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We need to get rid of ERCOT and the PUC and then let the free market distribute energy. While this crisis during the icestorm would have been much worse had we been fully regulated (we would have had long blackouts, not just brownouts) ERCOT really screwed the pooch on this one and gave the uneducated liberals a talking point on how deregulation failed, even though we’re not truly deregulated.”
Something similar happened in Californian the liberals made sure they did a half ass job in deregulation so that what remained could be used by them and other criminals to abuses the system.
That being said given the extortionately unusual weather conditions in Texas you need to cut them some slack. No system can endure this.
The electric power grid is a machine. Who instead of ERCOT will run the grid in Texas?
The Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) has primary jurisdiction over activities conducted by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). ERCOT is governed by a board of directors made up of independent members, consumers and representatives from each of ERCOT’s electric market segments.
The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) makes policy recommendations to the board of directors. The TAC is assisted by five standing subcommittees as well as numerous workgroups and task forces.
The board of directors appoints ERCOT’s officers to direct and manage ERCOT’s day-to-day operations, accompanied by a team of executives and managers responsible for critical components of ERCOT’s operations areas.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) manages the flow of electric power to 22 million Texas customers – representing 85 percent of the state’s electric load and 75 percent of the Texas land area.
As the independent system operator for the region, ERCOT schedules power on an electric grid that connects 40,000 miles of transmission lines and more than 550 generation units.
ERCOT also manages financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk-power market and administers customer switching for 6.5 million Texans in competitive choice areas.
Facing its first major test during the extreme cold weather on February 2, 2011, the new Texas wholesale market produced supply scarcity prices of $3,000 per megawatt-hour (MWh) for about six hours – the average price in 2010 was about $40/MWh. Prices quickly returned to more normal levels. The cold weather caused an electricity supply shortage in Texas. Over 50 generators tripped offline, ultimately leading to rolling blackouts for an estimated 1.2 million customers.
Cold temperatures returned February 10, 2011. The system operator for most of Texas (ERCOT) set a new winter peak load record of 57,282 MW (eclipsing the 56,334 MW record set last week), but did not suffer a similar supply shortage.
Real-time energy prices for February 2, 2011 rose to the system-wide offer price cap at 5:15 a.m. and mostly stayed there until 11:30 a.m. Real-time prices typically account for less than 5% of the energy cost of power and, thus, this event should have a negligible effect on retail rates. By the afternoon, prices had dropped to around $50 per MWh - a more typical real-time price.
More than 7,000 megawatts (MW) of power plant capacity was out of service or not producing at its expected level as of 9:00 a.m.
The ERCOT made public appeals for conservation, reduced the system voltage, and ultimately asked utilities to shed 4,000 MW, or about 8% of load. Rolling blackouts –– controlled, 10-45 minute interruptions of electric service –– extended until about 1:30 p.m. Critical facilities were exempt, such as hospitals and nursing homes.
Power plants in typically warm climates do not always have the same cold-protective measures in place as their northern counterparts; frozen and broken pipes, frozen coal piles, frozen transmitters, and natural gas supply disruptions are among the reported issues plaguing Texas generators. Generators in Arizona and New Mexico tripped as well, but those regions have a greater ability to purchase power from their neighbors. ERCOT’s Texas grid has only limited connections to the rest of the grid, which limits its import/export capability.