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I recall that we were told the terrorists once used pictures to transmit information.
Buried in the photo's letter equivalents was messages.

Steganography.

To assume that the terrorists are not expecting us listening in is absurd. They will be taking all sorts of measures to avoid dedection.

I agree.

Asking FISA permission for any of these monitorings would likely yield a no answer. If it were done once, the administration would have a problem with precedents set.

I don't think the warrants are drawn in a way that limits the ability to gather whatever useful data is there. The NSA issue is whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy (impying a private communication) of a US citizen is violated by a warrantless intrusion that supposedly is also short on probable cause.

The NSA issue is whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy (impying a private communication) of a US citizen is violated by a warrantless intrusion that supposedly is also shot on probable cause.

If I receive one word that unlocks a coded meesage in an otherwise mundane conversation and I have never had previous communication could the US get a warrant even after the fact?

I recall that we were told the terrorists once used pictures to transmit information. Buried in the photo's letter equivalents was messages.

Steganography.

To assume that the terrorists are not expecting us listening in is absurd. They will be taking all sorts of measures to avoid dedection.

I agree.

First, it is unlikely that NSA was monitoring content. They were undoubtedly monitoring only for connections among the al Qeada network.

When Sheik Mohammad was nabbed they also got his laptop (and let's just speculate cellphone). So lets say he had 100 email addresses in Outlook (remember, the Sheik was U.S. educated) and a total of 40 numbers in his cellphone (inbound and outbound).

Immediately this info is relayed to NSA, which places a "watch list" on core routers and phone switches (my theory being grossly generic) for (a) the 100 email addresses and (b) the 40 phone numbers.

Within 48 hours, you announce the capture of Sheik Mohammad. With the help of your watch list, you now observe which connections "light up". Which address gets activated, and to which other address? Now you add that new info to your watch list. Perhaps run some new disinformation. Who lights up again?

What you're doing is building a plausible (not definitive) network map *using addresses only, not content*.

As time goes on you determine which activity (connections in the network) appears to be of interest, so you go and get your FISA warrant for that specific address or addresses.

There is a simple illustration of network analysis. But reading between the lines of the last two weeks, I'm convinced that this is what the program entailed.

And it would be extremely difficult to evade. The NYT story - however bogus its conclusion - did assert that the program started from captured al Qaeda materials. And I specifically recall that they got Sheik Mohammad's laptop (although that also could have been disinfo to jumpstart a new round of connections).