Posted on 12/06/2014 4:29:20 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Great observations.
Thanks again--you should be charging me tuition.
I too think culture influenced the tendency toward overly complex plans and the inexplicable failure to do obvious things. "Face" must explain a lot. For example, why plans were not given the rigorous staffing needed to make them as complete as possible and to insure proper coordination.
The Leyte campaign is a perfect example. The principle of Mass was utterly disregarded, but somehow the Japanese managed to pull off their naval plan. Then, it was all thrown away when Kurita failed to press the attack home.
But the plan was still doomed. Had Kurita destroyed the landing and supply ships, they would have been replaced. The result would have been delay. The only hope for the operation was for the Army plan to work in coordination with the Navy so that the Japanese reinforcements would be landed in time to take Carigara and drive down Route 2 against the Americans. Deprived of supplies and reinforcements, our troops would have been hard pressed to prevent an advance to the landing beaches.
But the Army and Navy did not coordinate and the Army landed only to find we had taken the Carigara Bay coast road and were driving south toward Ormoc. It has been a very hard fight, but the result will be the loss of some fine divisions by the Japanese as we destroy them in detail.
In contrast look at the fine work done by Krueger and his staff. When the Japanese reinforced Leyte and promised an all out attack, MacArthur obtained release of the 77th Division by Nimitz and diverted it to Leyte. Krueger devised a daring plan to land the 77th at Ormoc, but properly coordinated the landing with the Air Force and Navy so that it would be properly supported. Despite the presence of a Japanese convoy nearby, the landings were a success.
It was really quite a gamble, but has gotten very little historical attention. I didn't really know about it until now.
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-9-1/CMH_Pub_5-9-1.pdf
They achieved complete surprise. When Gen. Bruce realized that he abandoned his initial plan of forming a defensive perimeter and receiving additional supplies in favor of an immediate march on Ormoc. From what I can gather the LST's followed him up the coast and resupplied him on the fly. Of course, once Ormoc is taken the port facility can be used.
The official history labelled the Japanese effort to take the airfields as a "rash scheme," quite an understatement. They apparently were unaware that the 11th Airborne was in the center of the island and elements of other units were staging in the rear. A few Japanese got as far as 5th Air Force GHQ and there is an amusing story of some bullets passing through a very angry CG's house, but at the end of the day they accomplished nothing, did not destroy any aircraft or any appreciable material.
With the landing of the 77th, the remnants were ordered back across the mountains for the now desperate defense of the Ormoc Valley.
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