Quincy, Mass.; launched on 6 September 1941; sponsored by Mrs. Margarita Coll de Santori; and commissioned on 28 February 1942, Capt. James E. Maher in command.

After shakedown in the Atlantic, SAN JUAN departed from Hampton Roads, Va., on 5 June 1942 as part of a carrier task group formed around WASP (CV-7) and bound for the Pacific. The group got underway from San Diego on 30 June escorting a large group of troop transports destined for the Solomon Islands where the Navy was about to launch the first major American amphibious operation of the war.

Following rehearsal in the Fiji Islands, SAN JUAN provided gunfire support for the landings at Tulagi on 7 August 1942. On the night of 8 and 9 August, she was patrolling the eastern approaches to the transport area between Tulagi and Guadalcanal when gun flashes indicated that fighting was taking place in the western approaches. The action turned out to be the Battle of Savo Island, in which an enemy cruiser force sank four Allied cruisers. SAN JUAN retired from the forward area with the empty transports on the 9th and escorted them to Noumea.

She then rejoined WASP and operated with the carrier force for several weeks between the New Hebrides and the Solomons, on guard against a Japanese carrier attack. However, when this strike materialized on 24 August, SAN JUAN had withdrawn to refuel and thus missed the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. ENTERPRISE (CV-6) was hit in the battle, and SAN JUAN, which had damaged a gun mount off Guadalcanal, escorted the carrier to Pearl Harbor, arriving on 10 September 1942.

On 5 October, the cruiser again headed for the South Pacific, stopping first at Funafuti in the Ellice Islands to deliver a deck load of 20 millimeter guns to the marines who had just landed there. She then carried out a raid through the Gilberts sinking two Japanese patrol vessels on 16 October. Disembarking Japanese prisoners at Espiritu Santo, the cruiser joined ENTERPRISE on the 23d. Three days later, after patrol planes had made contact with enemy carrier forces, the Battle of Santa Cruz Island was fought in which HORNET (CV-8) was lost and ENTERPRISE damaged while the Japanese suffered severe losses in aircraft and pilots. During the last dive-bombing attack on the formation, one bomb passed through SAN JUAN's stern, flooding several compartments and damaging, though not disabling, her rudder. She arrived at Noumea with the task force on 30 October and then spent 10 days at Sydney Australia, receiving permanent repairs.

SAN JUAN joined carrier SARATOGA (CV-3), at Nandi, Viti Levu Island, in the Fijis on 24 November. From December 1942 to June 1943, the cruiser was based at Noumea and operated in the Coral Sea, both with carrier groups and alone. At the end of June 1943, during the occupation of New Georgia, SAN JUAN’s carrier group patrolled the Coral Sea for 26 days to prevent enemy interference. Late in July, the force made a quick stop at Noumea and moved to the New Hebrides, first to Havannah Harbor, Efate, and later to Espiritu Santo.

On 1 November, the SARATOGA group, including SAN JUAN, neutralized airfields on Bougainville and Rabaul while Allied forces landed on Bougainville. In the middle of November, the task group acted as a covering force for the occupation of the Gilberts. SAN JUAN then joined ESSEX (CV-9) on a raid on Kwajalein in the Marshalls, fighting off persistent torpedo plane attacks on 4 and 5 December. Detached on 6 December, the cruiser returned to the United States for overhaul at Mare Island.

SAN JUAN rejoined SARATOGA off Pearl Harbor on 19 January 1944 and the force covered the occupation of Eniwetok in February. SAN JUAN next escorted carriers, YORKTOWN (CV-10) and LEXINGTON (CV-16), in strikes on Palau, Yap, and Ulithi between 30 March and 1 April. On 7 April, the cruiser joined the new carrier HORNET (CV-12), which covered the landings at Hollandia in April and then struck at Truk on 29 and 30 April. After returning to bases in the Marshalls, the HORNET group began support of the Marianas campaign in early June, striking at Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima in the Bonins, while American troops landed on Saipan. SAN JUAN helped guard her group during the Battle of the Philippine Sea when American naval air power decisively defeated a Japanese counterattack to save the Marianas, and, in doing so, all but wiped out Japanese naval air strength.

