Ethiopian Troops Advance on Mogadishu (May Capture Somali Captial in 24-48 hrs)

ETHIOPIAN troops are advancing on the Somali capital and could seize it within two days.

Somalia's envoy to Ethiopia said yesterday: "Ethiopian forces are on their way to Mogadishu. They are about 70 kilometres away and it is possible they could capture it in the next 24 to 48 hours."

Addis Ababa has vowed to protect Somalia's weak interim Government from rival Islamists based in Mogadishu, and a week of artillery and mortar duels between the two sides has spiralled into open war that both sides say has killed hundreds.

Islamist fighters have retreated from the front line, with troops loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts withdrawing more than 50 kilometres to the south-east from Daynuney, a town just south of the Government's headquarters of Baidoa.

Ethiopian jets fired missiles at the retreating soldiers yesterday, after bombing Somalia's two Islamist-held international airports on Monday.

While the Government hailed the retreat as a partial victory, the Islamists insisted their withdrawal and re-grouping was a tactic in what they vowed would be a long war.

The Islamist forces also abandoned their main stronghold in Bur Haqaba and were forming convoys heading towards the capital Mogadishu, reported residents in villages along the road.

"We woke up from our sleep this morning and the town was empty of troops, not a single Islamic fighter," said Ibrahim Muhammad Aden, a resident of Bur Haqaba. Another resident said locals were looting the food left behind.

Islamic fighters were also reportedly retreating on two other fronts in the war for control of Somalia. On the northern front, Government and Ethiopian troops entered the town of Bulo Barde, where two weeks ago a Muslim cleric said anyone who did not pray five times a day would be executed.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced on Saturday that he had sent troops into Somalia to fight international terrorists, defend Ethiopian interests and prop up the besieged UN-backed Government, which has only a small military force.

But Mr Zenawi has said he does not intend to keep his forces in Somalia for long. He has told visiting dignitaries in Addis Ababa that his goal is to severely damage the Islamic Courts' military capabilities, take away their sense of invincibility and allow both sides to return to peace talks on an even footing.

The Islamic group, which wants to rule the country by the Koran, has been a source of grave concern for Ethiopia. Since June, it has seized control of the capital and much of southern Somalia.

No reliable casualty reports are available. Both sides claim to have killed hundreds of their enemy, but independent observers were not given access to the battlefield. The Arab League, which has mediated several rounds of talks between the Somali Government and the Islamists, called for all parties involved to "immediately hold a comprehensive ceasefire".

Many Somalis are enraged by Ethiopian involvement - the countries have fought two wars over their disputed border in the past 45 years.

Somalia has not had an effective government since warlords overthrew dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, plunging the country into chaos.

Joint Ethiopian And Somalia Govt. Forces Advance Towards Mogadishu

December 26, 2006 2:33 p.m. EST

Julie Farby - All Headline News Staff Writer
Mogadishu, Somalia (AHN) - Joint Somalia government and Ethiopian forces advanced towards Mogadishu, forcing the ruling Union of Islamic Courts into retreat, but sparking fears of a full-scale war. The Islamic Courts militia have ruled Mogadishu since June, slowly consolidating their power across the country and imposing Islamic Sharia law in areas under its control.

On route to the capital of Mogadishu, the Ethiopian military and Somalia forces attacked towns held by the Union of Islamic Courts and bombed Mogadishu's main airport.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said initial reports revealed as many as 1,000 people have died in the conflict so far, but added that a "very significant proportion of them are not Somalis," most likely referring to foreign radicals who have reportedly joined the fighting on the side of the Islamists.

As Ethiopian forces prepare to enter the Somali capital, Islamist forces have started to retreat. However, signaling that the war is far from over, Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, a senior leader of the Islamic Courts militia, says, "The war is entering a new phase... We will fight Ethiopia for a long, long time and we expect the war to go everyplace."

http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7005963497

History of Somalia since the collapse of the last effective central government:

• April 1992: Massive U.N. relief operation begins to help thousands of civilians left starving because of fighting. More than 100,000 people died between 1991-92.

• January 1993: U.S. stages first airstrike on warlord‘s headquarters.

• March 1994: U.S. troops withdraw from Somalia, leaving a U.N. peacekeeping operation in place.

• August 1998: Simultaneous suicide bombings destroy the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 Africans and 12 Americans. The ringleaders flee to Somalia.

• March 2003: Warlord Mohammed Dhere captures a suspect in the 1998 bombings and turns him over to U.S. authorities, via Kenya. There are reports he has captured other suspected al-Qaida members and turned them over to U.S. authorities as well.

• March 2005: Islamic leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former army colonel, threatens a holy war if foreign troops enter Somalia again, pledges to establish an Islamic government.

• June 5: Militias loyal to the Council of Islamic Courts drive the warlords from Mogadishu.

• June 30: Osama bin Laden releases a tape calling on Muslims to support the Islamic courts and to open a third front in the war against the United States in Somalia.

• Oct. 9: The Council of Islamic Courts declares holy war on Ethiopia.

