[AdmSmith]

Q: You have your own ideas regarding Wilayat-e-Faqih and you believe that this concept is confronted by a problem, in what way?

A: I believe the Wilayat-e-Faqih stage in Iran is drawing to a close and if indeed it did have any future, I believe that the next Wali al Faqih will be from Tehran not Qom because governing society requires more than knowledge of jurisprudential knowledge. It is common knowledge that if we wanted to use al Sayyed Khamenei as a benchmark for a jurist, we would find that he is not one but instead is an individual who has some knowledge of fight. However, I believe he has managed the society in the same way that Ayatollah Khomeini did; his method was good but that depends on his political experience since Khamenei was the president of Iran for eight years and he also held other political positions. The applies to al Sayyed Mohammed Khatemi and al Sayyed Hashemi Rafsanjani both of whom have political experience and have held the post of president, as well as ministerial positions.

However, society is in greater need of these positions than the hawza is. In the future, Qom may not have a role in Wilayat-e-Faqih. It may come as a surprise to you if I told you that some of Qom’s grand ayatollahs do not believe in Wilayat-e-Faqih at all, such as Ayatollah Wahid Khurasani and Ayatollah al Khoei. In my book ‘Governance Theories in Shia Jurisprudence’, I have explained that the theory of Imam Ruhullah Khomeini regarding Wilayat-e-Faqih is one of many theories on the subject. This means that there is more than just one theory, view or perspective.

You’ll find that most fiqh students do not believe in Wilayat-e-Faqih or do so under the constraint of authorities. I believe that many of the current ayatollahs do not believe in Khomeini’s interpretation of Wilayat-e-Faqih. For example, my respected mentor Ayatollah Montazeri believes in Wilayat-e-Faqih but he has two points of contention with his teacher Khomeini’s theories: He refutes Ayatollah Khomeini’s belief that the Guardian Jurist is appointed by God, the Prophet, or the 12th Imam and says that the Wali al Faqih is popularly elected by representatives of the public or by the Assembly of Experts, thus making it the choice of the people and not God. The second point on which he disagrees with his teacher over is the authority of the Wali al Faqih; Khomeini deemed it absolute and unrestrained by anything in the same way that the Prophet’s authority is, while Ayatollah Montazeri disagrees and upholds that it is bound by laws, which are the condition between the Guardian Jurist and the people. Both are governed by this law and neither are above it.

I told my teacher Ayatollah Montazeri, you criticized your teacher on two issues and I would like to criticize you in another two, to which he replied: after four criticisms there will be no meaning left for the Wilayat-e-Faqih. Yes, I responded. I said to him that Khomeini believed the Wilayah delegated a ‘revealed and absolute’ authority to the Guardian Jurist, you believe the Wilaya to be ‘restrained and elected’, I do not believe in the notion of Wilaya but I believe in fiqh. There is no correlation between the two and furthermore, the relationship between the people and the ruler is not that if a ‘Wilayah’ but rather a wikala [appointing representatives, delegation and procurement] – which means popularly elected representatives like parliament.

The notion of a religious guardianship does not figure into the relationship between the people and the ruler, moreover, it is not like the guardianship a father has over his son. The concept of guardianship is a religious one that is very dangerous in politics. Writing about Wilayat-e-Faqih in his book, Ayatollah Khomeini likened it to the guardianship a father has over his children and I have criticized that in my book saying that we are not children. I wrote that there are two types of incompetence; those who are declared incompetent by reason of insanity or by virtue of young age and as such, others take decisions on their behalf. The two types are: those deemed publicly incompetent and who are incompetent on a private level. Those who are incompetent on a public level cannot make their own decisions and other must make their decisions for them – others who are appointed by God, the Prophet, or the Mehdi. I told Montazeri, although he personally does not believe in this view, that the Wilayah may be understood through two different perspectives, ‘management’ and ‘hajr’ [limiting one’s power after declaring incompetent]. I said to him, by Wilayah you mean management so let us use another expression, additionally, ‘wilaya’ is a Quranic concept and because of the complexity of its meaning it has been used differently in accordance with the interpretation.

