If I were to simply go with the odds, I believe the court would rule that this otherwise law-abiding citizen lacks standing to use the second amendment in his defense.
The DC Circuit might rule differently. Or they might say a $200 tax stamp is not an infringement. Or they might say that taxing an M16 is a reasonable regulation as long as an AR-15 is left untaxed.
I'm not asking you what you think WILL happen. I am asking you to apply your understanding of the Miller decision to tell me what YOU believe should happen, given that the Miller decision is the law.
robertpaulsen said: "...I believe the court would rule that this otherwise law-abiding citizen lacks standing to use the second amendment in his defense."
So you think that the court would rule that militia-membership is required? If a militia member were the defendant, would he have to prove something about the usefulness of the weapon?
The reason I ask is because the prosecution in Miller made TWO distinct arguments in asking for a reversal of the District Court dismissal. To me, it is very obvious that the reversal and remand was only granted based on one of the two arguments. The Supreme Court intentionally and purposely DID NOT grant the reversal and remand based on the other argument. I want to hear from you whether YOU think a militia-membership test is warranted and how you decided that such a test should be the law?
Another way of wording my question is really, do you recognize that there were two DISTINCT arguments by the prosecution in Miller? Do you recognize that usefulness of a weapon and militia-membership are two totally separate issues? Do you recognize that the Supreme Court was obligated to reverse and remand with instructions regarding both arguments if they thought they were relevant to the proposed trial of Miller and Layton?
Keep in mind that Miller and Layton probably WERE members of the "unorganized militia", as legally defined, and that they deserved the protection that such membership would afford them. The Supreme Court was obligated to instruct the lower court consistent with protecting the rights of the defendants.