June-July 1863
The Devil's Call
Since Chancellorsville, as much was asked of the cavalry as it could deliver. They'd done most of the fighting, lived in their saddles, and took a heavy casualty toll. Buford's men were allowed four days to rest and refit before being ordered to pursue Lee. Guarding the rear of the newly-formed "Left Wing" commanded by Major General John Fulton Reynolds, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Infantry Corps, Buford crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry on June 27. Upon reaching Frederick MD, Buford caught and hung a spy named Will Talbot, who admitted he was a member of Confederate Elijah White's Comanches. Buford had a note pinned to the body announcing that the corpse was to hang three days and that anyone cutting him down early would hang the remainder. When the townspeople complained of the spectacle, Buford, in an obvious reference to the June 28 promotions to brigadier general of Wesley Merritt, Elon J. Farnsworth, and George A. Custer, in dry humor stated that he hung him rather than send him to Washington for fear that "they would make him a Brigadier General." Much of the Army of the Potomac, on its march northward, would pass by the hanging Talbot. Talbot was as much of a message evidencing Buford's viciousness in dealing with spies as it was a vignette of the dark reality of war to the marching blue army behind him.
On the same day that the three "boy generals" were promoted, Hooker's offer to resign was accepted and General George G. Meade placed at the helm. Hooker had just dispatched the cavalry "in the direction of Gettysburg and Emmitsburg" to ascertain the movements and position of the Rebels. Buford was ordered by Pleasonton to proceed to Gettysburg by way of Emmitsburg, with orders to cover the left flank of the army. The new commander, Meade, decided to continue the pursuit. It is unsure whether Pleasonton's claim that he ordered Buford to hold Gettysburg, an important rail and road junction, "at all costs" was a contemporary order or a post-battle embellishment, but the old Dragoon would soon recognize the importance of the area and the favorable terrain surrounding it.
On June 29, Buford sent his Reserve Brigade under Merritt to Mechanicsburg (now Thurmont), Maryland, to guard the Catoctin mountain passes and the divisional trains. To the call of "Boots and Saddles" the First and Second Brigades left at 9 am, following the base of South Mountain to Pennsylvania. Crossing the Mason-Dixon line into the Keystone State, all the troopers, especially those of Devin's 17th Pennsylvania, "raised their caps and lustily cheered, again and again" for their home soil.
Reinforced by 21 year-old 2nd Lieutenant John Calef's Battery A, 2nd US Artillery, and its 75 men, the brigades continued on dangerous winding roads and steep cliffs, finally reaching the summit of the Monterey Gap pass in the South Mountain ridge. As Buford peered through the pass in the approaching dusk, he saw Confederate campfires in the valley farm fields below. To no one in particular, Buford prophesied aloud that "Within forty eight hours the concentration of both armies will take place on a field within view and a great battle will be fought." It was almost as if, by Dragoon instinct, Buford knew somehow that Lee had just turned his army around on the information of one of Longstreet's paid spies. Buford of course didn't know, but the movement and concentration of Lee's army would underscore the importance of Buford's destination, a little crossroads town in southern Pennsylvania.
Proceeding down the mountain, the troopers went into camp near present-day Fountaindale PA for another restless respite for the exhausted men. At 2 am on June 30, the men began the march to Fairfield, through which they planned to pass on the way to Gettysburg. However, an unexpected run-in with pickets of a Mississippi and North Carolina regiment, which they hadn't seen in the dense fog that morning, reinforced his premonition. After a brief skirmish, Buford wisely broke it off and countermarched south toward Emmitsburg to march to Gettysburg via that alternate different route. Buford was intensely irritated by the lack of warning by the populace, leading to the stumble, as evidenced by his report: "The inhabitants knew of my arrival and the position of the enemy camp, yet not one of them gave me a particle of information... Had any of them given me timely information and acted as a guide that night, I could have surprised and captured this (Rebel) force." Arriving at Emmitsburg, Buford likely consulted with his wing commander Major General John F. Reynolds, after having sent early morning dispatches to both him and Pleasonton about a large Confederate force in the vicinity of Cashtown, only 8 miles from Gettysburg.