After a short stop at Eniwetok, SAN JUAN escorted carriers, WASP (CV-18) and FRANKLIN (CV-13), during July as they covered the capture of Guam with strikes on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. After a strike on Palau and Ulithi, SAN JUAN was ordered to San Francisco for overhaul, and departed from Eniwetok on 4 August escorting YORKTOWN.

Following refresher training at San Diego and Pearl Harbor, SAN JUAN joined LEXINGTON’s task group at Ulithi on 21 November. In early December, she screened the carriers in strikes on Formosa and Luzon in support of landings on Mindoro. During this operation, she was sent alone within scouting range of Japanese airfields in an effort to draw out Japanese aircraft by radio deception, but none rose to the bait. On 18 and 19 December, the force was battered by a typhoon, and returned to Ulithi on Christmas Eve. Underway again six days later, the carriers covered the occupation of Luzon with strikes on Formosa, Okinawa, and Luzon from 3 through 9 January 1945, and then from 10 to 20 January, raided ports and shipping in the South China Sea, particularly Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Hong Kong. After replenishing at Ulithi, SAN JUAN escorted carrier HORNET in air strikes on Tokyo during the Iwo Jima operation in February and then returned to Ulithi on 1 March to prepare for the Okinawa invasion.

SAN JUAN rejoined HORNET on 22 March and, until 30 April, operated with her to the north and east of Nansei Shoto, interrupting her regular occupation of supporting air strikes and replenishment at sea with a bombardment, on 21 April, of Minami Daito Shima, a small island about 180 miles from Okinawa. Planes from SAN JUAN's group helped sink the giant Japanese battleship YAMATO, on 7 April. After nine days at Ulithi, the HORNET group was back on station off Nansei Shoto for strikes on targets in Japan. SAN JUAN arrived in Leyte Gulf on 13 June for repairs and then joined carrier, BENNINGTON (CV-20), on 1 July for more strikes on the Japanese home islands. She was at sea when the news of the Japanese capitulation was received on 15 August, and, on the 27th, after 59 days at sea, she joined the van forces for the triumphal entry of the 3d Fleet into Sagami Wan, just outside Tokyo Bay.

SAN JUAN's embarked unit commander, Commodore Rodger W. Simpson, was assigned responsibility for freeing, caring for, and evacuating Allied prisoners of war in Japan. On 29 August, the ship entered Tokyo Bay and landed parties which liberated prisoners at camps at Omori and Ofuna and the Shanagawa hospital. The former prisoners were transferred to hospital ships BENEVOLENCE (AH-13) and RESCUE (AH-18). After evacuating camps in the Tokyo Bay area, SAN JUAN moved to the Nagoya-Hamamatsu area to the south and then to the Sendai-Kamaishi area to the north. On completing her liberation duty, the cruiser moored on 23 September next to the last Japanese battleship, NAGATO, at Yokosuka shifting to an outer anchorage there on 28 October. She sailed for the United States on 14 November, disembarked Commodore Simpson at Pearl Harbor, and continued to the U.S. with homewardbound troops, arriving on 29 November. Three days later, she sailed on "Magic Carpet" duty to Noumea and Tutuila, returning to San Pedro, Calif., on 9 January 1946 with a full load of troops. The cruiser arrived at Bremerton, Wash., for inactivation on 24 January 1946, and was decommissioned and placed in reserve there on 9 November 1946. SAN JUAN was redesignated CLAA-54 on 28 February 1949. She was struck from the Navy list on 1 March 1959 and sold on 31 October 1961 to National Metals and Steel Co., Terminal Island, Calif., for scrapping.

SAN JUAN received 13 battle stars for her World War II service.