I will probably address this some in my post-mortem, but can also do so now. I think there was a fundamental flaw in the American command set up that I would have addressed.
The Ardennes was a natural dividing point splitting the Allied front. Yet Bradley’s 12th Army Group straddled it with 1st and 9th Armies north and 3rd Army south. This led to cumbersome command, control and logistic arrangements. Marseilles was capable of supplying all of the Allied requirements south of the Ardennes while Antwerp could supply all forces north.
To me, the logical solution would have been to bring 9th Army on line when Antwerp was opened, and have Bradley’s 12th AG command those two formations north of the Ardennes and act in concert with Monty’s 21st AG operating toward north Germany. We had the 1st Allied Airborne Army, and it was going to be used somewhere. Might as well use it breaching the northern wing of the Siegfried line in a large set piece battle. Had the Scheldt Estuary been opened in late September or early October, the operation could have taken place in mid to late October, although weather may have been an issue for airborne operations. The idea is that the airborne troops drop close behind the front so that the ground units can reach them quickly. This is the sort of thing I would do better at illustrating on a map. (I really like maps.)
Meanwhile, south of the Ardennes, 6th AG comprises American 3rd and 7th Armies and makes a concerted push in Lorraine with the two Armies acting in concert. Instead, 6th AG was never really integrated into a comprehensive strategy, and 7th Army and 3rd Army never really worked together. A look at the map makes this appear an obvious arrangement. Why was it not done?
Much as I admired Ike, the blame here rests entirely on him and was for personal and not military reasons. Ike despised Devers, the 6th AG commander. Devers had ben a rival and contender for the SHAEF job. During the campaign in Western Europe, Devers was repeatedly treated as a red-headed step child. Bradley was very much Ike’s pet. So there was no way he would take Patton’s army from Bradley and give it to Devers. This showed plainly in an incident in November 1944, just after Devers had broken the German line and seized Strasbourg. Ike and Bradley came to visit Devers, and brought Patton along. Instead of being there to support the one success on the entire front, it became clear to Devers that Bradley and Patton were there to poach units from his command.
There is more to this situation than is widely known, but I believe that Ike’s personal animosity clouded his military sense, and resulted in a flawed command structure.
1. Thank you for your thoughtful and generous time-and-effort expenditure, again, in attempting to combat my woeful ignorance.
2. Seldom have events been so thoroughly scrutinized in retrospect as were WWII's command decisions. You'd think anticipating that would have kept the leaders from such folly, even in the absence of their own internal moral compass. But "All have sinned..."
3. It's certainly telling, and very much a shame, that these generals allowed such petty personal differences and agendae to ENDANGER HUMAN LIVES!!! Good thing we have a President currently who is above all that.
Interesting analysis. I guess Ike was human after all.