Posted on 05/16/2011 8:27:11 AM PDT by NCjim
Following operations to open, extract, clean and dry the memory cards from the flight recorders, BEA Safety Investigators were able to download the data over the weekend.
These operations were filmed and recorded in their entirety. This was done in the presence of two German investigators from BFU, an American investigator from NTSB, two British investigators from AAIB and two Brazilian investigators from CENIPA, as well as an officer from the French judicial police and a court expert.
These downloads gathered all of the data from the Flight Data recorder (FDR), as well as the whole recording of the last two hours of the flight from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).
In the framework of the safety investigation directed by the BEA, all of this data will now be subjected to detailed in-depth analysis.
This work will take several weeks, after which a further interim report will be written and then published during the summer.
Well done. It’s amazing that they were able to find the wreck and the data recorders, and that the recorders survived almost two years thousands of feet underwater.
}:-)4
Bump for follow up.
Just like with Obama's past...the truth will out!
Easier than finding 0’s BC.
I never bought the story that the Pitot tubes froze up...they’re heated. No SOS received anywhere would indicate sudden catastrophe.
The issue with an Airbus is that if the auto pilot is on it can really get screwed up fast. Not sure how the comparators work on that aircraft.
There was an issue with A320 pitot tubes that resulted in a flight worthiness directive to replace them. The A330 uses the same pitot tubes.
You forgot the first BS story that France tried to use to explain the crash - lightning strike.
“The most likely thing is that the plane was hit by lightning,” Air France’s director of communications, Francois Brouse said, the Times reports. “The plane was in a stormy area with strong turbulence,” he said. Search crews have been dispatched to look for wreckage by air and water, but the plane remains missing. “It’s certainly no longer in the air now,” said Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, the airline’s CEO. “It would have run out of fuel.”
Bookmark
For example, the AA1420 crash in Little Rock, analysis of the CVR indicates that the speedbrake arm checklist item was never completed.
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/AAR0102.pdf (3.1 MB PDF)
From Page 131 and 132 of the report (incredible what investigators can discern from stuff most of us won't even notice):
The CVR transcript identified the sound of two “thuds” similar to the sound of an airplane touching down on a runway along with a “squeak” sound at 2350:20.2, 2 seconds before the first officer stated, “we’re down.” Analysis of the CVR sound spectrum for the accident airplane indicated that the first “thud” was main landing gear touchdown and that the second “thud” was nose gear touchdown. Safety Board investigators determined that the squeak sound, which occurred in between the two “thud” sounds, was the autospoiler actuator operating. Because of the placement of the squeak sound, Board investigators further determined that the actuator was triggered at main landing gear touchdown by the wheel spin-up transducers.According to Le Figaro, first results from the FDR or the CVR analysis shows that Airbus has no responsibility.... The A330 did not fail and is not responsible for the crash.The Safety Board compared the CVR sound spectrum for the accident airplane with those for other CVR recordings obtained during the Palm Springs incident and the flight and ground tests that were conducted as part of the investigations of this accident and the Palm Springs incident.195 According to the CVR sound spectrum study, the sound durations associated with the autospoiler actuator extension for the Little Rock and Palm Springs flights (0.08 and 0.06 second, respectively) were consistent with the ground test in which the spoiler handle was unarmed (0.06 second). The study also indicated that, for the two flight tests and two ground tests involving normal autospoiler operation (that is, when the spoiler handle was armed before touchdown and the spoilers fully deployed after touchdown), the sounds associated with the activation of the autospoiler actuator lasted at least two times longer for the flight and ground test airplane recordings (between 0.16 and 0.19 second) than the sounds for the Little Rock airplane recording.
