The central question in this case, like that in Kurth Ranch, is whether the tax in question is, despite its label, a criminal penalty.4 A "tax" can encompass any "pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the government." New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906). The North Carolina Drug Tax, as a pecuniary burden laid upon drug dealers, is in that sense a tax. But the question here is whether the tax is so punitive that the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants should attach to its enforcement. "`[T]here comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.'" Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)). A penalty "may be termed a duty or tax and yet be a penalty. Its name does not determine its nature."5 Fontenot v. Accardo, 278 F. 871, 874 (5th Cir.1922). As we explain below, North Carolina's Drug Tax, like Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax, has enough punitive features that its nature is that of a criminal penalty, not a civil tax.
Lynn v. West 134 F.3rd 583 (4th Cir., 1998)
If it's designed as a penalty and not for raising revenue, it's a penalty, no matter what the government calls it. If it's a penalty, then those being penalized are entitled to due process.
So in the eyes of Congress and, unfortunately, a great many on this board convicted drug dealers have more Constitutional protection that a bunch of insurance executives?