This is true, and its damage goes far beyond firearms law. Unfortunately I'm not sure even Scalia would be on board this (though he would scale it back). Thomas is probably the only justice who would actually overturn it given the opportunity.
Indeed. I would have said that Scalia would have been on board except for his poor performance with “Gonzales v. Raich”, where he said that homegrown marijuana that *was not sold* could be regulated by the federal government under the interstate commerce clause!
Scalia is a gun grabber.
Scalia: We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." [All of Scalia's conclusions in this vein depend on the scope of government regulatory power being congruent with "in common use," which is downright handy when the government can regulate things out of common use] We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons." [1) notice the stated historical prohibition is on carrying, not on keeping, and 2) cites omitted, but they do not support a conclusion that the US government can constitutionally ban the private possession of a dangerous and unusual weapon, let alone Scalia's outcome that it can constitutionally ban a small arm in common use by the military]It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service--M-16 rifles and the like--may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. [Here he seems to be saying that the government may ban M-16s and weapons that are useful in military service] But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. [Notice he does not probe the scope of "lawful weapons possessed at home" at the time of the Second Amendment's ratification] It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. [Unusual is not the measure, and even if it was, "highly unusual" in this instance is bootstrapped from government restriction] Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right. [He neutralizes the Miller Court's statement -- "weapon [that] is any part of the ordinary military equipment or [which] use could contribute to the common defense [is in the scope of 2nd amendment protection]" -- without explanation]