My main objection to my teacher Ayatollah Montazeri is regarding his statement that the most important characteristic for leadership or Wilayah is the knowledge of fiqh. I told him that a leader can have a consultative council of Shariah jurists but that the leader himself must have experience in managing society – which is not a jurist’s job. A Wali may be well versed in fiqh but that is not a prerequisite for ruling. If you seek to become a grand ayatollah then it would require 50 years of experience in learning and teaching theology, to read a huge amount of material and to write a book on fatwa and fiqh, however managing a society is an objective political matter. If you want to be versed in politics then you must have the relevant political expertise –which an ayatollah wouldn’t have.

[AdmSmith]

Q: Why do you say that the time of Wilayat-e-Faqih in Iran will not endure much longer, is it because the Ayatollahs in Qom will no longer support the principle in the future, or because the Iranian people will exert pressure to decrease the authority of the Guardian Jurist by binding him to elections and laws?

A: Each will play a role: In Qom there are at least two schools, those who believe in Wilayat-e-Faqih, and they are financially and politically supported by the government and have many resources, and others who do not believe in it. I think that the school that does not believe in the Wilayat-e-Faqih is a considerable one that is not weak but strong and also has an ‘influence’ that is more important than power. The first school has ‘power and authority’, money, security and intelligence systems and suchlike – they are strong. The second school has ‘ideological and religious influence’ that is greater than the first.

There is a famous story in Iran that illustrates the authority of religion versus the regime’s authority: A century ago and during his reign, Nasser al Din Shah, one of al Qajar dynasty’s rulers wanted to start a tobacco trade in Iran and monopolize it after exporting it from England. He gave a large sum of money to the English to purchase it and told the Iranians who were in possession of tobacco to hand it over to him. Ayatollah Mirza Hasan Shirazi was the most important Ayatollah in Iran at the time, he issued a written decree that said: “In the name of God the merciful, the usage of tobacco in any way is equal to denouncing God and fighting against the 12th imam [known as the ‘hidden imam or the Mehdi who is the holiest figure in Shia Islam]. One day when Nasser al Din Shah asked one of his wives to bring his pipe so that he may smoke, she replied by saying that tobacco was forbidden. When he told her, “I am the king and your husband and I order you to bring the pipe, so bring it.” She answered, “He who has deemed me lawful as your wife has said that tobacco is forbidden for you.

In Iran the power of religion is greater than the power of government. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was the people's revolution, 18-year-old Iranian university students were among those who led it ¬– it was a true revolution that come through the majority of society, however the political system that was pledged before it was not the same as what came after it. In my book ‘Governance Theories in Shia Jurisprudence’, I wrote that we have four different versions of Imam Khomeini: the ‘Imam of Qom’, when Khomeini was in Qom; the ‘Imam of Najaf’, when he was forced to leave to Najaf and remained there for 15 years; the ‘Imam of Paris’, when he traveled to Paris from Najaf to remain there for a year, and the ‘Imam of Tehran’, when he returned following the success of the revolution and became the Wali al Faqih for 10 years before his died.

When Imam Khomeini was in Al Hawzah al Ilmiya in Qom and was not very well-known, he believed like other ayatollahs in Qom in the limited constitutional monarchy for authority. In 1906, the Iranians carried out a people's revolution, with the support of clerics, to limit the powers of the king. While Khomeini was in Qom, in his book entitled ‘Discovery of Secrets’ that was published in Persian, he said, "There is no role for jurists in running the affairs of governance, as this is the task of the king, but the king must adhere to Islam. When Khomeini was forced to leave for Najaf under pressure from the king, at which point he became more popular and one of the most important ayatollahs in Iran, he wrote his famous theory on ‘Wilayat-e-Faqih’ or the general absolute guardianship of jurists, that is that jurists are appointed by God and have similar authority to the Prophet and may do anything they deem fit. Khomeini then headed to Paris where he said that his régime would be "an Islamic republic" that is modern and democratic, in which he would have no role. In Paris he signed the first draft of the new Iranian constitution, in which there was no mention at all of Wilayat-e-Faqih but only a reference to the presidential post, similar to the French system. Khomeini and other ayatollahs signed that draft; however, Khomeini’s opinions began to change slowly as time went on. Khomeini, as the third Imam or the "Imam of Paris", became well-known to the Iranians as his speeches and press interviews were published and distributed publicly all over Iran. When I wrote that Khomeini believed in the principle of absolute power for Waliyat-e-Faqih and that the Supreme Guide is appointed by God and not the people, the public responded by disagreeing and saying that he did not believe that and that the public had heard Khomeini speaking of a conditional guardianship. The public was correct because it had only heard the Imam of Paris. Al Khomeini said: I rule because the people chose me, therefore the people are correct, however there were two dimensions to Khomeini; he truly believed he was the people's choice, but he also believed that he was appointed by God. Before the revolution, Khomeini would show the first dimension and hid the second dimension, whereas after the revolution, he focused more on portraying the second dimension. From a political point of view, what he did was correct, and I think that we may reexamine his position and situation before the revolution and his method of administration.

