I wonder how long it took for any real understanding of what had hit Hiroshima to permeate the consciousness of the Japanese people as a whole.
I think it probably took weeks or even months. Japan was in ruins and communication was very minimal.
I wonder how long it took for any real understanding of what had hit Hiroshima to permeate the consciousness of the Japanese people as a whole.
Some interesting insight here, encourage reading in its entirety:
http://www.mconway.net/page1/page15/files/Shock%20of%20Atomic%20Bomb.pdf
On August 7 a San Francisco broadcast carried the announcement by President Truman that the United States had
dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. As soon as Foreign
Minister Togo learned of this through the Foreign Ministry’s
short-wave receiver, he tried to get the facts from the army ministry.
(Aerial bombings were a purely military matter, and the
heads of the armed services exercised sole jurisdiction over reports
of air-raid damages.) The army denied that there was any
atomic bombing, maintaining that “although the United States
claims it to be an atomic bomb, it actually appears to be a conventional
bomb with extraordinary destructive power.
Togo recognized the possibility that the United States had
exaggerated the bomb for propaganda purposes, he was impressed
that American radio broadcasting was “rampant” and
“massive.” He probably recalled that the Potsdam Declaration
of July 26, 1945, had threatened Japan with “prompt and utter
destruction.” Galvanized by a sense of urgency, he took the initiative
in convening an emergency meeting of key cabinet ministers
on the afternoon of August 7.37
In an audience with Emperor Hirohito
at 1:30, Kido noted how worried the emperor was. Hirohito, a
scientist specializing in marine biology, was quick to grasp the
destructive power of the atomic bomb. The emperor peppered
Kido with questions about the bomb.40 He had been apprised
by court attendants of the Hiroshima bomb on the afternoon
of August 6 and was informed the following morning that it
was an atomic bomb. He demanded more details from the government
and the army about the devastation of Hiroshima and
was “strongly displeased” that he was not getting enough
information.41
According to Kido’s postwar recollections, Hirohito told
him: “Now that things have come to this impasse, we must bow
to the inevitable. No matter what happens to my safety, we
should lose no time in ending the war so as not to have another
tragedy like this.”42A fter Kido departed, Hirohito asked his military
aide-de-camp almost every hour about the extent of the
damage in Hiroshima.43
The first to take concrete action to terminate the war was
Foreign Minister Togo, a dour-faced, outspoken, and resolute
man. On the morning of August 8, with Suzuki’s approval,
Togo took it upon himself to visit the Imperial Palace and make
a direct appeal to the emperor in his underground air-raid shelter.
According to his postwar account (in September 1945),
Togo reported in detail that American and British broadcasts
were “most enthusiastically” repeating news of the atomic
bomb. Characteristically, he invoked the enemy’s broadcast to
buttress his case for a prompt surrender. “The atomic bomb,”
40.
From the same source:
What the peace party had been worrying about most was
how many more A-bombs the United States had in readiness.
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the Supreme War Council
meeting, “a rather bullish atmosphere” prevailed, as Admiral
Toyoda Soemu, Chief of the Naval General Staff, recalled in his
memoirs. “To be sure, the damage of the atomic bomb is extremely
heavy, but it is questionable whether the United States
will be able to use more bombs in rapid succession.”56A lthough
the proceedings of the council meeting do not exist, it appears
that Army Minister Anami indulged in wishful thinking when
he said that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was the only
atomic bomb the United States possessed.
At precisely this moment, just before 1:00 p.m., news
reached the meeting that a second atomic bomb had been
dropped on Nagasaki.
........
On the other hand, from the standpoint of its shock effect,
the political impact of the Nagasaki bomb cannot be denied.
Army Minister Anami’s wishful thinking was shattered; if
two bombs were available, then maybe there were three or even
four.58 In fact, rumor had it that Tokyo would be atomicbombed
on August 12 and that many more cities would be incinerated.