The ground tests conducted on the Palm Springs airplane also indicated that, when the left throttle was at least 1 3/8 inches above idle and the autospoiler actuator operated, the spoiler handle would fully extend (by means of the autospoiler actuator), be knocked down, and retract about 0.5 second later to the stowed position. Because the two spoiler positions—the left outboard and right inboard—are recorded alternately every 0.5 second with about 0.25 second in between recordings, it is likely that an autoretract event would be captured by an FDR. In fact, the ground test FDR captured all of the autoretract events, and the two spoiler autoretract events reported by American (see section 1.6.2.2) were captured on FDR data. However, no indication of an autoretract event was found on the flight 1420 FDR data.
The CVR sound spectrum study, physical evidence, and testing and teardown results indicate that the autospoiler actuator on the flight 1420 airplane operated properly at touchdown and that the spoiler handle was in the unarmed position when the autospoiler actuator extended. Accordingly, the Safety Board concludes that the autospoiler system operated properly and that the spoilers did not automatically.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/20...de-cause-par-les-boites-noires.php
Same article cites sources close to the investigation as saying that new elements will be made public tomorrow regarding Air France and the crew's possible responsibility.
It's impossible for the BEA to have already processed the FDR data and reconstructed a possible scenario. Either it's a fake information leak, or they listened to something "very big" on the CVR.
Of all the scenarii that have been discussed, one IMO sticks out: There was only one pilot at the controls., one who in the noise of the alarms and the gongs going off missed the cockjpit calls and left the other two pilots locked out of the flight deck. Only something that big could have been determined so quickly.
And for the moment, i'm feeling in my stomach pit like I did when the FR report was: "Guys, the shuttle is scheduled to land at this very moment. We have a problem" (they'd not heard from it for almost 1/2 hour by that time and the runway and skies were empty).
They rightfully point out that only they can issue reports on the accident investigation, and that many sets of data need to be analysed before any conclusions can be drawn.
They are however satisfied that the data they have retrieved will enable them to draw conclusions, once their interim report is released in the summer.
They conclude by saying that at this stage of the investigation it is too early to draw a conclusion.
Paraphrased: Vol AF 447 du 1er juin 2009, A330-203, immatriculé F-GZCP - Communiqué de presse diffusé le 17 mai 2011
This just in from Reuters... No immediate A330 concern from crash probe-sources
PARIS | Tue May 17, 2011 5:10am EDT
PARIS May 17 (Reuters) - Airbus (EAD.PA) has told airlines a partial examination of black boxes recovered from a plane that crashed in the Atlantic has not led to any immediate new safety recommendations, sources familiar with the matter said.
[snip]
"At this stage of the preliminary analysis of the DFDR (digital flight data recorder), Airbus has no immediate recommendation to raise to operators," the European planemaker said in an industry bulletin obtained by Reuters.
[snip]
EDIT: That CVR transcript is going to be fascinating.
ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
SUBJECT: AF447 ACCIDENT INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN
OUR REF: AF447 AIT 7 dated May 16th 2011
PREVIOUS REF:
- Ref 1: AF447 AIT 1 dated June 1st 2009
- Ref 2: AF447 AIT 2 dated June 4th 2009
- Ref 3: AF447 AIT 3 dated June 8th 2009
- Ref 4: AF447 AIT 4 dated July 2nd 2009
- Ref 5: AF447 AIT 5 dated July 30th 2009
- Ref 6: AF447 AIT 6 dated April 03rd 2011
This AIT is an update of the previous AIT 6 concerning the AF447 accident which occurred over the Atlantic Ocean on June 1st, 2009.
It has been approved for release by the French BEA who lead the investigation as per European Regulation and ICAO Annex 13 International Recommendations.
Following underwater search campaigns and subsequent operations, the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) were recovered.
Data extraction of both recorders have been performed at the BEA facilities in the presence of two German investigators from BFU, an American investigator from NTSB, two British investigators from AAIB and two Brazilian investigators from CENIPA, as well as an officer from the French judicial police and a court expert.
Data from DFDR and CVR have been successfully downloaded. At this stage of the preliminary analysis of DFDR Airbus has no immediate recommendation to raise to operators. [emphasis mine]
Further update will be provided as soon as new significant information becomes available or as soon as Airbus will be authorized to share more information in compliance with investigation rules.
