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Here is some of the exchange that went on with respect to suppression of information relating to the criminal or national security investigation:

PROF. GUIORA: Suppose that Agent Wasky says “Please do not print this?”

JUDGE POLSTER: Hypothetically, I would want to know if release of that information would endanger people. Would it endanger lives, or would it compromise a very important criminal investigation, and balance that with the public right to know [the information]. [That is a] critical right in our country, and we guard that zealously. Generally once the media has something, they are free to print it. It is very difficult to get a prior restraint, but there are situations where they are imposed.

AGENT WASKY: As I said before, protection of life is paramount. We will damage a crime scene if it means saving somebody’s life. ... In the end, if we protect someone’s life, that might be a potential witness. We do not know. Why get him in danger? . .

PROF. GUIORA: Hypothetically speaking, could you foresee coming in front of Judge Polster and asking for prior restraint?

AGENT WASKY: In this case, no. The only way I could see [grounds for prior] restraint is if the information they would print would endanger someone’s life. As he said, if we had information from a singular source, that would identify the source and this terrorist group would kill that person. Not knowing the facts, [prior restraint] would be the only way of us coming and preventing someone from giving them someone’s life. [We would also have grounds for prior restraint if] that information was obtained through classified means, and that classification is of significant interest to national security. When I say national security, that means other people’s lives are at risk or the technique of getting it has saved other lives and that technique [needs to remain confidential to continue to be effective]. It is not necessarily the information that . . . is classified, and that understanding is very important.

Protecting sources of information protects how we get the information . . . . We can sanitize the information in a general fashion to get it out to the public, as long as we can be assured that how we get it remains confidential, because that might save someone’s life tomorrow. Osama Bin Laden, someone divulged that he was using a certain type of telephone. Classified information. Sources and methods. Not that we were able to find him, but it was how that was done that compromised a significant national security interest . . . we can not ever capture it that way anymore because it is out there. . . . [This is]why we might go to ask for a restraining order.

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MR. MEYER: It is working too. If there is another anthrax attack nobody is going to talk to reporters about it because we were all subpoenaed in the Steven Hatfill case, and we can all end up in prison.”

Comment:

Disclosure that the USG was intercepting Bin Laden’s satellite phone used in communicating the 1998 embassy bombings is a real life example. A device was put in the battery and then delivered by someone from Northern Virginia (and St. Louis) to Afghanistan. It was the satellite phone bought by the fellow (Khaleel Ziyad) living with the Dad of Al-Timimi’s friend, co-defendant Royer. There has been no public prosecution of that leaker but both Richard Clarke and Michael Scheuer agree it was a disastrous leak with ruinous consequences.

Given the context and history of past investigations involving Al Qaeda, jpl and treblerebel, it is not surprising that they know how to zealously safeguard classified information.

The reality, though, as Richard Clarke and Michael Scheuer have often said, most intelligence is open source.

It is public knowledge that when Brian Ross reported on December 20, 2001 that they were investigating former Battelle employees, experts knowledgeable about anthrax, such as Dr. A and Dr. B at GMU, were slated to be polygraphed, along with dozens of other scientists.