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With all due respect, my FRiend, let's put those in perspective. From Sable v.FCC:

Held:

1. Section 223(b) does not unconstitutionally prohibit the interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone messages. The protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech. In addition, 223(b) does not contravene the "contemporary community standards" requirement of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , since it no more establishes a "national standard" of obscenity than do federal statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials or the broadcasting [492 U.S. 115, 116] of obscene messages. There is no constitutional barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under local standards even though they are not obscene in others. Sable, which has the burden of complying with the prohibition, is free to tailor its messages, on a selective basis, to the communities it chooses to serve. Pp. 124-126.

2. Section 223(b)'s ban on indecent telephone messages violates the First Amendment since the statute's denial of adult access to such messages far exceeds that which is necessary to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to the messages. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 , an emphatically narrow ruling giving the FCC power to regulate an indecent radio broadcast, is readily distinguishable from these cases. Pacifica, which did not involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent material, relied on the "unique" attributes of broadcasting, which can intrude on the privacy of the home without prior warning of content and which is uniquely accessible to children. In contrast, the dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communications. The Government's argument that nothing less than a total ban could prevent children from gaining access to the messages and that this Court should defer to Congress' conclusions and factual findings to that effect is unpersuasive. There is no evidence to show that children would have evaded the rules that the FCC, after prolonged proceedings, had determined would keep the messages out of their reach. Moreover, deference to Congress' legislative findings cannot limit judicial inquiry where First Amendment rights are at stake. Here, the congressional record contains no legislative findings that would justify a conclusion that there are no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means to achieve the Government's interest in protecting minors. Pp. 126-131.

The issue in this cases was not pornography, but access to pornography by minors.

From Miller v. California, the following:

This case involves the application of a State's criminal obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had in no way indicated any desire to receive such materials.

Again, the issue here is not pornography, but pornographic junk mail.

I don't think that anyone on this thread thinks that sending porn spam through regular or email is a good idea. The issue is whether the police could arrest an adult for possessing otherwise legal pornography, which you called "contraband." The answer is still no.