Yannick Malinge
Senior Vice President
Chief Product Safety Officer
Airbus
Here's today's press release from Airbus:
Airbus statement regarding media reports about the AF447 investigationSome recent media reports about the AF447 accident mention an information note issued by Airbus to its customers. The purpose of this document, known as an AIT (Accident Information Telex), is to provide operators with information related to potential safety recommendations that may derive from an accident investigation.
For this reason, an AIT has to be approved by the authority that manages the investigation; in this case, the BEA (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses – French civil aviation safety Investigations and Analysis Bureau). This AIT was approved by the BEA before being issued by Airbus to its customers and does not include any safety recommendation at this stage of the investigation.
Airbus strongly disagrees with any form of speculation in the scope of the safety investigation and deplores all inappropriate communication concerning such a serious event that should be handled with professionalism and dignity.
In cooperation with Air France and the authorities, and since the very first days of the accident, Airbus has been supporting the search for the aircraft as well as the technical investigation to identify all lessons to be learnt in the sole interest of air transport safety.
In this context, Airbus continues to support the BEA which is leading the investigation with expertise.
http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-s...concernant-le-rio-paris-164330.php
Pilot error emerges as the most likely cause of Air France crash
By John Lichfield in Paris[snip]
Wednesday, 18 May 2011Pilot error is emerging as the most likely cause of the crash of the Air France Rio-Paris airbus which plunged into the South Atlantic in June 2009, killing all 228 people on board.
Preliminary investigation of black-box flight recorders, found three miles down in the ocean last month, suggest there was no major technical failure in the Airbus A330.
Separately, The Independent has learned that investigators believe the senior pilot may have been absent from the cockpit when the aircraft dived into the ocean four hours into its flight. His absence was not, in itself, unusual. There were two less-experienced pilots aboard.
EXCERPT: read entire article at above link
EDIT: the author of the above piece is apparently a rather well respected political journalist. Its the "if Walter Cronkheit is saying it, then it must be true." credibility stamp of approval.
Vol Rio-Paris: la thèse d'une erreur humaine fait bondir les pilotes (Pilots Outrage At Human Error Theory)
It is too early to mention the theory of a pilot error in the RIO-Paris Airbus crash on 1st June 2009, the SNPL has strongly reacted, refusing that the pilots who died in that catastrophe could be thrown to the lions.The pilot’s ire has been triggered by two articles on the Fig’s internet site. In the unions crosshairs , there is the information that the first analysed sections of the recorders seem to exonerate Airbus.
To support for this information, the article relied on a telex Airbus sent their clients, reassuring them that at this stage of the first analyses of the DFDR, Airbus has no immediate recommendation to the airplane operators.
Hasty conclusion
Thus was relaunched the speculative track of « a crew error » as the Fig title implied., which was, to the outraged SNPL a rather hasty conclusion, (as) the link between the telex and the conclusion of a possible blame put on the crew is an astonishing shortcut, said Jean-Louis Barber, president of SNPL / Air France ALPA. “The accident results from a chain of events and one cannot isolate one without replacing it in the chain”.The BEA which is in the process of analysing both boxes and has confirmed that the recordings could be extracted has promised a report for this summer.
That timing seems, to the SNPL coherent with the task at hand. There was the same cautious reaction from Airbus, the spokesperson of which declared to have been shocked by the shortcut that points at the pilots as probable culprits.
“We have just informed the operators of our airplanes that they could go on flying the airplane –an Airbus A330- without any new recommendation, and in all safety; It’s the 7th telex Airbus has sent since the accident. They were all validated by the BEA.
Reminder : the pitot heads that were equipping flight 447 are suspected of having frozen, and being if not the main cause, at least one of the factors of the accident. Thus, Airbus which is legally responsible for that element, had soon after the crash advised on the replacement of that sensor model. So it’s quite awkward to let Airbus so quickly off the hook.
