Please read the rather lengthy but worthwhile analysis below which includes excerpts by one to the most renown constitutional authorities of his time, Robert Bork. The issue and proof of original intent is not that of the writer but that of the ratifiers and why this incredible expansion of federal power is unconstitutional, unwarranted, and unwanted.
Q: What is the basis for saying that the framers of the 14th Amendment intended it to apply only to former slaves?
A: - The historical context of the post-civil war reconstruction period to instate the former slaves as full U.S. citizens with full rights as others.
- The legal context of this being the middle of the three reconstruction amendments.
- The lack of clear text that proves specific provision of unparalleled and massive expansion of federal power which would have been completely out of place from the purpose of these post-civil war reconstruction amendments and would have produced much evidence, of which there is none, of debate and discussion about such a radical departure from American governance, as noted below.
- The weight of the probative value of accuracy and precedent in a SCOTUS case decided four years after the amendment was ratified versus 131 years later.
- The intent of the ratifiers, not the drafters. Thomas’ argument rests on the drafters’ intent to apply Corfield v. Coryell rights. But as noted below, there is scant evidence this was intended by the ratifiers and it is the intent of the ratifiers, not the drafters, that counts.
Judge Robert Bork, the generally recognized leading scholar on Constitutional Law of his time and most notably focused on original understanding and intent in construction, said this about the fourteenth amendment:
"The fourteenth amendment was adopted shortly after the Civil War, and all commentators are agreed that its primary purpose was the protection of the recently freed slaves. As we have seen, of the amendment's three clauses, two have been pressed into service of judicial imperialism - the due process and equal protection clauses - while the third, the privileges and immunities clause, has remained a cadaver that it was left by the Slaughter-House Cases. It is this corpse that [former dean of the Stanford law school] Ely [and apparently now Justice Thomas] proposes to resurrect.
"The due process clause will not do as a warrant for the creation of new constitutional rights because, as Ely notes, it is simply a requirement that government not do certain things to people without fair procedures, not a statement of what things may not be done. The fifth amendment's due process clause, which applied only against the federal government, was later copied in the fourteenth amendment, which applied to the states. 'There is general agreement that the earlier clause had been understood at the time of its inclusion to refer to lawful procedures. What recorded comment there was at the time of replication in the fourteenth amendment is devoid of any reference that gives the provision more than a procedural connotation' (J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) at 105-16). That is true, and it is more than enough to condemn the hundreds of cases, stretching from Dred Scott to today, in which the courts have given the due process clause substantive content in order to read their own notions of policy into the Constitution.
"Ely's attempt [and apparently Thomas' proposed attempt] to make the privileges and immunities clause do the work that has been improperly assigned to the due process clause is, however, unsuccessful. He points out that 'there is not a bit of legislative history that supports the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to be meaningless' (Id. at 103). That is hardly surprising. One would not expect ratifying conventions to enact a constitutional provision they intended to mean nothing. But that hardly solves the problem, and the problem is that we do not know what the clause is intended to mean.
"Bingham and Howard meant these additional rights [taken from Corfield v. Coryell]. That the ratifiers did is far less clear. Certainly there is no evidence that the ratifying convention intended such power in judges, and it is their intent, not the drafters’, that counts. Nor is it easy to imagine the northern states, victorious in a Civil War that lead to the fourteenth amendment, should have decided to turn over to the federal courts not only the protection of the rights of freed slaves but an unlimited power to frustrate the will of the Northern states themselves. The only significant exercise of judicial review in the past century had been Dred Scott, a decision hated in the North and one hardly likely to encourage the notion that courts should be given carte blanche to set aside legislative acts.
"Had any such radical departure from the American method of governance been intended, had courts been intended to supplant legislatures, there would be more than a shred of evidence to that effect. That proposal would have provoked an enormous debate and public discussion.
"We know there is no evidence that the ratifiers imagined they were handing ultimate governance to the courts. We know that a constitutional revolution of that magnitude would have provoked widespread and heated (to put it mildly) discussion but there is no record of any such discussion. The rather sweeping mandate must be judged counterfeit” (R. Bork, The Tempting of America (1990), excerpted at 180-83).
And, therefore, in reference to Justice Miller’s opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, Bork says, “ Miller was following sound judicial instinct: to reject a construction of a new amendment that would leave the Court at large in the field of public policy without any guidelines other than the views of its members. [ ] In a word, the history of the fourteenth amendment gave judges no guidance on any subject other than the protection of blacks. Beyond that, the Justices had nothing more to apply than their personal views. That, Miller thought, was reason enough to confine the amendment almost entirely to the subject of race” (id. at 37-38).
Q: What does Bork say about the meaning of Privileges and Immunities of US citizens, as the terms were understood in the late 1860s?
A: Well, if you are asking about the general understanding of the P&I Clause before the 14A, Bork says, "Most people have always thought that the article IV clause simply prevented a state from discriminating against out-of-staters in favor of their own citizens" (R. Bork, The Tempting of America at 181).
