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I read the whole thing, although my eyes were fogging over and drying up.

The guy has basically taken notes from Eikenberry, and reps Eikenberry's POV, which is a good one given his duration and direct involvement in service "over there".

Keeping in mind that the chief praters and critics of U. S. Policy that he names were dubious Patriots and some, Soviet assets, there are still responsible critics of the current U. S. force structure and its demands on e. g. National Guard mobilization. (At least he knew better than to throw Slick and Teddy Kennedy into the mix. Now there were a couple of deep minds.)

He touches on a string of problems.

Communist-run Mobe/New Mobe campaigns to shut down U. S. resistance to the NVA conquest of Vietnam were using the draft to corner Nixon and force him to capitulate to the Communists (hanging an "L" on a Pubbie war president seems to be a compulsion among traitorous 'Rat-bastards), so Nixon countered by ending the draft. The author reports that Eikenberry thinks (now) that that was a huge, strategic-level error.
The volunteer, careerist military is isolated from society (and also remote from ' Rat-modulated social decomposition processes).

(It' s hard to tell whether the author regrets the division of society, or just the failure to decompose and demoralize social attitudes in the Military.)
Long-term, a professional military may prove dangerous to the Republic (as it did in Rome and does today in South America, where the military is an integral part of the problem of the caudillo/revolution cycle).
The public and the Congress are becoming detached and feckless, not just ignorant, about military affairs of the United States.

That's not the whole list of issues, but most of the article offers support to this outline by enumerating things that actually happened w/r/t Afghanistan and Iraq that support the above agenda of problems.