Marching along the road between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg, passing Federal infantry along the way, the worn-out troopers arrived in town about 12 noon, following advance scouts from Gamble's Brigade who arrived about an hour earlier. The scouts, pounding into town at full gallop, captured several Confederates who were straggling from Confederate General Jubal A. Early's visit to the town just four days prior. The brigade, along with Calef's artillery, received a rousing welcome from the townspeople. Buford sent a dispatch back to Pleasonton about the "terrible state of excitement in the town" and that the men and horses were at their limit. Setting up headquarters at Tate's Blue Eagle Hotel at the corner of Washington and Chambersburg Streets, Buford declared martial law, closed the saloons to his troopers, and jailed another captured spy.
By mid-afternoon, Buford and his commanders were closely inspecting the terrain around the town. His trained Dragoon eye quickly took note of the network of roads radiating through town like the spokes of a wheel, perfect for infantry to march on. Foremost were the series of hills and ridges north, west, and south of the hamlet. Knowing that a large concentration of Rebel troops was to his west and north, Reynolds and the other Federal corps commanders to his south, any confrontation would be an obvious race for the high ground. The nearly parallel ridges to the west and northwest, in the direction from which Buford suspected the Confederates would advance, seemed ideal to deploy a "defense in depth," a dismounted cavalry delaying-action and active defense designed to buy time for the infantry to arrive. He also inspected the ridges and hills east and south of town, a very defensible fall-back position for the infantry, a perfect ultimate line of passive defense. His Dragoon tactical expertise told him that a delay action in advance of the intended ultimate position for defense, holding until the infantry could arrive in force, had a chance for success. He also knew that timing, planning, and the dedication of his men would be critical. Climbing into the cupola of the Lutheran Theological Seminary west of town with Colonel Devin, Buford was able to see this lay of the land and far out the due-west Chambersburg Pike. By late afternoon, Buford sat upon Grey Eagle near the hotel, alone, in profound thought, staring to the west. The arthritis that had begun to afflict him was getting worse. But any personal matters were unimportant... he had made up his mind to stand and fight. He would commit his brigades. He had committed himself.
The day and evening were filled with preparations. Along with his brigade leaders, staff, and his signal officer Aaron B. Jerome, Buford studied the topography that would play such a crucial role in what he knew was to come. Earlier that day, his troopers had seen a Confederate element (General J. Johnston Pettigrew's) approach to within a mile of town to the west, but they had backed off at the sight of the cavalrymen. If the intelligence was correct, then he knew that the whole of the Army of Northern Virginia, some 70,000 strong, would come to this town the following day. He had to achieve the seemingly impossible, the thought of which might have crippled any other commander than Buford - to hold off an enemy force many times larger than his, perhaps for several hours. A cavalry defense-in-depth delaying action of such magnitude had never been attempted before. He had to hope that the Rebels would come at him piecemeal, a unit at a time, and he had to both deceived and confuse them for as long as could. He could last perhaps those few hours, but not much more.
Buford, though by nature extremely steady under such pressure, was understandably anxious as well. He and his men had a hard month in the saddle, and final destiny would come on the morrow. Jerome observed a meeting that night between Buford and Colonel Devin, in which the ever-anxious for a fight Devin tried to reassure his commander that the brigades could hold off anything the Confederates would throw at them. "You're unduly excited, General. I'll agree to take care of all the Rebels in my front for the next twenty-four hours," stated Devin. The pragmatic Buford looked at the exuberant Irishman and said, "No you won't... you will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive... and if we are able to hold it we will do well." Buford's state of mind on this June 30 is evidenced by those who observed him. One of his staff recorded that they "had never seen him so apprehensive, so uneasy about a situation as he was at this time." Additionally, Jerome wrote, "He seemed anxious, even more so than I ever saw him." Buford was convinced he would be attacked in the morning.
The McPherson Farm and ridge
Buford's anxiousness worked to his and the men's advantage. Once described by a staff officer as "anxious by nature, a tremendous worker leaving nothing undone," this trait of Buford's personality perfectly fit his role, and no less conspicuously than on the coming day. Anxious people tend to deal with their anxieties in one consistent way; they must tediously prepare for every single possible contingency, in order to achieve a comfortable confidence in their situation. How well the old dragoon dealt with his anxiety this day would go a long way toward determining the level of his success on the morrow.
