With all due respect, put down the bong. Oswald's Carcano M91/38 is bolt-action rifle with a six-round magazine. It wasn't a single-shot rifle. The Carcano wasn't as imprecise a weapon as the conspiracy theorists would have you believe. The FBI's testing of Oswald's rifle consistently put three shots in a three- to five-inch circle from 100 yards, and Oswald was shooting at about sixty yards, if I remember correctly.
Also, current analysis of the Zapruder film place the three shots as occurring over the span of 8.3 seconds. In other words, aim . . . BANG . . . and then four seconds to work the bolt, ejecting the spent cartridge, which automatically loaded another, aiming, and firing again, and four seconds to repeat the action.
Four seconds is a long time for an ex-Marine who twice earned a rating of sharpshooter (48 and 49 bulls-eyes out of fifty in rapid-fire shooting at 200 yards with an M-1 Garand). In a 1967 test of 11 shooters, the average time to aim and fire three shots with a Carcano rifle like Oswald's, WITH NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE except to work the bolt, was about 5.6 seconds. The attorneys for the House Committee on Assassinations were able to work the bolt and fire two shots with Oswald's Carcano in under 1.5 seconds.
The arguments about Oswald not being a good marksman are nonsense. The argument that his rifle was not accurate are nonsense. The argument that there was insufficient time to fire three shots are nonsense.
The statement that the Mannlicher-Carcano was a six-shot bolt action is meaningless in defense of any assertion of Oswald’s supposed ability to have actually fired the shots during the amount of time actually elapsed, because exhaustive re-creation and testing by Marine Corps sharpshooters and additional evidence as to Oswald’s actual performances on the firing range do not support the conclusions reached by the Warren Commission Report.
From Chapter 9 of “PRESUMED GUILTY: How and why the Warren Commission Framed Lee Harvey Oswald—A factual account based on the Commission’s public and private documents”, by Howard Roffman, the author states:
“In this chapter I will examine the Commission’s handling of the evidence related to Oswald’s rifle capability. It will be demonstrated that the Commission consistently misrepresented the record in an effort to make feasible the assertion that Oswald was the assassin.[1]
The first consideration germane to this topic is the nature of the shots, assuming theoretically that all originated from the sixth-floor window by a gunman using the Mannlicher-Carcano. For such a rifleman, “the shots were at a slow-moving target proceeding on a downgrade in virtually a straight line with the alignment of the assassin’s rifle, at a range of 177 to 266 feet” (R189). According to the Commission, three shots were fired, the first and last strikes occurring within a span of 4.8 to 5.6 seconds; one shot allegedly missed, although the Commission did not decide whether it was the first, second, or third. While the current analysis ignores evidence of more than three shots from more than one location, I can make only a limited departure from reality in working under the Commission’s postulations. My analysis of the wounds proved beyond doubt that the President and the Governor were wounded nonfatally by two separate bullets. This demands, in line with the Commission’s three-shot-theory, that all shots hit in the car. The Zapruder film reveals that the first two hits occurred within a very brief time, probably shorter than the very minimum time needed to fire two successive shots with the Carcano, 2.3 to 3 seconds. The fatal shot came about four seconds after the one that wounded Connally.
The Report repeatedly characterizes the shots as “very easy” and “easy.” However, the experts who made these evaluations for the Commission did not consider two essential factors that cannot be excluded from any hypothesizing: 1) the President was a living, moving target, and 2) the shots had to be fired in a very short period of time. First quoted in the Report is FBI ballistics expert Frazier:
From my own experience in shooting over the years, when you shoot at 175 feet or 260 feet, which is less than 100 yards, with a telescopic sight, you should not have any difficulty hitting your target. (R190)
Frazier testified at the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, where he modified his previous Commission testimony. How would the added consideration of a moving target affect his previous assessment?
it would be a relatively easy shot, slightly complicated, however, if the target were moving at the time, it would make it a little more difficult.[2]
The next “expert” quoted is Marine Sgt. James A. Zahm, who was involved in marksmanship training in the Marine Corps:
Using the scope, rapidly working the bolt and using the scope to relocate your target quickly and at the same time when you locate that target you identify and the crosshairs are in close relationship to the point you want to shoot at, it just takes a minor move in aiming to bring the crosshairs to bear, and then it is a quick squeeze. (R190)
Zahm never used the C2766 Carcano; his comments related to four-power scopes in general as aids in rapid shooting with a bolt-action rifle. Another expert, Ronald Simmons, was directly involved in tests employing the Carcano. Although this is not reflected in the Report, he told the Commission that, contrary to Zahm’s generalization of a “minor move” necessary to relocate the target in the scope, such a great amount of effort was needed to work the rifle bolt that the weapon was actually moved completely off target (3H449). There is yet another factor qualifying Zahm’s evaluation. This was brought out during Frazier’s New Orleans testimony:
Mr. Oser: . . . when you shoot this rifle . . . can you tell us whether or not in rebolting the gun you had to move your eye away from the scope?
Mr. Frazier: Yes, sir, that was necessary.
Mr. Oser: Why was that necessary?
Mr. Frazier: To prevent the bolt of the rifle from striking me in the face as it came to the rear.[3]
At best, the Report drastically oversimplified the true nature of the shots. It is true that shots fired at ranges under 100 yards with a four-power scope are generally easy. However, the assassination shots, in accordance with the Commission’s lone-assassin theory, were fired in rapid succession (indeed the first two would have occurred within the minimum time needed to operate the bolt) and at a moving target. The difficulty of such shots becomes apparent when it is considered that operation of the bolt would have thrown the weapon off target and caused the firer temporarily to move his eye from the sight.