• Dec. 6: The U.N. Security Council U.N. Security Council authorizes a regional peacekeeping force for Somalia.

• Dec. 19: The first direct fighting between the Islamic courts and troops from the Somali government and Ethiopia begins.

• Dec. 25: Ethiopian jets bomb Mogadishu-area airports.

• Dec. 26: Government soldiers, joined by Ethiopian troops, advance toward the capital; Islamic fighters, who have threatened suicide attacks, promise a "new phase" in the war.

Why Arabs Lose Wars
September 2, 2002

At lot has been written lately about why Arab armies so consistently lose wars with non-Arabs. These reasons also explain why Arab nations, and many other Third World nations as well, also have trouble establishing democratic governments or prosperous economies. A lot of it has to do with culture, especially culture influenced by Islam. Some of the reasons for these failures are;

Most Arab countries are a patchwork of different tribes and groups, and Arab leaders survive by playing one group off against another. Loyalty is to one's group, not the nation. Most countries are dominated by a single group that is usually a minority (Bedouins in Jordan, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq, Nejdis in Saudi Arabia). All of which means that officers are assigned not by merit but by loyalty and tribal affiliation.

Islamic schools favor rote memorization, especially of scripture. Most Islamic scholars are hostile to the concept of interpreting the Koran (considered the word of God as given to His prophet Mohammed). This has resulted in looking down on Western troops that will look something up that they don't know. Arabs prefer to fake it, and pretend it's all in their head. Improvisation and innovation is generally discouraged. Arab armies go by the book, Western armies rewrite the book and thus usually win.

There is no real NCO corps. Officers and enlisted troops are treated like two different social castes and there is no effort to bridge the gap using career NCOs. Enlisted personnel are treated harshly. Training accidents that would end the careers of US officers are commonplace in Arab armies, and nobody cares.

Officers are despised by their troops, and this does not bother the officers much it all. Many Arab officers simply cannot understand how treating the troops decently will make them better soldiers.

Paranoia prevents adequate training. Arab tyrants insist that their military units have little contact with each other, thus insuring that no general can became powerful enough to overthrow them. Units are purposely kept from working together or training on a large scale. Arab generals don't have as broad a knowledge of their armed forces as do their Western counterparts. Promotions are based more on political reliability than combat proficiency. Arab leaders prefer to be feared, rather than respected, by their soldiers. This approach leads to poorly trained armies and low morale. A few rousing speeches about "Moslem brotherhood" before a war starts does little to repair the damage.

Arab officers often do not trust each other. While an American infantry officer can be reasonably confident that the artillery officers will conduct their bombardment on time and on target, Arab infantry officers seriously doubt that their artillery will do its job on time or on target. This is a fatal attitude in combat.

Arab military leaders consider it acceptable to lie to subordinates and allies in order to further their personal agenda. This had catastrophic consequences during all of the Arab-Israeli wars and continues to make peace difficult between Israelis and Palestinians. When called out on this behavior, Arabs will assert that they were "misunderstood."

While American officers and NCOs are only too happy to impart their wisdom and skill to others (teaching is the ultimate expression of prestige), Arab officers try to keep any technical information and manuals secret. To Arabs, the value and prestige of an individual is based not on what he can teach, but on what he knows that no one else knows.

While American officers thrive on competition among themselves, Arab officers avoid this as the loser would be humiliated. Better for everyone to fail together than for competition to be allowed, even if it eventually benefits everyone.

Americans are taught leadership and technology; Arab officers are taught only technology. Leadership is given little attention as officers are assumed to know this by virtue of their social status as officers.

Initiative is considered a dangerous trait. So subordinates prefer to fail rather than make an independent decision. Battles are micromanaged by senior generals, who prefer to suffer defeat rather than lose control of their subordinates. Even worse, an Arab officer will not tell a US ally why he cannot make the decision (or even that he cannot make it), leaving US officers angry and frustrated because the Arabs won't make a decision. The Arab officers simply will not admit that they do not have that authority.

Lack of initiative makes it difficult for Arab armies to maintain modern weapons. Complex modern weapons require on the spot maintenance, and that means delegating authority, information, and tools. Arab armies avoid doing this and prefer to use easier to control central repair shops. This makes the timely maintenance of weapons difficult.

Security is maniacal. Everything even vaguely military is top secret. While US Army promotion lists are routinely published, this rarely happens in Arab armies. Officers are suddenly transferred without warning to keep them from forging alliances or networks. Any team spirit among officers is discouraged.

All these traits were reinforced, from the 1950s to the 1990s, by Soviet advisors. To the Russians, anything military was secret, enlisted personnel were scum, there was no functional NCO system, and everyone was paranoid about everyone else. These were not "communist" traits, but Russian customs that had existed for centuries and were adopted by the communists to make their dictatorship more secure from rebellion. Arab dictators avidly accepted this kind of advice, but are still concerned about how rapidly the communist dictatorships all came tumbling down between 1989-91.
Such a system can produce fearsome looking armies, but not a force that can survive an encounter with well trained and led soldiers.

http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles2002/20020909.asp

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