Replies

I have converted from the PDF file of attorney Hatfield’s brief to the GA court submitted on February 1st, 2012. I cleaned up most of the converted errors but minor errors likely remain. The lines below will be definitely of different lengths. The underling or bold words don’t show up below. For example, the court cases are underlined in the original PDF.

If something does not look correct, check the hyperlink to the original PDF court brief that I provided which is located at the bottom of this post.

Converting from PDF to HTML or text without a software converter program is a pain in the butt, but here it is. Forget the ignorant trolls who love being ignorant here, or use what I posted to good effect. ;-)

It is worth the read:

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OFFICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF GEORGIA

DOCKET NO.: OSAH -SECSTATE -CE -
1216218-60-MALIHI

CARL SWENSSON, Plaintiff
V.
BARACK OBAMA,
Defendant

OFFICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF GEORGIA

DOCKET NO.: OSAH-SECSTATE-CE-
1216823-60-MALIHI

KEVIN RICHARD POWELL,
Plaintiff
V.
BARACK OBAMA,
Defendant

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF OF LAW REGARDING MINOR V. HAPPERSETT
AND THE “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” CLAUSE OF ARTICLE II

Now come Plaintiffs Carl Svensson and Kevin Richard Powell
by and through undersigned counsel, and submit this post-hearing “Brief of Law Regarding Minor v. Happersett and the ‘natural born Citizen’ Clause of Article II” for the Court’s consideration. Undersigned counsel would point out that the entire content of this Brief, with slight modifications, consists of material written by Attorney Van R. Irion in his “Plaintiff Welden’s

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Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” submitted in the companion matter of David P. Welden v. Barack Obama, Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings, Docket No- OSAHSECSTATE-CE-1215137-60-MALIHI. Attorney Irion’s material is used with the express consent and permission of Attorney Irion, and this material is offered in support of Plaintiffs’ positions taken in the instant cases concerning the applicability of Minor v. Happersett and the “natural born Citizen” Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution to the challenges raised by Plaintiffs to Defendant Obama’s qualifications for office. T. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 22 L. Ed. 627, 21 Wall. 162 (1875)

In Minor v. Happersett, the United States Supreme Court was
presented the question: does the 14th Amendment grant all
citizens the right to vote? Minor, a woman living in Missouri, challenged that state’s constitutional prohibition against women voting. The Court held that women could be citizens before ratification of the 14th Amendment, but that the 14th Amendment created no new privileges or immunities.

[Note] 1. Minor Court’s Definition of Natural Born Citizen Under Article Nothing herein should be read as an attempt to independently construe the United States Constitution. To the contrary, this section and the following section of this brief are simply intended to set forth the construction established by United States Supreme Court precedent.

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The United States Supreme Court defined the term “natural
born Citizen” in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S., at 167. The Minor Court established that “it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born Citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Id. It is clear that the Minor Court was referring to the term. “natural born Citizen,” as it appears in Article II of the Constitution because, in the paragraph preceding the definition quoted here, that Court quoted, the Article II requirement that the President must be a “natural born Citizen.”

The Minor Court’s definition of “natural born Citizen” is
immediately followed by a. statement that “there have been doubts” about the broader class of people identified as “citizens,” Id. However, this statement is immediately followed by the clarification that there have “never been doubts” as to the narrower class of “natural born Citizen[s].” Id. This understanding of the Minor Court’s statement is supported by its extensive discussion of the broader term “citizen” at the beginning of the Court’s opinion. Id. at 166. The Court concludes its discussion of the term citizen, by stating, “When used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a. nation, and nothing more,” Id. The Court,

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therefore, clearly established that the term “citizen” in its opinion was to be understood to be very broad. With this in mind, the Minor Court’s statement is unambiguous: it established two distinct classes of people, citizens and “natural born Citizen[s]”; “citizen” is a broad term that is inclusive of all “natural born Citizen[s]”; as to the outer limits of the term “citizen” there are doubts; and as to the definition of “natural born Citizen” there have “never been doubts”. Id. The Minor Court’s definition of the term “natural born Citizen” uses the term “parents.” This is the plural form of the term “parent.” Had the Court intended to indicate “natural born Citizen” status could be conferred upon an individual with one citizen parent, the Court could have used the term “parent” instead of “parents.” The Court could also have identified a
specific parent using the terms “father” or “mother.” It did not use the terms “mother,” “father,” or “parent.” Instead it chose to use the plural term “parents.” The plain language meaning of this term indicates a requirement for both parents to be citizens.