If you are asking what the P&I Clause was intended to mean in the 14A, Bork says this about the P&I Clause: "One would not expect ratifying conventions to enact a constitutional provision they intended to mean nothing. But that hardly solves the problem, and the problem is that we do not know what the clause is intended to mean.”
So his point is judges should not insert their own personal moral viewpoints of what THEY think a clause should mean where they have no guidance from original understanding of the text. He therefore approved Justice Miller's judicial restraint and "sound judicial instinct" in doing just that.
Bork is inferring that, the history of the definition of P&I notwithstanding, there is not enough evidence to understand what and why they put P&I in the 14A. But there is PLENTY of reason conclude that no constitutional revolution was intended by the 14A. It seems that P&I in the 14A is a moot point that Thomas wants to resurrect to give "justifiable" life to the utterly discredited incorporation doctrine. Justice Miller saw that P&I in the 14A added nothing to P&I in Article IV, so it was a moot point as far as he was concerned.
I agree with Bork and Miller and believe simply that the ratifiers were trying to put former slaves on equal footing with all U.S. citizens. Just guessing (something Bork, admirably, was loathe to do which is why he might have been one of our greatest Justices if he had been given the chance), my sense is the ratifiers were simply wanting to confirm that states could not discriminate against black out-of staters. In that sense, P&I in the 14A doesn't add anything, only confirms the full citizenship status of former slaves. But that's my opinion only, not a constitutional basis for construction. I sense it's probably Bork's also, but he was disciplined and discrete enough to keep his personal opinions separate from valid constitutional construction.
Anyway, the argument is not about the historical definition of P&I. It is about what and how it was intended to mean and be used in the 14A. The P&I of Article IV is not so much about what P&I itself is so much as the P&I in one state is valid for out-of-staters. Beyond this is a "fundamental" flaw some have of understanding a basic presumption of the Constitution.
The original body of the Constitution doesn't name specific "rights" or P&I's. It is well understood that those rights named in the so-called "Bill of Rights" were listed only to appease the anti-federalists so the Constitution could be ratified. Whatever rights, powers, and liberties not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution or forbidden to the states by it belongs to "the States and the people respectively." The ninth and tenth amendments confirm that.
So the effort to define P&I is inconsistent with the whole presumption of the Constitution, that as far as the Constitution is concerned, all rights not delegated or forbidden belong to the states and the people. They don't have to be listed nor should they be listed because as far as the Constitution is concerned those rights and P&I's are none of the feds business. Only discrimination of P&I by one state upon non-state citizens is a concern of the federal government.
There is no proof of what the ratifiers intended by P&I. One’s conjecture is as good as another. Mine is that the ratifiers meant nothing more than to confirm former slaves had the same P&I as understood in Article IV among the states as any other U.S. citizen. In the sense of probability, mine is much more likely because the other argument would have resulted in a Constitutional revolution of which there would have been some record of the debates and discussions that would have ensued. We know no such record exists.
However, I don't really see how can can agree that the "Incorporation Doctrine" is really the "Corruption Doctrine" if you believe the Incorporation Doctrine to be valid as you seem later to indicate.
If you are asking what the P&I Clause was intended to mean in the 14A, Bork says this about the P&I Clause: "One would not expect ratifying conventions to enact a constitutional provision they intended to mean nothing. But that hardly solves the problem, and the problem is that we do not know what the clause is intended to mean.”
Regarding point 1, who cares what I think?
Again, John Bingham, the main author of Section 1 of the 14th Amendment, had clarified that the “privileges and immunities” referred to in that section basically included all of the personal rights expressly protected by the Constitution, most of these rights listed in the Bill of Rights. Here’s the excerpt from the congressional record again.
"Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly [emphasis added] defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States." — John Bingham, Appendix to the Congressional Globe
So for all I know, “ignored" 19th century justices invented the constitutionally baseless selective incorporation doctrine to get a little attention.
Also, I think that I see the possible source of confusion between the privileges and immunities mentioned in Clause 1 of Section 2 of Article IV and the ones mentioned in Section 1 of the 14th Amendment. More specifically, the ones mentioned in Article IV refer to privileges and immunities in state constitutions and codes, many such rights based on the express rights listed in federal Bill of Rights.
Regarding lesser known privileges and immunities peculiar to a given state, consider this example. A young man who has just turned 18 wants to celebrate by getting drunk. The issue is that since the minimum drinking age in the state where he is domiciled is 21, he needs to go to a state where minimum drinking age is 18 so that he can celebrate.
Regarding point 2 which I have already addressed in my analysis of point 1, given Bingham’s simple explanation of privileges and immunities in the congressional record, I wish that I knew what Judge Bork was basing his statement concerning confusion about privileges and immunities in the context of the 14th Amendment on.