N.C. judge dismisses voting machine case; vendor may pull out
Posted on 11/29/2005 12:19:42 PM PST by Zuben Elgenubi
RALEIGH, N.C. (AP) - One of the nation's leading suppliers of electronic voting machines may decide against selling new equipment in North Carolina after a judge declined Monday to protect it from criminal prosecution should it fail to disclose software code as required by state law.
Diebold Inc., which makes automated teller machines and security and voting equipment, is worried it could be charged with a felony if officials determine the company failed to make all of its code -- some of which is owned by third-party software firms, including Microsoft Corp. -- available for examination by election officials in case of a voting mishap.
The requirement is part of the minimum voting equipment standards approved by state lawmakers earlier this year following the loss of more than 4,400 electronic ballots in Carteret County during the November 2004 election. The lost votes threw at least one close statewide race into uncertainty for more than two months.
About 20 North Carolina counties already use Diebold voting machines, and the State Board of Elections plans to announce Thursday the suppliers that meet the new standards. Local elections boards will be allowed to purchase voting machines from the approved vendors.
``We will obviously have no alternative but withdraw from the process,'' said Doug Hanna, a Raleigh-based lawyer representing North Canton, Ohio-based Diebold.
David Bear, a Diebold spokesman, said the company was reviewing several options after Monday's ruling. ``We're going to do what is necessary to provide what is best for our existing clients'' in North Carolina, he said.
The dispute centers on the state's requirement that suppliers place in escrow ``all software that is relevant to functionality, setup, configuration, and operation of the voting system,'' as well as a list of programmers responsible for creating the software.
That's not possible for Diebold's machines, which use Microsoft Windows, Hanna said. The company does not have the right to provide Microsoft's code, he said, adding it would be impossible to provide the names of every programmer who worked on Windows.
The State Board of Elections has told potential suppliers to provide code for all available software and explain why some is unavailable. That's not enough of an assurance for Diebold, which remains concerned about breaking a law that's punishable by a low-grade felony and a civil penalty of up to $100,000 per violation.
``You cannot have a statute that imposes a criminal violation ... without being clear about what conduct will submit you to a criminal violation,'' Hanna said.
But because no one has yet to accuse Diebold of breaking the law, Wake County Superior Court Judge Narley Cashwell declined to issue an injunction that would have protected the company from prosecution. Cashwell also declined to offer an interpretation of the law that would have allayed Diebold's concerns.
``We need to comply with the literal language and the statute,'' Cashwell said. ``I don't think we have an issue here yet.''
Diebold machines were blamed for voting disruptions in a California primary election last year. California has refused to certify some machines because of their malfunction rate. California officials have agreed to let a computer expert attempt to hack into Diebold machines to examine how secure they are.
On Monday, California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson said his office might seek to expand such testing to all systems seeking certification for use in California's 58 counties.
Diebold shares fell 71 cents, or 1.8 percent, to close at $38.93 Monday on the New York Stock Exchange.
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NC ping
While code dealing with voting and tabulation should be available, I can't see that the operating system code has any relevance.
That said, I dislike these computer voting machines. I've been a programmer, and know that I could bury routines in code that could manipulate results. I doubt that anyone would find them or any evidence that they ever existed.
It's hard enough to keep track of code if you're writing it, much less examining someone else's code. Just about every program has abandoned or nonfunctional blocks of code in it. Those are the places to hide stuff. In any case, there is just way too much chance of fraud when computers are involved. I don't like them for elections. In fact, I'd like to see hand counts exclusively.
Anyone know what party Narley Cashwell belongs to, or what his record is? I found a couple of his cases on-line, but no biography.
A Narley Cashwell is listed as a policeman and as Vice President of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. I don't know if this is the judge at an earlier time, or maybe his son? Probably his son, since the website appears to have been updated in 2005.
http://www.ncpba.org/raleigh-wake(new).htm
They ought to be forced to disclose their tabulation codes for all to see.
Yep. An easier solution is to have a hard printout that is viewable after the voter is finished for postive verification. That way every machine can be verified after the election for monkey business.
We fill in the circle next to the name with a Sharpie. Works every time. But...wasn't it the Democrats who demanded these voting machines after Floriduh in 2000?
WOOO-HOOO!!! :-)
The best voting machines I have seen are optical scan type. Then again, that would require someone to be able to READ the ballot.
"Yep. An easier solution is to have a hard printout that is viewable after the voter is finished for postive verification. That way every machine can be verified after the election for monkey business."
This is the one place where I think open source software is an absolute necessity. I don't trust my vote to a machine with no paper trail where the public can't know what the code underneath is doing.
"I can't help chuckling at the thought of Diebold pulling up the NC courthouse with 50 18-wheelers filled with a hard copy of the Windows source code, or the look on faces the 2 "experts" NC hires to go through it all."
A few years ago IIRC Hughes decided to stop all those with pirated cards for their satellites. Instead of downloading a program that would be caught by the pirates and circumvented, they downloaded small regular updates that included some stray code.
A final update had another bit of code in it that brought all the previous stray code bits together, forming a program that destroyed the card.
It's easy to hide stuff.
Put a routine in that makes the machine print the opposite of the vote tallied and you can still have chaos.
That certainly would help their competitors cut back on their R & D.
"Good lord, no. The potential for fraud in that "voter takes a printout home" is 100%."
Oh, I didn't mean that those would be used in tabulations, ever. I just would like a copy of what the machine recorded as my vote. Some other secure form of hard copy would be needed for recounts, for sure.
Will get back to you on affiliation if I find anything.
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