2. Precedential Status of the Minor Court’s Definition of
“natural born Citizen” In order to reach its holding, the Minor Court first had to determine whether Mrs. Minor was a citizen. It explicitly did so by determining that she was a “natural born Citizen”: “For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.

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It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens.” Id. at 167. Because both of Mrs. Minor’s parents were U.S. citizens at the time she was born, and she was born in the U.S., she was a “natural born Citizen.” Because all “natural born Citizen[s]” are also within the broader category
“citizen,” Mrs. Minor was a citizen.

The Minor Court’s decision to establish that Mrs. Minor was
a citizen because she was a “natural born Citizen” followed the well-established doctrine of judicial restraint. Judicial restraint required the Minor Court to avoid interpreting the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment if the circumstances presented in the case at hand didn’t require the Court to construe the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause in order to reach its holding. The facts presented didn’t require such an interpretation, so the Court didn’t reach the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. But this restraint did require the Court to conclude that Mrs. Minor was a citizen via its definition of “natural born Citizen” and its conclusion that all “natural born
Citizen[s]” are within the broader category of “citizens.” This is why it made the statement, “For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens.”

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Id. at 168. In other words, the Minor Court’s definition of
“natural born Citizen” was pivotal to reaching its holding.
The Court then discussed several other types of citizenship
as general examples of its conclusion that women could be
citizens. However, it then returned to the specific case of Mrs. Minor, concluding: “The fourteenth amendment did not affect the citizenship of women any more than it did of men. In this particular, therefore, the rights of Mrs. Minor do not depend upon the amendment. She has always been a citizen from her birth, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship.” Id. at 170.

Because the Minor Court’s definition of “natural born
Citizen” was pivotal to reaching its holding, the Court’s
definition is part of its holding and is, therefore, also
precedent. See Black’s Law Dictionary 737 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999) (see also Id. at 1195, defining “precedent” and quoting James Parker Hall, American Law and Procedure xlviii (1952); see also Black’s Law Dictionary at 465, distinguishing “dictum gratis”).

II. Congressional Power to Naturalize Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress power “To establish uniform rules of naturalization.” However, this power does not alter or effect the Article II requirement that “No person except a natural born Citizen...shall be eligible

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to the office of President.” U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. I, Cl. 5. It is well established that Congressional authority does not include authority to alter the Constitution unless it follows the steps required to amend the Constitution, as established within Article V. See Amd. X. Therefore, all acts of Congress made pursuant to its Article I authority to naturalize have no effect upon the Supreme Court’s construction of Article I regardless of any attempt by Congress to establish a different definition of
“natural born Citizen.” All federal code, regulations,
resolutions, and other acts of Congress are simply irrelevant to the analysis at hand because Congress has no authority to alter Article II except through the amendment process.

III. Fourteenth Amendment

The 14th Amendment to the Constitution created a third
independent path to citizenship. However, the amendment did not alter or affect the Article II requirement that “No person except a natural born Citizen...shall be eligible to the office of President.” U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. I, Cl. 5. The Supreme Court established the relevant rule of constitutional construction in Marbury v. Madison:
“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible.” 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1805). This rule is still in effect and a similar rule is used for statutory construction:

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“When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible...The intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). See also, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88 (1870); Henderson’s Tobacco, 78 U.S. 652 657 (1870); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 61 (1932); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342, 362-63 (1842).

Nothing in the language of the 14th Amendment expressly
alters the language or construction of the term “natural born Citizen.” In fact, neither the term “natural born Citizen,” nor the requirements to serve as President, are mentioned in the 14th Amendment.