One is prompted to ask what caliber of shooter would be required to commit the assassination alone as described above. Simulative tests conducted by the Commission, while deficient, are quite illuminating.
The Commission’s test firers were all rated as “Master” by the National Rifle Association (NRA); they were experts whose daily routines involved working with and shooting firearms (3H445). In the tests, three targets were set up at 175, 240, and 365 feet respectively from a 30-foot-high tower. Each shooter fired two series of three shots, using the C2766 rifle. The men took 8.25, 6.75, and 4.60 seconds respectively for the first series and 7.00, 6.45, and 5.15 for the second (3H446). In the first series, each man hit his first and third targets but missed the second. Results varied on the next series, although in all cases but one, two targets were hit. Thus, in only two cases were the Commission’s experts able to fire three aimed shots in under 5.6 seconds as Oswald allegedly did. None scored three hits, as was demanded of a lone assassin on November 22.
These tests would suggest that three hits within such a short time span, if not impossible, would certainly have taxed the proficiency of the most skilled marksman.[4] In his testimony before the Commission, Ronald Simmons spoke first of the caliber of shooter necessary to have fired the assassination shots on the basis that only two hits were achieved:
Mr. Eisenberg: Do you think a marksman who is less than a highly skilled marksman under those conditions would be able to shoot within the range of 1.2 mil aiming error [as was done by the experts]?
Mr. Simmons: Obviously, considerable experience would have to be in one’s background to do so. And with this weapon, I think also considerable experience with this weapon, because of the amount of effort required to work the bolt. (3H449)
Well, in order to achieve three hits, it would not be required that a man be an exceptional shot. A proficient man with this weapon, yes. But I think with the opportunity to use the weapon and to get familiar with it, we could probably have the results reproduced by more than one firer. (3H450)
Here arises the crucial question: Was Lee Harvey Oswald a “proficient man with this weapon,” with “considerable experience” in his background?
While in the Marines between 1956 and 1959, Oswald was twice tested for his performance with a rifle. On a scale of expert-sharpshooter-marksman, Oswald scored two points above the minimum for sharpshooter on one occasion (December 1956) and only one point above the minimum requirement for marksman on another (May 1959) — his last recorded score. Colonel A. G. Folsom evaluated these scores for the Commission:
The Marine Corps consider that any reasonable application of the instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified at least as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently, a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor “shot” and a sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good “shot.” (19H17-18)
There exists the possibility that Oswald’s scores were either inaccurately or unfairly recorded, thus accounting for his obviously mediocre to horrendous performances with a rifle. However, there is other information independent of the scores to indicate that Oswald was in fact not a good shot. In his testimony, Colonel Folsom examined the Marine scorebook that Oswald himself had maintained, and elaborated on his previous evaluation:
Mr. Ely: I just wonder, after having looked through the whole scorebook, if we could fairly say that all that it proves is that at this stage of his career he was not a particularly outstanding shot.
Col. Folsom: No, no, he was not. His scorebook indicates . . . that he did well at one or two ranges in order to achieve the two points over the minimum score for sharpshooter.
Mr. Ely: In other words, he had a good day the day he fired for qualification?
Col. Folsom: I would say so. (8H311)
Thus, according to Folsom, Oswald’s best recorded score was the result of having “a good day”; otherwise, Oswald “was not a particularly outstanding shot.”
Folsom was not alone in his evaluation of Oswald as other than a good shot. The following is exerpted [sic] from the testimony of Nelson Delgado, one of Oswald’s closest associates in the Marines:
Mr. Liebeler: Did you fire with Oswald?
Mr. Delgado: Right; I was in the same line. By that I mean we were on the same line together, the same time, but not firing at the same position . . . and I remember seeing his. It was a pretty big joke, because he got a lot of “maggie’s drawers,” you know, a lot of misses, but he didn’t give a darn.
Mr. Liebeler: Missed the target completely?
Mr. Delgado: He just qualified, that’s it. He wasn’t as enthusiastic as the rest of us. (8H235)
The Report tried desperately to get around this unanimous body of credible evidence. First Marine Corps Major Eugene Anderson (who never had any association with Oswald) is quoted at length about how bad weather, poor coaching, and an inferior weapon might have accounted for Oswald’s terrible performance in his second recorded test (R191). Here the Commission scraped the bottom of the barrel, offering this unsubstantiated, hypothetical excuse-making as apparent fact. Weather bureau records, which the Commission did not bother to check, show that perfect firing conditions existed at the time and place Oswald last fired for qualification — better conditions in fact, than those prevailing during the assassination.[5] As for the quality of the weapon fired in the test, it is probable that at its worst it would have been far superior to the virtual piece of junk Oswald allegedly owned and used in the assassination.[6] Perhaps Anderson guessed correctly in suggesting that Oswald may have had a poor instructor; yet, from the time of his departure from the Marines in 1959 to the time of the assassination in 1963, Oswald had no instructor.”
The remainder of the chapter (rather lengthy) can be found at http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/PG/PGchp9.html
Could it be any clearer?
The video speaks for itself.
Against all logic, the two Secret Service bodyguards closest to Kennedy were told to stand down. Minutes later Kennedy was shot.
This footage was suppressed for many years after the assassination.
The “conspiracy theorists” who believe Kennedy was murdered by a lone nut who was in turn murdered by another lone nut have never addressed this footage.