13 SUSPECTED TERRORISTS TO BE DETAINED 2 YEARS
By Chua Lee Hoong
THREE terrorists cells made up of ordinary Singaporeans living in Housing Board flats and with jobs such as drivers and technicians had been plotting for years to attack targets in the Republic, in places including Changi and Yishun.
They took direction from and communicated with foreigners, some of whom they knew only by code-names.
And their attack plans, in various stages of certainty and progress, centred around American and pro-American interests in Singapore.
The detainees
Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin, 51, condominium manager;
Mohamad Anuar bin Margono, 31, driver;
Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar, 39, printer
Jaafar bin Mistooki, 40, despatch driver;
Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, 39, businessman;
Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, 36, businessman;
Mohamed Ellias s/o Mohamed Khan, 29, manager
Mohamed Nazir bin Mohmmed Uthman, 27, ship traffic assistant;
Adnan bin Musa, 36, technician;
Halim bin Hussain, 41, supervisor;
Hashim bin Abas, 40, service engineer;
Andrew Gerard, alias Ali Ridhaa bin Abdullah, 34, technician;
Othman bin Mohamed, 42, supervisor
These were among the fresh revelations the Government made on Friday, six days after it first announced the arrests of 15 people by the Internal Security Department for involvement in terrorism-related acts.
It said on Friday that 13 of the 15, all except one of them Singaporean citizens, had been issued two-year detention orders under the Internal Security Act.
They were members of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a clandestine network which also has cells in Malaysia and Indonesia.
The three cells in Singapore were named Fiah Ayub, Fiah Musa and Fiah Ismail.
Aged between 27 and 51, the 13 detained comprised six Malays, four Indians, and one each of Javanese, Boyanese and Malayalee descent, and were hitherto unknown figures in the Muslim community.
The remaining two, both Singaporeans, were released on Sunday after it was confirmed that they were not part of JI. They were served with restriction orders barring them from further contact with any terrorist organisation.
One of the JI cells attempted to procure 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, a chemical often used in truck bombs and the same that was used in the 1995 Oklahoma bombing in the United States.
This was under the direction of two foreigners, one calling himself 'Sammy' and believed to be linked to al-Qaeda, the other calling himself 'Mike' and believed to be a trainer and bomb-maker with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines.
The attempt was foiled when the Internal Security Department arrested the man doing the procuring, Mohd Ellias.
Another JI cell undertook video surveillance of the Yishun MRT station, part of a plan to attack a shuttle bus service used to ferry US personnel from Sembawang Wharf to Yishun MRT station.
The videotape and some handwritten debriefing notes in Arabic were later found in the rubble of an al-Qaeda leader's house in Afghanistan.
Apparently also targeted for attack were US naval vessels in the waters between Changi and Pulau Tekong.
'The group appeared to be dominated by foreign elements and subscribed to these elements' extremist ideology and its anti-American, anti-West agenda,' the Government said.
It also noted that their activities began long before the Sept 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
The surveillance activities of the first JI cell in support of terrorist targeting began as early as 1997, led by a 39-year-old printer, Khalim bin Jaffar.
Of the eight confirmed to have gone to Afghanistan for training in al-Qaeda camps, one went as early as 1991.
The JI's local leader, an Indian Muslim condominium manager and part-time ustaz or religious teacher, Ibrahim Maidin, went in 1993.
The courses they took in Afghanistan included the use of AK-47s and mortars, and the study of military tactics.
The Government said the 13, none of whom had ever attended madrasahs or Islamic religious schools, were recruited into the JI when they were part of Ibrahim Maidin's religious classes. They were not known to be active members of any particular mosque or local Muslim organisation.
'They maintained tight operational secrecy, using code-names and code-words for communication,' said the Government.
Investigations are still continuing.