GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence.
If you add up all the coalition troops, Iraqi MOD troops, and Iraqi policemen (who's jobs would have been done immediately following the invasion by coalition MP's or other soldiers) available at the height of the surge, you're in the several hundred thousand range. Granted, the indigenous forces aren't as effective as our soldiers, but when they're providing law and order through their presence, rather than having to overcome heavily armed resistance, they don't have to be.
I find it simpy amazing that people are still debating this - read the end of David Gregory's interview with Sec. Rumsfeld & Gen Pace from 5 Nov 07:
DAVID GREGORY: Hey, also your favorite subject: looking back. What's become conventional wisdom,simply Shinseki was right? If we simply had 400,000 troops or 200 and 300? What's your thought as you looked at it?
GEN. PACE: I'm sorry, sir. I didn't take the (unintelligible). I apologize.
SEC. RUMSFELD: First of all, I don't think Shinseki ever said that. I think he was pressed in a congressional hearing hard and hard and hard and over again, well, how many? And his answer was roughly the same as it would take to do the job - to defeat the regime. It wouldbe about the right amount for post-major combat operation stabilization. And they said, "Well,how much is that?" And I think he may have said then, "Well, maybe 200,000 or 300,000."
GEN. PACE: I think he said several.
DAVID GREGORY: Several, yes, several hundred thousand. (Cross talk.)
SEC RUMSFELD: Now, it turned out he was right. The commanders - you guys ended up wanting roughly the same as you had for the major combat operation, and that's what we've have. There is no damned guidebook that says what the number ought to be. We were queued up to go up to what, 400-plus thousand.
GEN. PACE: Yes, they were already in queue.
SEC. RUMSFELD: They were in the queue. We would have gone right on if they'd wanted them, but they didn't, so life goes on.
In short, not even Rumsfeld thinks Rumsfeld was right anymore - he's just looking for someone else to blame for being wrong.
As a Monday morning quarterback, I look at the initial estimates from two standpoints.
One, US commanders initially figured how many US troops it would take to topple and defeat Saddam's military .... and then maintain security until an indiginous power structure could take over. They were basically correct in their force numbers.
I think Shiniski (and perhaps others) were (pre-liberation) referring to the worst case scenario ... which never occurred militarily ... even though it might have seemed that way due to the tremendous havoc caused by insurgents with crude IED's and ambush explosives.
But the decision was made in April 2003 (a huge blunder in retrospect)... to disband the mainstream Iraq army and send them home, which allowed many soldier-aged Iraqi men to simply continue doing what they were trained to do only months before... which was fight Americans.
Secondly, Rumsfeld and others were wrong in that they expected the many tribal factions in Iraq to quickly recognize they were outgunned, and fall into place behind an Iraqi-led leaders.
In March, April, and May of 2003 .. if the US commanders would have taken the territories and then "held the territory" so to speak... the war would have gone much better, I believe.
We wrongly assumed that ALL Iraqi's would be happy to be free of Saddam, and eventually cooperate. (it didn't help that Saddam Hussein was not killed or captured until 10 months later, which gave these insurgent terrorists hope)
That was perhaps the biggest blunder of the early war.... NOT that we had too few troops.
The Iraqi army could have and perhaps should have been kept conscripted under super tight control.... until an Iraqi command structure could have been put in place friendly toward the US.
By giving up all that territory in the summer of 2003, and allowing terror insurgents to formulate in outlying areas... we gave them a second life.
It was not so much a 'numbers' mistake as it was a strategic blunders which yes, can and should be placed on Rumsfeld's head.
It was a tough situation. Asymetrical warfare is something the US military has had little if any experience in dealing with.... especially a country so large and diverse as Iraq.
That was the press conference where Rumsfeld denied there was any insurgency and tried to make Gen. Pace look like a fool but was shown up himself, right?