Hood was too influenced by his desire to punish the Unionist sections of Tennessee. Just as Lee’s first campaign was an attempt to coerce Unionist sections of Virgina, Hoods last campaign was an attempt to coerce Unionist sections of Tennessee.
Odd, then, that he completely avoided the Unionist section of East Tennessee.
Hood's campaign into TN was an attempt to get Sherman to turn around and chase him instead of pushing farther into the vitals of the Confederacy. He also wanted to recruit in the confederate sections of TN and KY.
Neither worked. Sherman assigned Thomas and Schofeld to deal with Hood and headed across GA himself. And Hood picked up few men in TN and KY.
All of TN was lost long before this once Vicksburg fell— the original mississippi riverine campaign (Donelson etc.) The North started there (ex: Shiloh).
There was no hope to stop the unionists in E. Tenn. So one can argue as many have Hood was high or something-— book is coming out in June this year— he wasn’t. The overall strategy of S from the get go was to politically grind down the N. The effort in TN was a last desperate and foolish effort to disrupt supply lines that were already secure, and Sherman being already more than half the way to Savannah and burning/pillaging up GA along the way. Total war in other words. By this point it was last stand time in Richmond, redoubts, delay and pray— and all logistical.
Will be interested for true facts about Hood’s personal state to come out, esp. as regards his relationships with his command staff. Also would like to know about the “peculiar behaviour of Patrick Cleburne” at Franklin— aside from being a warrior.