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U.S. OPPOSES THE BRITISH ON ITALY, BARS INTERVENING IN FREED LANDS (12/6/44)
Microfilm-New York Times archives, Monterey Public Library | 12/6/44 | Bertram D. Hulen, Raymond Daniell, Drew Middleton, Arthur Krock, Hanson W. Baldwin

Posted on 12/06/2014 4:29:20 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson

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To: henkster

Great observations.


41 posted on 12/06/2014 9:08:00 PM PST by EternalVigilance
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To: henkster
I agree: great observations. Your argument is persuasive.

Thanks again--you should be charging me tuition.

42 posted on 12/06/2014 9:20:51 PM PST by Hebrews 11:6 (Do you REALLY believe that (1) God IS, and (2) God IS GOOD?)
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To: Hebrews 11:6; henkster; EternalVigilance
Thanks for your detailed observations, henkster. I had heard of the game "Go" but had not heard it used as a cultural metaphor. Fascinating.

I too think culture influenced the tendency toward overly complex plans and the inexplicable failure to do obvious things. "Face" must explain a lot. For example, why plans were not given the rigorous staffing needed to make them as complete as possible and to insure proper coordination.

The Leyte campaign is a perfect example. The principle of Mass was utterly disregarded, but somehow the Japanese managed to pull off their naval plan. Then, it was all thrown away when Kurita failed to press the attack home.

But the plan was still doomed. Had Kurita destroyed the landing and supply ships, they would have been replaced. The result would have been delay. The only hope for the operation was for the Army plan to work in coordination with the Navy so that the Japanese reinforcements would be landed in time to take Carigara and drive down Route 2 against the Americans. Deprived of supplies and reinforcements, our troops would have been hard pressed to prevent an advance to the landing beaches.

But the Army and Navy did not coordinate and the Army landed only to find we had taken the Carigara Bay coast road and were driving south toward Ormoc. It has been a very hard fight, but the result will be the loss of some fine divisions by the Japanese as we destroy them in detail.

In contrast look at the fine work done by Krueger and his staff. When the Japanese reinforced Leyte and promised an all out attack, MacArthur obtained release of the 77th Division by Nimitz and diverted it to Leyte. Krueger devised a daring plan to land the 77th at Ormoc, but properly coordinated the landing with the Air Force and Navy so that it would be properly supported. Despite the presence of a Japanese convoy nearby, the landings were a success.

43 posted on 12/08/2014 12:04:49 PM PST by colorado tanker
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To: colorado tanker
I think the Ormoc Bay landing of 77th Division may have been the gutsiest amphibious operation of the war. It wasn't subject to the excruciating detail of Overlord. It was put together very quickly. It didn't have the support of Halsey's carriers, only what land based air forces were in the Philippines (and those were hampered by rain and subject to the Japanese suicide paratrooper attack). The Japanese were still quite active in the air and sea in the Central Philippines. And to top it off, they pulled off the landing as part of a race with an escorted Japanese convoy.

It was really quite a gamble, but has gotten very little historical attention. I didn't really know about it until now.

44 posted on 12/08/2014 1:49:42 PM PST by henkster (Do I really need a sarcasm tag?)
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To: henkster
The landing at Ormoc is quite remarkable. I agree with you - that took brass balls. The more I learn about how Krueger conducted the land war for MacArthur, basically on a shoestring, the more I admire the guy. The chapter in the U.S. Army history begins at P. 275.

http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-9-1/CMH_Pub_5-9-1.pdf

They achieved complete surprise. When Gen. Bruce realized that he abandoned his initial plan of forming a defensive perimeter and receiving additional supplies in favor of an immediate march on Ormoc. From what I can gather the LST's followed him up the coast and resupplied him on the fly. Of course, once Ormoc is taken the port facility can be used.

The official history labelled the Japanese effort to take the airfields as a "rash scheme," quite an understatement. They apparently were unaware that the 11th Airborne was in the center of the island and elements of other units were staging in the rear. A few Japanese got as far as 5th Air Force GHQ and there is an amusing story of some bullets passing through a very angry CG's house, but at the end of the day they accomplished nothing, did not destroy any aircraft or any appreciable material.

With the landing of the 77th, the remnants were ordered back across the mountains for the now desperate defense of the Ormoc Valley.

45 posted on 12/08/2014 2:36:29 PM PST by colorado tanker
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