As the darkness fell, Buford deployed his men according to his measured tactics along a seven-mile front west and north of the town. The furthest vedettes posted themselves at intervals of thirty feet, using anything - fences, shrubs, trees, as cover. Half of all the horses were kept bridled and saddled, ready to ride, and the men grabbed anxious sleep in shifts. At 10:30 pm, Buford penned an assessment of his situation to Pleasonton: "A.P. Hill's corps... is massed back of Cashtown... rumor says Ewell is coming over the mountains from Carlisle." He also sent a detailed report to Reynolds. Meade was apprised of Lee's position and movements. In the early morning, Buford could conceivably be attacked from three directions, by a force many times larger than his own. For the old dragoon and his troopers, all of whom had been through so much together and who looked to him for reassurance, the test of their lives was coming.
The overcast, warm summer dawn arose. Buford's early warning system kicked in as one of Gamble's vedette posts on the Chambersburg Pike, about four miles from town, sent back word that an approaching Confederate column had been sighted. A shot had been fired by the post, while Devin's vedettes north of town may have exchanged shots with some pickets of Confederate General Robert Rodes' division. At 8 am, upon receiving the news, Buford hastily climbed on Grey Eagle to make the ride from headquarters to the Lutheran Seminary area. When asked by a staff officer what was "the matter," as rifle and cannon shots began booming in the distance, Buford nodded to the west and curtly snapped, "That's the matter!" The deadly business had begun, and there was no sign or word yet from Reynolds. Also, the time for anxiety had passed; now was the time to put all the preparatory deployments into motion.
Forming skirmish and battle lines, Confederate General Henry Heth's men pushed Buford's pickets in from the west. They and Devin's posts to the north were doing a meritorious job of delaying the onslaught. With every fourth trooper holding the horses behind each ridge summit, it was some time before the Confederates determined they were facing veteran Union cavalry. It would take Heth one and a half hours to advance the mile and a half from Wisler's (Knoxlyn) Ridge to McPherson's Ridge. Buford's men were executing his plan perfectly, but time was running short. Sooner or later they would break under the pressure of superior numbers. Confederate commanders felt secure in the fact that they were pushing their enemy back over the ridges toward town, taking very few casualties. But, they were missing the point of the "game" Buford was playing with them. If he could just hold them until Reynolds' infantry could arrive...
Grudgingly and stubbornly giving way, Buford's winded troopers were pushed back to the main defensive line on McPherson Ridge by 9:30 am. There, Buford's battle line was set. But the situation was now very deadly, more so than before. Subtracting the horse-holders, Buford had barely 2,000 effectives to hold off the more than 7,000 Confederates. He could only delay them, not fight them toe-to-toe. Calef's battery was working their guns so fast and furious, the barrels were red hot. Heth positioned his guns on Herr Ridge and pounded away as his brigades formed a massive front line. Buford had given Devin a free hand to the north while he stayed close to Gamble's line, moving between the ridge and the Seminary cupola, glassing for a sign of Reynolds. While riding his line, Buford sat high upon Grey Eagle, seemingly daring the Rebels to shoot at him, while he calmly puffed his pipe. He constantly yelled encouragement to his worn-out troopers, telling them they must "hold this position until Reynolds comes up or die in the attempt!"
He sent Jerome up into the cupola to watch for Reynolds' arrival. As Buford's lines were just about to break, Jerome spotted the First Corps flag of Reynolds, flapping in the humidity of the morning, along the Emmitsburg Road. Jerome yelled down to a staff officer to alert the General. At the news, Buford spurred his horse to the Seminary, ran up the steps to the observation deck, and glassed south. Spotting the advancing blue column, Buford let out the breath he had been holding. "Now we can hold the place."
Statue of civilian John Burns, a Gettysburg resident who joined the Iron Brigade for the first day's battle and was wounded three times. Burns was over 70 years of age at the time
Buford sent out two officers to ride to Reynolds and rush him to the scene. He nearly had to retreat at this point to his next fall-back position, Cemetery Hill, but decided to hold on a little longer while the First Corps moved into line. Buford anxiously stared through the glass as Reynolds spurred ahead of his column and rode to the front. Arriving on the grounds of the Seminary, Reynolds looked up to the cupola and yelled to Buford, "What's the matter, John?" Using his characteristic phrase he yelled back, "The devil's to pay!" Moving down the steps to greet his old friend, Buford was asked by Reynolds if he could hold out until the Corps could arrive in force. "I reckon I can," was the reply. "Let's ride out and see all about it," the wing commander said as he looked at the desperate fighting ahead. Riding to the front, Buford filled in Reynolds on the situation, all the while under infantry and artillery fire. Buford expressed concern over Reynolds' exposure to the missiles. Reynolds simply laughed and moved even closer to the front.