The fourth Imam or the "Imam of Tehran" is Khomeini at the point in which he became the supreme commander and the supreme leader in Tehran. I believe that he was a political leader of the people who had charisma and leadership skills similar to Gandhi in India, Mao Zedong in China, or Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt; people admired and obeyed Khomeini. At that time however, Khomeini began to believe in absolute power for the supreme leader and he also focused on being appointed by God and like a prophet, he could govern outside the boundaries of religious ruling if he deemed it in the interest of the Islamic system or the Islamic nation. Furthermore, some of his comments demonstrated that he believed in democracy. Because of the ambiguity and contradictions between Khomeini’s words and actions, there are now two schools of thought in Iran today; the school of the great Ayatollah Montazeri, and the school of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi, the latter of whom understood that Khomeini was appointed by God and the public had no say or role in selecting him, saying that if any of Khomeini’s words were found that contradict this ruling then they are false and are only for the sake of argument. As for Montazeri, from his perspective, Khomeini believed in a limited Wilayat-e-Faqih, and in the people's role. In fact Khomeini made many statements that support Montazeri's explanation regarding democracy, such as his saying "the balance is the nation's opinion," meaning that the criterion with which to judge is the public’s vote. However, Khomeini also made statements that would support Yazdi's interpretation such as, “the rule of supreme leader cannot be objected by any person.” Thus both ayatollahs quote Khomeini to support their arguments which each state as "accurate" (from the text), while describing other positions that do not support their claims as "doubtful" (outside of the text) and consequently are not to be used as a reference. Misbah Yazdi's school states that “what is accurate is that Khomeini was appointed by God and what are doubtful are the situations that depict Khomeini to be a believer in democracy.” Thus, the doubtful issue is democracy (he laughs). The school of Ayatollah Montazeri contradicts this standpoint and claims the opposite; what is correct is that the guardianship is limited and that anything that claims the opposite is "doubtful". I think that from a historical viewpoint, the interpretation of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi is correct, but from a practical viewpoint, Ayatollah Montazeri is more accurate; practically, Khomeini was more democratic than the people who obeyed his orders, yet theoretically he was not. Khomeini was very skillful and like every charismatic leader, he wanted to please all his supporters so he established some kind of balance between the two camps that believed in him. After that, matters changed, Sayyed Khamanei does not have that same influence upon the scholars of Al Hawzah al Ilmiya in Qom or the same power in religious background. He was criticized by the democratic camp during the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, therefore, practically, Khamanei belongs to the first camp; he is closer to the school of Misbah Yazdi than he is to the school of Ayatollah Montazeri.

In turn, Montazeri's school is divided into several visions or branches, some of which regard Khomeini as a charismatic hero, such as Seyed Mohammad Khatami and the officials of Al Musharaka party, Seyed Mehdi Karroubi and the Etemad Melli party, and others from the same school who view Khomeini as a part of our history that we admire, yet also criticize. We admire him for his independence of the West and his struggle against Israel and America, but we require another kind of management of society because our time is perhaps different from his own. Personally, I do not believe in Wilayat-e-Faqih at all; I believe that we should have a democratic system that must respect Islamic values; we are Muslims with a Shia majority, and the situation is such that every government must respect the values of Islam and Shiism. In the Shura council (the parliament), it is normal to have several parties; each party can have a majority vote in the elections, form a government, and protect the rights of minorities. In doing so, I think we can protect our Islamic values whilst at the same time, have a democratic nation.

