FORT DETRICK was not responsible for the anthrax attacks.
SADDAM was :
Comparatively, the FBI’s domestically originated-SSP hypothesis turned out to be futile. Slowly and steadily, it is perishing.59 Particularly, that the view that the old U.S. Army anthrax stockpile was not silica-based, while the fineness of various aerosols of anthrax spores - including Ames - applied by the U.S. Army for experimental infection studies after the U.S. biological weapons arsenal had been eliminated - even if including spray-dried spore powders containing silica - did not at all equal the quality of the SSP. Yet theoretically, some U.S. federal institutions, after fully recognizing the anthrax technology melting pot formed in Iraq (or Russia), might possibly have covertly accomplished the imitation of such a melting pot in the U.S. during the 1990s, and hence could perhaps be in support of the FBI hypothesis. Thus far, this possibility seems to be less likely, however. As the Christian Science Monitor put it: “A recent decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is an ironic reminder that one of the greatest whodunits in recent history remains a threat to the safety of Americans,”60 while Steven Hatfill, the man labeled by the FBI a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation, has been allowed to go forward with his defamation suit.
http://newsdetails.blogspot.com/2007/05/technical-intelligence-in-retrospect.html
Four distinct elements are involved - though possibly taking place unconnectedly with each other, in reality - in the course leading to the anthrax letter attack: the AS supplier; the basic powder technology supplier; the origination of the subsequent powdery bacillus modeling; and the SSP producer. The first three might be completely innocent, according to the following clustering. Namely, the AS supplier (to either Basson, el-Hibri, or another “legitimate” intermediary) was a U.S./British laboratory; the basic powder technology supplier was Denmark’s Niro; the origination of the powdery bacillus modeling was USSR/Russia, which preferred BT rather than BG, because the former is a much better simulant for BA spore powder; and the SSP producer - the fourth and cardinal element - was plausibly Iraq, thanks to having obtained and employed the first three elements together, thereby forming a superb integral in Iraq. Alternatively, Soviet or formerly Soviet institutions could constitute the first three elements altogether (or two of them), and al-Qaeda itself could be the intermediary (and the perpetrator, but not the SSP producer). Notably, and in spite of continuing claims that no solid connections - including the contexts of CBW at-large, as well as the 2001 Twin Towers attack - existed between al-Qaeda and Iraq, the opposite has increasingly and firmly been emerging since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.52
http://newsdetails.blogspot.com/2007/05/technical-intelligence-in-retrospect.html
Well, I’m sure the FBI will be having a press conference at some point that you can attempt to feebly mock.