Posted on 10/28/2004 5:56:45 PM PDT by Axion
Summary
Debate continues over the disappearance of nearly 400 tons of explosives from an Iraqi munitions depot. It is not clear what happened to the cache (though it is likely in the hands of insurgent groups). What is clear is that Iraqi militants are growing increasingly combative. This has the potential of creating the same kind of chaos in Iraq that Lebanon suffered through in the 1980s. How the U.S.-led coalition might prevent this from happening depends, in large part, on the U.S. presidential election.
Analysis
Army Col. David Perkins commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division when it captured the Al Qaqaa weapons depot during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. On Oct. 28, after The New York Times reported that 377 tons of explosives were missing from the depot, Perkins, now a staff officer at the Pentagon, said it is "very highly improbable" that the munitions were removed after the arrival of U.S. forces.
Whatever became of the explosives at al Qaqaa, the level of violence and the existence of numerous rival insurgent groups clearly show that Iraq is armed to the teeth. If the general elections in Iraq, scheduled in January 2005, fail to produce some semblance of political consensus across the three main communities -- Sunni, Shia and Kurd -- there is a great danger that the country will see the kind of civil war chaos that gripped Lebanon in the 1980s.
Lebanon had Sunni, Shiite and Christian communities, each of which had its own factional subsets. During the civil war, many of these groups banded together to fight the Israeli invasion. Exacerbating the situation in Lebanon was the headquarters of a foreign terrorist group --Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization -- similar to Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's presence in Iraq. Neighboring Syria was also involved in Lebanon, with boots on the ground. In Iraq, there is talk of introducing forces from Muslim states to assume the day-to-day security role. Meanwhile, local paramilitary and police forces are being overwhelmed by the various militant factions and are unable to shape events -- just as in Lebanon.
This begs the question: What role will U.S.-led coalition forces play in preventing anarchy in Iraq? The answer depends on which candidate wins the U.S. presidential election Nov 2. Both candidates agree that pulling out of Iraq prematurely is not an option. Where they differ is in their exit strategies and the roles they envision for international allies and other states.
If President George W. Bush is re-elected, the United States is likely to play the lead role in security, while a White House under Sen. John Kerry would likely try to enlist the French, Germans, Russians and others in helping share the burden. Both candidates have yet to provide anything like a roadmap for securing Iraq and withdrawing coalition forces. Whatever route is ultimately chosen, the plan will certainly involve bringing the various Iraqi groups together in a power-sharing arrangement.
The majority Shiite community in the south and the Kurds in the north are cooperating with each other and with the coalition to keep the political process going. Even a few Sunni elements are on board -- or could come on board with enough inducement from Washington. Unfortunately, the three communities are at loggerheads over how power could be shared in a postwar Iraq. The result is more fear than cooperation as each community confronts a host of internal and external forces.
A good example of this is the situation in the majority Shiite community, where Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army has yet to give up its heavy weapons in spite of concerted combat with U.S. forces, lengthy negotiations and a weapons buyback program.
Internally, al-Sadr is not sure how long the Hawza, the Shiite clerical establishment in An Najaf led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, will support his movement. He is equally uncertain of ongoing support from the country's largest Shiite political party, Hizb al-Dawah (Islamic Call Party [HD]), or when his archrival group, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), will actively turn against him. Externally, U.S.-led coalition forces are battling a plethora of armed Sunni groups (some more hostile to the Shia than others) and Kurdish Peshmergas are cooperating with the coalition.
Given that occupying forces are a common enemy for both the Sunnis and Shia, Stratfor sources close to the Shiite community tell us that al-Sadr has made contact with Sunni insurgents to solicit cooperation against coalition forces. However, no deal appears likely anytime soon, and a fractured guerrilla war is likely to continue unabated.
Stratfor has said in the past that the Mehdi Army will likely evolve into an organization similar to the Lebanese Hezbollah -- a political party with a military wing. As it prepares for elections it remains wary of the security situation and, to some extent, is also preparing for further conflict.
Indeed, the multiplicity of groups, the availability of weapons and the presence of foreign militants and states make Iraq look more like Lebanon every day.
Stratfor has always been a doom and gloom source of negativism. It must be staffed by former Clinton appointees to the CIA and State.
In Lebanaon you had the following groups, geographically dispersed throught the country and all trying to kill one another at various times:
Sunni Arabs
Shiite Arabs
Druze Arabs
Maronite Christians
Palestinians
The notion that Iraq is as Balkanized as Lebanon when almost all of the Shiites (60% of the population) and all of the Kurds support the movement towards elections is ludicrous
What you have is a Sunni Arab minority attempting to reimpose a Sunni-fascist state on the majority.
Nothing here let's move along.
I agree, those whose reading skills do not rise to the level of a GED, should not read STRATFOR.
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