...Jenks later argued that the chances of a trade deal being rejected due to an immigration provision is Zero. The history is that no trade agreement has ever been stopped once fast-track authority has been given, and this fast-track authority, in particular, specifically limits the way that a trade agreement can be stopped by saying that the disapproval or the action to stop it has to come from Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee or Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), the Chairman of the Finance Committee. Now, those two get to decide whether the TPP and TiSA, and whatever comes next abide by the terms of the fast-track deal. Those two, no other member of Congress can decide that.
Totally false. Not only does the latest version of TPA include new language expressly stating that the House or Senate can dismantle the fast-track rules for various disapproval reasons, buteven more importantlyCongress has always retained this power because it has plenary authority over its rules of procedure, including fast track.
The new TPA, like previous versions before it, acknowledges this fact in Sec. 106(c), which states that the fast-track rules are enacted as as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, but with the full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House. The CRS summary of TPA reiterates this fact: Congress reserves its constitutional right to withdraw or override the expedited procedures for trade implementing bills, which can take effect with a vote by either House of Congress.
Such power is not merely theoretical. It is precisely what then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi did to the Colombia FTA in 2008 after President Bush submitted its implementing legislation. Her move effectively dismantled the fast track procedures and thus delayed congressional consideration of the agreement indefinitely.
In short, Congress retains total control over the FTA implementation process under TPA and can only be bound by the fast track rules if it wants to be bound.
Sensing a theme here yet?
Mostly false. As already noted, TPA sets congressional negotiating objectives on a range of issues (some more palatable than others), but, contrary to the statements of TPA antagonists and even some supporters, these objectives are not legally binding on the executive branch. Instead, the president retains his authority to negotiate with foreign governments, and, as Meese notes, thats a good thing: under well-established constitutional rulings, it would raise serious constitutional concerns for Congress to try to mandate the President’s negotiating positions.
The president and his U.S. trade representative thus technically have discretion to ignore these objectives, but doing so would obviously jeopardize any final congressional vote. As the CRS explains:
To take the fullest advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its constitutional authority and historical precedent, defined the objectives that the President is to pursue in trade negotiations. Although the executive branch has some discretion over implementing these goals, they are definitive statements of U.S. trade policy that the Administration is expected to honor, if it expects trade agreement implementing legislation to be considered under expedited rules [i.e., fast track].
The negotiating objectives constitute one part of the gentlemans agreement between Congress and the president: follow our wishes when you negotiate, and well limit our meddling when a final deal is struck. If the president doesnt follow them, then the deal is off.
Which brings us to