The Nagasaki bomb, which instantly killed
approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people, was unnecessary to
induce Japan to surrender, but it probably had confirmatory
effects.59
Speaking with emotion but in a quiet tone of
voice, Hirohito said he agreed with Togo, ruling that the Potsdam
terms be accepted. “Especially since the appearance of the
atomic bomb,” he said, continuation of war spelled needless
suffering for his subjects and Japan’s ruin as a nation. He reprimanded
the army and pointed out the discrepancy between
its promise and performance, referring to the army’s failure to
complete defense preparations for the Kujukuri coastal plain,
a key point to repel an American invasion of the Kanto (Tokyo)
Plain. Thus at 2:30 a.m. on August 10, the “sacred decision” was
made to accept the Potsdam terms on one condition: Perrogative of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.”68
And this bit is interesting:
After the
war Suzuki recalled: “The atomic bomb provided an additional
reason for surrender as well as an extremely favorable opportunity
to commence peace talks. I believed such an opportunity
could not be afforded by B-29 bombings alone.”47 The hitherto
vacillating and sphinx-like Suzuki had finally made up his
mind. It is important to note that Suzuki did so beforeh e was informed
of the Soviet entry into the war early on the following
day.48 Sakomizu also felt that “the army will admit that now that
the atomic bomb has come into existence, it precludes war between
a nation that possesses the atomic bomb and one that
does not.”49 However, the army was not to be so easily swayed.
And more. Interesting that under the situation, negotiation was still in their minds. But Canceling the invasion might have been something of value to us?. Note the last paragraph, it could have gone the other way, A REAL POSSIBILITY.
The Supreme War Council failed to break the three-tothree
deadlock. Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai insisted on terminating
the war on the sole condition concerning the emperor
system, while Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda called for a decisive
homeland battle unless the United States accepted the three
additional conditions as well.
......
Anami fiercely opposed Togo and Suzuki.
In fact, Anami’s utterances became almost irrational. As recalled
by those who attended the meetings, Anami declared:
“The appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of
war....We are confident about a decisive homeland battle
against American forces.” He admitted that “given the atomic
bomb and the Soviet entry, there is no chance of winning on
the basis of mathematical calculation,” but he nevertheless declared
that “there will be some chance as long as we keep on
fighting for the honor of the Yamato race.... If we go on like
this and surrender, the Yamato race would be as good as dead
spiritually.” Such was the mentality of the Japanese military.
Urged by middle-echelon and young officers who were “half
mad,” Anami would not retreat from making the last sacrificial
homeland battle.64
Says it best:
The Atomic Bomb as a “Gift from Heaven”
In a postwar interview (in November 1945), Kido explained
the decision to surrender in the following words: “The
feeling that the emperor and I had about the atomic bombing
was that the psychological moment we had long waited for had
finally arrived to resolutely carry out the termination of the
war.... We felt that if we took the occasion and utilized the psychological
shock of the bomb to follow through, we might perhaps
succeed in ending the war” (emphasis mine).71 In the
same interview Kido went so far as to say that the U.S. government,
by using the atomic bomb, actually intended to “assist”
Japan’s peace party:
In rereading some of this, the following makes chills run through me. We, through the eyes of history think we know the only possible outcome of dropping the atomic bomb. IT WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT HAVE HAD TO INVADE.............
Anami fiercely opposed Togo and Suzuki.
In fact, Anami’s utterances became almost irrational. As recalled
by those who attended the meetings, Anami declared:
“The appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of
war....We are confident about a decisive homeland battle
against American forces.” He admitted that “given the atomic
bomb and the Soviet entry, there is no chance of winning on
the basis of mathematical calculation,” but he nevertheless declared
that “there will be some chance as long as we keep on
fighting for the honor of the Yamato race.... If we go on like
this and surrender, the Yamato race would be as good as dead
spiritually.” Such was the mentality of the Japanese military.
Urged by middle-echelon and young officers who were “half
mad,” Anami would not retreat from making the last sacrificial
homeland battle.64
In rereading some of this, the following makes chills run through me. We, through the eyes of history think we know the only possible outcome of dropping the atomic bomb. IT WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT HAVE HAD TO INVADE.............
Anami fiercely opposed Togo and Suzuki.
In fact, Anami’s utterances became almost irrational. As recalled
by those who attended the meetings, Anami declared:
“The appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of
war....We are confident about a decisive homeland battle
against American forces.” He admitted that “given the atomic
bomb and the Soviet entry, there is no chance of winning on
the basis of mathematical calculation,” but he nevertheless declared
that “there will be some chance as long as we keep on
fighting for the honor of the Yamato race.... If we go on like
this and surrender, the Yamato race would be as good as dead
spiritually.” Such was the mentality of the Japanese military.
Urged by middle-echelon and young officers who were “half
mad,” Anami would not retreat from making the last sacrificial
homeland battle.64