From Atkinson’s The Guns at Last Light
(Some of this goes back a few days, and some ahead a few days)
No sooner had Eisenhower suppressed this insurrection on his northern flank than his southern flank erupted, first with insubordination by 6th Army Group, then in a German attack hardly less cheeky than HERBSTNEBEL.
Although he commander ten French and eight American divisions, General Devers had accomplished little in Alsace since Eisenhower’s refusal in late November to permit the Rhine crossing near Strasbourg. The U.S. Seventh Army’s combat power had been dissipated by the requirements to move in two opposite directions: north to shore up Bradley’s flank, and south, to help General de Lattre eradicate enemy salient around Colmar. Neither gambit yielded conspicuous success. After punching half a dozen holes through German border to the north, GIs found the Siegfried Line impenetrable; they were reduced to tacking up latrine placards along the West Wall that read, “Shit on Hitler’s Home.”
The Colmar pocket, as wide as the Bulge in Belgium and about half as deep, also proved unyielding. General Dahlquist’s 36th Division, attached to DE Lattre’s First Army, reported that their French brother-in-arms showed little interest in completing the liberation of Alsace, even as German forces aggressively shored up the salient. “The enemy attacked on three fronts today,” Dahlquist told his diary in mid-December, late adding, “The French left our division holding the bag for almost two weeks.” Squabbling between rival French factions persisted, aggravated by General Leclerc’s declaration that neither he nor his 2nd Armored Division cared to serve under a Vichy traitor like De Lattre. “I have now two problems children, Leclerc and De Lattre,” Devers wrote George Marshall.
At Verdun on December 19, Eisenhower had ordered 6th Army Group to help Bradley in the Bulge by contributing troops and shifting to the defensive. Three days later, Devers halted further attacks against the Colmar Pocket, leaving Hitler still master of 850 square miles of France. But Eisenhower was willing to concede much more: a SHAEF staff officer on December 26 brought Devers a map drawn by the supreme commander personally, which made plain that the Franco-American armies were to fall back nearly forty miles to an ostensibly more defensible line along the Vosges, abandoning Strasbourg and the Alsatian plain. Devers on December 27 flew to Versailles to argue that a retreat from the Rhine would anger the French, embolden the Germans, and bring the hard-won Saverne Gap within range of enemy artillery. Eisenhower stood fast, spooked by intelligence reports of German legions massing across the U.S. Seventh Army. The 6th Army Group, he told Devers, must move ‘back to the Vosges line and hang on” until the Ardennes struggle subsided. Supply dumps were to be shifted into the mountains, and Devers was to sequester two U.S. division, one armored, one infantry, as a SHAEF reserve west of the Vosges. Devers told his diary:
The Germans undoubtedly will attack me now….The position I give up is much stronger that the one to which I go….Giving up the town of Strasbourg is a political disaster for France.
De Galle thought so too: on December 28, he sent General Alphonse Juin, now the French military chief of staff, to Versailles to make inquiries about a rumored retreat in Alsace. A gallant Algerian, distinguished by his Basque beret and left-handed salute – his right arms had been maimed in 1915 – Juin corned Beetle Smith who told him that no firm decision had been made and that SHAEF’s action was “simply the study of a plan.” In truth, Smith had drafted the final order that morning. Juin motored back to Rue St.-Dominque and warned De Gaulle, “They are up to something.”
While Smith prevaricated, Devers temporized. He moved his command post seventy miles west, to Vittel, but ordered his staff to prepare plans for three intermediate fallback positions leading to a final line along the eastern face of the Vosges. When General Patch was told to ready his Seventh Army for withdrawal, he winked at a staff officer and said, “Ain’t going to do it. We aren’t the bad off.”
De Lattre was even more recalcitrant, decrying “a psychosis of retreat” that would force the Allies to capture the same ground twice. He took two days to translate Dever’s withdrawal directive into his own General Orders No. 201, which on December 30 instructed French subordinates “to maintain the integrity of the present front” by yielding not a single square centimeters of Alsatian soil. Devers cabled Eisenhower that falling back to the Vosges could take two weeks.
Once again the supreme commander’s neck flushed a deep red. “Call up Devers and tell him he is not doing what he was told,” he barked at Smith. “Tell him to obey his orders and shorten his line.” In a phone call from Vittel, Devers feebly claimed that Eisenhower’s earlier instructions had been discretionary. “I won’t go to him with that story,” Smith snapped. “He thinks you’ve been disloyal.” Another written order from Eisenhower left no wiggle room:
“The political pressure to retain French soil, which you are undoubtedly experiencing, must be resisted if it leads to any risk of your losing your divisions….You must not endanger the integrity of your units east of your main position, the Vosges. You must be prepared to accept the loss of territory east of the Vosges and all its political consequences.”
Devers capitulated, telling subordinates that all forces would have to retreat to the Vosges no later than January 5. “Eisenhower,” he advised his diary, “has given me no alternative.” As for the supreme commander, he was now so vexed at a man whom he had long disliked that he considered sacking Devers and giving command of his army group to Patch.
“You can kill a willing horse by overdoing what you require of him,” Devers wrote in his diary. “SHAEF has given me too much front, and taken away too many of my troops. This is unsound.” A message from De Gaulle through Juin urged the Allies not to surrender Strasbourg “but to make it a Stalingrad.”
The final day of the year ticked by with fresh snow and more omens. A reconnaissance flight at last light detected German artillery lumbering forward into new gun pits. Seventh Army placed all troops on high alert and canceled holiday celebrations. A reporter who insisted on toasting the departure of 1944 declared, “Never was the world plagued by such a year less worth remembering.” Dever’s diary entry for December 31 was just as cheerless: “Patch called me…. He was sure he was going to be attacked during the night.”
December 1944 explains Ike’s heart problems during his Presidency.
Really amazing stuff. Thanks for sharing.
To me, Ike was a superior commander, dealing with so many obtuse personalities, egos, and political self-interests as well as his own anger at such. Monty wasn’t the only source of “friendly fire” he had to deal with.
In some ways it was easier to deal with the Russian part of the coalition. You knew they would keep killing Germans until they got to Berlin. Of course, they would take Eastern Europe on the way, but there was nothing we could do about that.
Monty was so obtuse. We had four field armies in Western Europe, the British one and the Canadians one. Roosevelt and Marshall would never have allowed Monty to command them.