The Democrats were united and assured of the South, the Border States (except Maryland, which went for Fillmore), Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and Illinois. Southern Democrats wanted their shot at power and weren't going to waste it.
If Fremont had shown more signs of winning, secession talk would have been louder, and if he'd won, there might well have been a secession in 1856.
In 1850-1 there was a lot of talk about secession. I would surmise that it failed because neither party was anti-slavery, Calhoun and Clay were still alive, and the country had just passed through a victorious and unifying war, rather than six or ten years of sectional conflict.
You needed a run-up to rebellion. Enough Southerners had to feel that they'd exhausted alternative approaches before they would take such a radical step.
In 1860, by contrast, Southern Democrats split their party, ensuring the election of a Republican, an event which could serve as a pretext for secession. What was going on there?
Clearly John Brown was a factor, but I doubt one could say he was the main one. He was something demagogues could use to scare voters, but politicians had a pretty clear assessment of what was going on, and weren't so easily cowed themselves.
To be sure, there was fear in the South in the days leading up to war, but there was also a great enthusiasm for taking a revolutionary step. Those who believe in the Southern version of victim history leave that out of their accounts.
Also, I doubt Republicans "winked and nodded" at Brown. That's the sort of claim that people love to make then or now about this party or that, but when you look at the record there's usually less to such allegations than people want to believe.
Agreed, but Wise was one of those inclined to speak off the cuff. He invited Southern governors to meet in Raleigh to discuss what Southern States should do if Fremont was elected, and only NC and SC showed up. And they didn’t do anything in the end. There was no popular clamour for secession in 1856, I would assert, because the violence I spoke of had largely not occurred yet.
If Fremont had shown more signs of winning, secession talk would have been louder, and if he'd won, there might well have been a secession in 1856.
You didn’t have State legislatures passing resolutions about secession in 1856 like you did in 1860 (e.g. Alabama and Mississippi). It is not coincidental that the Alabama Resolutions (Feb. 24, 1860) were issued in the immediate aftermath of Harper’s Ferry, when there was talk of northerners rescuing Brown before his execution, northerners publicly praising his efforts, and public mourning of his execution. These acts by private citizens indicated how they intended to conduct themselves in the future.
In 1850-1 there was a lot of talk about secession. I would surmise that it failed because neither party was anti-slavery, Calhoun and Clay were still alive, and the country had just passed through a victorious and unifying war, rather than six or ten years of sectional conflict.
You needed a run-up to rebellion. Enough Southerners had to feel that they'd exhausted alternative approaches before they would take such a radical step.
In 1860, by contrast, Southern Democrats split their party, ensuring the election of a Republican, an event which could serve as a pretext for secession. What was going on there?
Obviously, there were elements in the South that demanded either (A) complete acquiescence in Southern demands, or (b) secession. That is the mindset of some of the delegates who went to Charleston.
As for the Compromise measures of 1850/51, those advocating their adoption (e.g. Clay and Webster) presented them as a “final adjustment” of the slavery issues. These measures were accepted by the people of the South on that basis. When the compromise measures weren’t honoured by the Northern people, the people of the South felt betrayed, and had reason to doubt the sincerity of any future compromise proposal.
Clearly John Brown was a factor, but I doubt one could say he was the main one. He was something demagogues could use to scare voters, but politicians had a pretty clear assessment of what was going on, and weren't so easily cowed themselves.
To be sure, there was fear in the South in the days leading up to war, but there was also a great enthusiasm for taking a revolutionary step. Those who believe in the Southern version of victim history leave that out of their accounts.
But that step only resonated with the people of the South after the violents events I wrote of.
Also, I doubt Republicans "winked and nodded" at Brown. That's the sort of claim that people love to make then or now about this party or that, but when you look at the record there's usually less to such allegations than people want to believe.
By winking and nodding, I meant certain concrete acts that were taken by Northern Republican office holders. For example (as I mentioned in an earlier post), Gov. Samuel Kirkwood (Republican, Iowa) and Governor William Dennison (Republican, Ohio) refused to extradite to Virginia those wanted for their connection to the Harper’s Ferry insurrection. Kirkwood’s excuse was that the extradition request wasn’t notarized. (I went to Richmond and saw the original letter from Kirkwood to Letcher). Dennison informed Letcher that there was no statute in the Ohio statute book that would allow him to extradite someone wanted to trial in another State. (Letcher then found the Ohio statute for Gov. Dennison.) Additionally, Dennison wrote that the indictment did not specify that the accused had ever been in Virginia, and thus he could not have fled to State to escape prosecution. Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, refused to allow a deputy of the US Senate apprehend Frank Sanborn and take him to Washington to testify to the Mason Committee investigating the Harper’s Ferry insurrection. These incidents were noted in newspapers all across the South at the time. In addition, the incidents were specifically referenced in the secession declarations of South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia in laying out their reasons for wanting out of the Union.
Ultimately, however, the decision to secede (and thus go to war, although these two things are not the same thing) was a complex one. There were a number of reasons, some directly related to protecting the investment of Southerners in that form of “property” others not directly related, and some not related at all. And the key thing is that any particular individual could have felt any or all of these reasons. And some of those reasons are completely honorable.