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[continued - part 2 - 1918 Flu]----------------------------- Ebright also believes that using an enhanced biosafety level-3 lab for the work was inadequate. If the researchers were going to do the work at all, they should have used level 4, the strictest biosafety condition, he says. ------------------------------- This requires experimenters to wear full body suits. In 2003, he points out, a SARS virus escaped accidentally from a level-3 lab in Singapore, and in 2004, 2 further escapes occurred from such labs in Beijing. Tumpey counters that enhanced level 3, which requires upper body suits and respirators, is safe enough. Disgruntled employees aren't a concern either, he says, because he is the only one who works with the virus. The few researchers with access to the lab undergo extensive background checks, and retina and fingerprint scans are used to prevent any unauthorized entry to the lab. He adds that even if the virus did escape, it wouldn't have the same consequences as the 1918 pandemic. ______________________________________________________________ Most people now have some immunity to the 1918 virus because subsequent human flu viruses are in part derived from it. And, in mice, regular flu vaccines and drugs are at least partly effective against an infection with reconstructed viruses that contain some of the genes from 1918 flu. _______________________________________________________________ The other potential threat comes from the availability of the full genome sequence, which has been put on the GenBank database -- a condition of the paper's publication. Anyone can order DNA to be made to a certain sequence, points out Jonathan Tucker, a policy analyst at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington DC. There are currently no governmental controls on what sequences can be used, says Tucker, although some DNA synthesis companies now screen their orders for pathogenic sequences. ------------------------------- If someone wants to reconstruct the virus, says Taubenberger, "the technology is available". Philip Campbell, editor-in-chief of Nature, says that although he did not seek advice on whether to publish the work, he has done so for previous flu-virulence and pathogen genome papers. He says that the benefits clearly outweigh the risks. Donald Kennedy, editor-in-chief of Science, agrees about the merits of publication. "I think we are going to depend on this kind of knowledge," he says. --------------------------------------- The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) reached a similar conclusion about both studies, after calling an emergency meeting last week to consider the risks. But, concerned about public fears, it asked the authors of both papers to add a passage to the manuscripts stating that the work is important for public health and was conducted safely. Campbell says he is worried that government agencies will start seeking to be involved in the publishing process. ------------------------------------------ "We are happy to cooperate with the NSABB to consider the principles by which dual-use results can be published responsibly," he says. "But government bureaucracies and committees may push to avoid perceived risks, at the potential expense of benefits to public security." ______________________________________________________________ Taubenberger admits that there can be no absolute guarantee of safety. "We are aware that all technological advances could be misused," he says. "But what we are trying to understand is what happened in nature and how to prevent another pandemic. In this case, nature is the bioterrorist." ------------------------------- [Byline: Andreas von Bubnoff] -- ProMED-mail -------------------------------- [see also: Influenza virus, 1918 pandemic strain: reconstruction 20051005.2901 Influenza activity update & 2005/2006 vaccine reco... 20050915.2726 2004 ---- Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 pandemic strain 20041007.2754 Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 ... (02) 20041008.2757 Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 ... (03) 20041009.2769, Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 ... (04) 20041011.2780, Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 ... (05) 20041013.2790, Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 ... (06) 20041013.2793, Influenza A virus, virulence, 1918 ... (02) 20041015.2810] .....................cp/pg/jw