As the commander conferred, Buford turned back, pointing toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge to the east and south, emphasizing that it was the proper position for the ultimate battle line of the army. Reynolds immediately gave a verbal message to an aide to take back to Meade, stating to the army commander that "the enemy are advancing in strong force... I will fight them inch by inch... and will hold them back as long as possible." Reynolds told the aide to run his horse to death if necessary.
Meanwhile, Buford's men were being pounded, with both men and horses going down. Colonel Gamble rode up to Reynolds and cried in his thick Irish brogue, "Hurry up, General, hurry up! They are breaking our line! They are breaking our line!" Bringing his commanders up at the double-quick, the winded infantry got into line, relieving Buford's exhausted, sweaty troopers. As the cavalry fell back between the infantry's lines, some of Gamble's men exhorted the First Corps on by yelling, "Go in and give them hell!" The cavalry moved to the Corps' flank in support.
That hot and deadly morning, Buford's two small brigades had accomplished their mission. They had held off a vastly numerically superior enemy just until the infantry could take the field. His old dragoon ploy had worked, deceiving his foe about both his numbers and his nature. Heth had come to Gettysburg expecting to brush aside green, scared, local militia, but instead had run into the veteran commander and his steadfast men. The small prey had delayed the larger hunter, just barely long enough. But it was enough.
Later in the afternoon, as the Federal infantry was pushed through the town and reformed on the ridges earlier pointed out by Buford, the old Dragoon oversaw the emplacement of his troopers in support of the new line. After Reynolds had been killed around 10:35 am, command of the field fell upon Major General Abner Doubleday. In danger of being flanked by a new Confederate advance, Doubleday sent to Major General Oliver O. Howard, just arrived and now in command, for reinforcement. Unable to spare any, Howard suggested that the courier go find Buford and seek his help. The courier, Captain Eminel P. Halstead (assistant adjutant on Doubleday's staff), found Buford and his two brigades along the Emmitsburg Road. When Halstead advised Buford of Howard's order, the irate Buford set his jaw, rose up in his stirrups, pointed west and yelled, "What in hell and damnation does he think I can do against those long lines of the enemy out there?" Advised again of Howard's order, Buford said, "Very well! I will see what I can do."
It was now about 5 pm. Buford ordered his entire command to trot out into the fields fronting Cemetery Hill, in full view of the Confederates. Colonel Gamble sent out men to remove fence rails, as if to clear the way for a mounted charge. Forming a cavalry line of battle, the exhausted troopers of both brigades stood their ground and stared at the Confederates of Brigadier General James H. Lane's brigade. Union Second Corps commander Major General Winfield S. Hancock later recalled that it was "one of the most inspiring sights" of his military career and lauded the "splendid spectacle of that gallant cavalry, as it stood there unshaken and undaunted, in the face of the advancing Confederate infantry." Lane's infantrymen delivered an ineffective fire, and then began forming "square" to meet the expected mounted assault Gamble's troopers fired at the Confederates, inflicting heavy casualties, then trotted back to their places in line. The maneuver bought the additional time necessary for the Federals to rally on the heights. That night, the veteran Dragoon would assist Hancock, Howard, and Chief Engineer Gouvernor K. Warren in making dispositions for the infantry along the ridges and hills to meet what must surely come as Lee decided to continue the engagement.
Buford's Division, less than a month before, had participated in the largest cavalry battle known to man. Now he had chosen the ground for, opened, and determined the course of, the largest infantry battle of the Civil War. When he and his command was ordered south on July 2nd by Pleasonton to give his men a much-needed rest and refit, his job still would not be over. Lee, his army bloodied and repulsed at Gettysburg, would retreat to safer haven off enemy soil. And Buford, who had chased him here, would now have to chase him again.
My thanks to J. David Petruzzi of www.bufordsboys.com for graciously allowing the use of his material for this thread.
www.bufordsboys.com
