[ME-262]

I find it kind of ghoulish that some people would keep pushing for a very bad design with an extensive record of fatal crashes despite its limited duty. I don’t relish the deaths, but as an aerospace engineer I see that ignorant designs can kill a lot of people, and not just time, money, and their mission. I’m just saying, start over with a good design.

It also seems that by calling me ghoulish, you are conceding the facts that the V-22 is a killer, and will continue to kill our boys, and you have shifted from debating the danger of the aircraft to questioning the motives of those who have been right about it for decades.

[rlmorel]

Who said I was talking to you? Seems you are a bit oversensitive. If the shoe fits, you can wear it. If it doesn’t, don’t.

[A.A. Cunningham]

an extensive record of fatal crashes

Are you talking about the H-60 now?

"Even counting two crashes of Air Force CV-22Bs in the past two years, the Osprey's safety record has been exceptionally good since the aircraft was redesigned and retested a decade ago. Since Oct. 1, 2001, three Ospreys have crashed with a loss of six lives. During the same period, the U.S. military has lost 414 helicopters at a cost of 606 deaths." Richard Whittle

Why is your plaintive wail deathly silent over that fact?(That's a rhetorical question because we already know the answer.)

the facts that the V-22 is a killer, and will continue to kill our boys,

More Bravo Sierra "facts" from you.

Despite your claims to the contrary and based on the historical ineptness in your posts, much of the following will be way over your head, madame. However, even an obtuse mind like yours should be able to comprehend the following. The next time you go sit down and empty your bladder take the report and a dictionary with you because it is intuitively obvious to the most casual observer that you are full of s***.

In August 2003, the V–22 Integrated Test Team completed a thorough investigation of the V–22’s low-speed / HROD flight characteristics. Testing defined an operational envelope for the aircraft and demonstrated flight regimes free from vortex ring state (VRS). Tests also probed deeply into fully developed VRS to determine precise flight conditions where it may be encountered, and to confirm the ability of the V–22 to recover from the condition. The ability to tilt the nacelles proved to be a powerful and (in every case) reliable means for rapidly regaining aerodynamic function of the rotors, even when operating in VRS beyond the point of having sufficient controllability. Results for steady-state HROD conditions are presented and the methods for testing are described. In an operational sense, the test results show that the V–22 has a significantly higher rate of descent margin for avoiding VRS with respect to the published NATOPS limitation than conventional low disk-loading helicopters. Furthermore, dynamic maneuver testing of the V–22 showed that VRS cannot be initiated outside the steadystate VRS boundary. Simple engineering analysis is used to show that the V–22’s steady-state VRS boundary is predictable by simple methods that work for conventional helicopters. High blade twist, and the side-by-side rotor configuration of the V–22 do not play a significant role in defining the VRS boundary.