Also, the 14th Amendment establishes a path to
“citizenship.” If individuals that qualify as “citizens” under the 14th Amendment are construed to qualify to run for President, then the term “natural born Citizen” establishing a distinct qualification for holding the office of President under Article II would lose its distinction from the term “citizen” as required
to hold the offices of Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives under Article I. This would leave the
distinction between the qualifications for President and members of Congress without effect. “Such a construction is
inadmissible.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174.

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More importantly, the Minor Court defined “natural born
Citizen” under Article II as “all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens.” The Minor Court’s holding and definition were established after the 14th Amendment had been ratified, proving that the amendment didn’t alter this definition. 88 U.S. at 167. This is further proved by the holding of the Minor Court that “The amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen.” Id. at 171.

Therefore, if an individual was not qualified to hold the office of President under Article II before the amendment, then he or she was not qualified after the amendment. Id.

IV. U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).

The Supreme Coures decision in Wong Kim Ark (”WKA”) did not
alter or negate the definition of “natural born Citizen” as
established by the Minor Court. Compare United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), with Minor, 88 U.S. 162. The holding of WKA answered the narrow question that was avoided by the Minor Court: namely construction of the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment. A review of the holding from WKA confirms this conclusion: “the single question stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are
subjects of the emperor of China, but have a permanent domicile and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on

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business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official
capacity under the emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution: ‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.’ For the reasons above stated, this court is of the opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.” 169 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).

Rather than construing the definition of the term “natural
born Citizen” under Article II, the WKA Court was construing the term “citizen” under the 14th Amendment. Regardless of the answer to the question answered by the WKA Court, it does nothing to change the requirements for the office of President.

To conclude that the WKA court altered the definition of
“natural born Citizen” under Article II would require a
conclusion that dicta alters established precedent. This is
simply not the rule. Dicta is persuasive. Where the reasoning in dicta is logical and well supported, and where it does not conflict with precedent, it can be followed at the discretion of other courts. However, where dicta directly conflicts with precedent it cannot be followed by lower courts.

Had Mr. Wong Kim Ark been a “natural born Citizen” then he
wouldn’t have had to resort to the 14th Amendment in order to be

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found a “citizen.” Because Mr. Ark was not a “natural born
Citizen,” the WKA court had no reason to construe the term
“natural born Citizen” in order to answer the question: Was Mr. Ark a citizen under the 14th Amendment? Therefore, any
discussion within the WKA opinion that could possibly be
construed to alter the Article II term “natural born Citizen” was unnecessary to reach the WKA holding, and was dicta. See Black’s Law Dictionary 465 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999) (defining Dictum Gratis).

To conclude that the WKA court altered the definition of
“natural born Citizen” under Article II would also require a
conclusion that the WKA court intended to completely ignore the rules of constitutional construction established by the Marbury Court, as discussed above. Nothing in WKA implies an intent to leave no distinction between the requirements to hold the office of President and the requirements to hold the office of Senator.

If WKA changed the definition of “natural born Citizen”
established by the Minor Court, then the distinction between the requirements to hold the office of President and the requirements to hold the office of Senator would be eliminated. This would leave Article II, Section I, Clause 5 “without effect.”

Finally, to conclude that the WKA court altered the
definition of “natural born Citizen” under Article II would also require a conclusion that the WKA court intended to overturn

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Minor’s holding that the 14th Amendment didn’t create any new privileges or immunities. Mr. Ark certainly was not qualified to run for president before the 14th Amendment was ratified. So, to conclude that he was a “natural born Citizen” after the 14th Amendment not only runs contrary to the holding of the WKA Court, it also requires Minor to be overturned. Such a conclusion is not suggested by WKA or any decision of the Supreme Court since WKA. The holdings from Minor and WKA simply do not conflict. Any other conclusion runs contrary to every rule of construction and
is not supported by any subsequent precedent from the Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request
that the Court adopt Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein.

Respectfully submitted, this 1st day of February, 2012.
HATFIELD & HATFIELD, P.C.
201 Albany Avenue
P.O. Box 1361
Waycross, Georgia 31502
(912) 283-3820

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http://www.art2superpac.com/UserFiles/file/PowellvObamaProposedFindingsofFactandConclusionsofLawGeorgiaBallotAccessChallenge2-1-2012.pdf