Q: Is it a generalization to say that there are three schools of thought in Iran regarding the concept of Wilayat-e-Faqih? The first believes in a Supreme Guide with unlimited power (the school of Misbah Yazdi), the second believes in the Supreme Guide with limited power (Khatemi and Karroubi for example), and the third school does not believe in the concept at all and considers it possible to establish an Islamic democracy without a Supreme Guide at all, such as yourself?

A: Firstly the juristic source for both the second and third streams is Ayatollah Montazeri, and both streams believe in elected guardianship or the jurist being elected by the nation, or by the people. The political symbols of that school are Khatami and Karroubi who do not believe in Montazeri, which is odd since they depend on his theory. Khatami and Karroubi believe that during the conflict between Khomeini and Montazeri, the latter was incorrect; I disagree. To be honest, I believe that those who criticized Montazeri were politicians loyal to Khomeini but did not want to leave the political arena because Montazeri criticized Khomeini candidly. I think he was very brave and through these criticisms he lost his position as Iran's Supreme Leader after Khomeini, which is not easy. After that Montazeri remained a prisoner in Qom for five years, he became very ill and was unable to continue his lessons in al Hawzah because of his illness. He is now roughly 82-years-old.

I think that the division is correct, but what I have mentioned about an Islamic democracy requires clarification; I do not think that democracy comes from Islam; we have no democracy in Islam. I said that we could have democracy and Islam at the same time. My interpretation of Islam is in harmony with democracy, but I do not claim that democracy comes from within Islam. In that regard I differ with Abul A’la al Maududi because he said that there is an Islamic democracy, and that democracy comes from the Quranic verse from Surah Ashura (…and their rule is to take counsel among themselves; 42:38). In my opinion I think that Shura does not conflict with democracy, but this does not mean that every person who believes in Shura also believes in democracy because Shura does not depend on the votes of electors.

Someone might come to me and ask for my advice and I have deliberated with everyone but in the end, I am the one who decides. We listen to others around us, but at the end the decision is ours alone. Shura then is another matter. It is not a democracy but it can be transformed into a democratic system, yet not every Shura is necessarily a democracy. That is why when I begun writing, I wrote that we can design a new form of democracy that is derived from Islam, but I was young then and when I began reading more and more I became more convinced and begun to believe that the principles of democracy are not part of our religious heritage, yet the latter can be interpreted in a way that agrees with the modern world. It is for this reason that we can have a new interpretation of Islam that is suitable to human rights, but that does not mean in our Islamic heritage we hold all the principles of human rights.

I wrote a research paper in which I identified six points in Islamic heritage that do not include the values of human rights; for example: the rights of women in Islam are not exactly like those outlined in the international human rights treaty. The second point is the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims; in the first act of the human rights treaty there is a statement of equality among all regardless of religion, color, race, or nationality. However, in the Islamic heritage, whether Shia or Sunni, there are rights for Muslims that are not afforded to non-Muslims; I say Islamic heritage because in my opinion Islam is the greatest, and that our interpretation of Islam whether Sunni or Shia, does not mean that we have understood real Islam as traditions, national and historical customs, as well as other things often overlap with Islam or our interpretation of it; therefore what we say is our interpretation of Islam according to traditions, customs, and history, but Islam is another matter. I took part in a discussion with some active members of the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood organizations and they were searching for a democratic example derived from Islam so I said to them, “We already did what you are trying to do now in Iran 30 years ago and we failed so do not follow the same path, which is to try and harmonize between the interpretation of Islam, not Islam itself, and democracy.” Having criticized some interpretations in Islam, I also object to some of the human rights principles in the West; I do not approve of homosexuality, as it is not correct religiously and intellectually; or pre-marital sex or [sexual] relations outside of marriage, the West says that these values and principles are correct, but I say no. I have criticized the modern Western values as well as traditional values of our own at the same time; I think we must assess both matters; we must have a mixture of Islamic and Western values but only after analysis and examination.