L'enquête sur le vol Rio-Paris suscite des tensions (The investigation on the flight from Rio to Paris raises tensions)
PARIS (Reuters) - Tensions have emerged between Air France and Airbus, speculation is starting to grow on the cause of the accident of flight AF447 from Rio to Paris in June 2009 with the reading of the black boxes of the device.The two companies indicted in March for involuntary homicide and injuries in the investigation into the disaster which has killed 228, have denied any disagreement. The decisive evidence from the two black boxes rescued in early May should not be known until the summer.
"Wait a few weeks that experts we deliver a consistent message before leaving on speculation one way or another," he said Thursday the CEO of Air France-KLM Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, during the presentation of annual accounts of the group, dismissing questions about his future at the head of the airline.
He stressed he was not yet possible to determine responsibility for the accident flight from Rio to Paris, and that crash was the result of the combination of various elements.
Speaking later to a colleague after the conference, he had these words, recorded by passing a microphone and relayed to reporters: "The way I responded a bit rude, but I am forced to because of Airbus. "
NO ADVICE FOR AIRBUS
Le Figaro wrote Tuesday that the first items put Airbus out of the question and directing investigators towards sole responsibility of the Air France crew or security procedures imposed by the company.
In a memo obtained by Reuters, said Airbus had provided no immediate safety recommendation to the airlines using the A330 as a result of the preliminary analysis of black boxes.
"It's not very 'fair play'," said a source familiar with the matter, adding that this procedure had broken an agreement.
A spokeswoman for Air France has denied any disagreement with Airbus.
"Our relationship with Air France is solid. They all use our products, including about 180 aircraft. With Air France, we shared the costs of research and our interest to support the investigation and understand what caused the tragic loss Flight 447 ", has even said a spokesman for Airbus.
The apparently contradictory information on the interpretation of the black boxes succeed in the media. Latest, Europe 1 radio reported Thursday that there was no error in steering the trajectory of the aircraft and that Air France would have 90% chance of being exonerated.
Asked by Reuters, the Office of Inquiry and Analysis (BEA), responsible for examining the black boxes, were willing to make "no comment" on that information.
Pierre-Henri Gourgeon reminded reporters Thursday that Air France and Airbus had taken "a number of initiatives" after the accident.
The hypothesis of a problem of measurement probes speed pitot type, manufactured by Thales and equipped the A330 and A340, has been suggested as a possible cause of the tragedy. The Pitot were replaced by other sensors throughout the Air France fleet after the accident.
Pitot probes of the wreck could be raised later. These small tubes placed in front of the camera frosted high altitude, which could disrupt the flight.
Reading the black boxes has raised all the technical data for the parameters of the flight and the last two hours of conversations and noises in the cockpit.
Moreover, according to police, the identification of two bodies found in the wreckage and brought to the surface is possible through the exploitation of their DNA.
The reappointment of Pierre-Henri Gourgeon for four years was endorsed Wednesday by the Board of Directors of Air France-KLM, but must be voted on by shareholders at the general meeting scheduled on July 7
Summary of the new findings based on recovered FDR/CFR:
At this stage of the investigation, as an addition to the BEA interim reports of 2 July and 17 December 2009, the following new facts have been established:
Accident to the Airbus A330-203
flight AF 447 on 1st June 2009
Update on Investigation
(1219 KB PDF)
This is starting to sound eerily like Aeroperu 603 or Birgenair 301...pitot-static system problems leading to inconsistent instrument readings, causing the pilots to take inappropriate action based on the faulty instrument readings. Technically it’s still considered “pilot error” but when getting bombarded with conflicting, or even impossible, instrument readings, it’s bloody hard to figure out what the correct action to take might be.
}:-)4
While I was reading your post I kept hearing, “Drop the nose and increase airspeed. Maintain level flight. You can figure out the problem when you regain control.” I don’t know how many times I heard that in my earphones when I was earning my license. Every instructor repeated it and repeated it.
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