Posted on 08/20/2016 7:37:21 PM PDT by sukhoi-30mki
TOKYO -- Japan's Defense Ministry is likely to request a budgetary allocation so the country's air force, which is responding more frequently to Chinese provocations, can load more missiles on its F-15 fighter jets, sources said.
The ministry wants to double the number of air-to-air missiles to be loaded on the mainstay jets, operated by the Air Self-Defense Force. It also plans to lengthen the jets' lifespans.
The ministry would like the money to be allocated in the budget for the fiscal year beginning in April.
There has been a surge in the number of Chinese warplanes as well as increased Chinese provocations in waters around the Senkaku Islands, in the southernmost Japanese prefecture of Okinawa. China also claims the islands, calling them the Diaoyu.
The ministry appears to want to counter China's moves by both souping up existing jets and introducing next-generation fighters.
The ASDF owns 200 F-15s, fourth-generation fighter jets made by Boeing, the U.S. aerospace and defense company.
The ministry plans to double the number of missiles each jet can carry to 16. It also plans to repair damaged wings and other parts to extend operating life.
The ASDF has been scrambling jets more often in response to Chinese maneuvers. It did so 199 times from April through June, a 75% increase from the same period last year.
Recently, Chinese jets have been flying further south, near the contested islands. "As the cruising range of Chinese military aircraft has gotten longer, they are coming ever closer to our territories," a Japanese Defense Ministry official said.
In January, the ASDF transferred its squadron at the Tsuiki air base in Fukuoka Prefecture, southern Japan, to a base in Naha, Okinawa, nearly doubling the number of F-15s there to 40. Were China to send a big squadron into Japanese airspace, Tokyo would need to respond with both quality and quantity.
At the end of fiscal 2017, the ASDF is to deploy fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters that are hard to detect by radar. But the first F-35s will be deployed at the Misawa base in Aomori Prefecture, at the northern tip of Japan's main island. The U.S. Air Force shares the base, and the ASDF plans to first work on joint pilot training and maintenance cooperation with the U.S. before putting the jets in operation in tenser areas.
(Nikkei)
One interesting tactic that the US will apparently use as well is to use Gen 4 fighters as “missile trucks” operating well behind Gen 5 F-22s and F-35s. The forward deployed stealth aircraft will designate targets within visual range, and the F-15s and F-16s in many miles away will fire AMRAAMs to destroy the aircraft.
It’s a pretty good approach and nicely addresses the limited munitions the Gen 5 aircraft can carry internally.
If a Gen 5 fighter is within visual range of the enemy, it has basically failed its mission. Nor would it be wise to lob AMRAAMs into an environment in which friendly aircraft were within visual range of enemy aircraft.
“If a Gen 5 fighter is within visual range of the enemy, it has basically failed its mission.”
There have been mighty few modern conflicts where fighters have been authorized to fire without visually confirming the target. In fact, I can’t think of any.
Visual confirmation includes observation via IR imagery. The EOTS sensor provides high-resolution IR imagery. The details are doubtless classified, but I’m sure enemy aircraft can be identified at long range in total darkness. By “long range”, I mean 30+ miles.
“Nor would it be wise to lob AMRAAMs into an environment in which friendly aircraft were within visual range of enemy aircraft.”
AMRAAMs aren’t “lobbed” they are cued to a particular radar signal and will only seek the designated target. The Gen 5 fighter would illuminate the target(s) for long enough for the AMRAAM’s onboard radar to lock on.
Further, there is virtually no chance of an AMRAAM successfully targeting a F-22 or F-35, as AMRAAMs are radar guided.
“At the end of fiscal 2017, the ASDF is to deploy fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters that are hard to detect by radar ...”
That’s the same year that China’s fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter becomes operational and two years later becomes combat ready.
I'm going to guess you haven't actually been associated with military operations in a long time. Fighters have been authorized to and have fired beyond visual range for decades. Many shots and kills taken during and since the first Gulf War were entirely BVR. That includes several AMRAAM shots.
Regarding the AMRAAM...it is an actively guided missile meaning it has its own radar. At long ranges, it is launched with what amounts to nothing more than a reference point for guidance. Its software cues it to turn on its radar at a certain distance from the target and the missile guides itself to intercept. That allows the launching aircraft to leave well before the missile impacts, and even before the missile turns on its own radar. That is one of the huge advantages of the AMRAAM. The problem is, the probability of kill is reduced when it doesn't have supporting updates from the launching aircraft's radar because the missile is basically using an interpolation of the last data it received to guess where its target is when it turns on its own radar. So it is entirely possible for an AMRAAM to target an aircraft other than the one it was intended to hit when it was launched. And that is one reason (among several) you would never launch an AMRAAM BVR into an engagement in which friendly and adversary aircraft are within visual range of each other.
The first Gulf War barely qualifies as "modern". As far as I can tell, there was exactly one BVR shootdown in the entire conflict. There were bad shoots even when the shooter had visual contact with the target. That has something to do with current doctrine.
"Regarding the AMRAAM...it is an actively guided missile meaning it has its own radar. "
Yep, as I mentioned above.
"At long ranges, it is launched with what amounts to nothing more than a reference point for guidance. Its software cues it to turn on its radar at a certain distance from the target and the missile guides itself to intercept. That allows the launching aircraft to leave well before the missile impacts, and even before the missile turns on its own radar. That is one of the huge advantages of the AMRAAM. The problem is, the probability of kill is reduced when it doesn't have supporting updates from the launching aircraft's radar because the missile is basically using an interpolation of the last data it received to guess where its target is when it turns on its own radar. So it is entirely possible for an AMRAAM to target an aircraft other than the one it was intended to hit when it was launched. And that is one reason (among several) you would never launch an AMRAAM BVR into an engagement in which friendly and adversary aircraft are within visual range of each other."
The AMRAAM generally isn't launched using "fire and forget" mode at long range for exactly the reason you cite - lower PK. In the case where Gen 5 aircraft are being used as "forward observers" there would also likely be a way to hand off the data link. Also, as I pointed out and you conveniently ignored, AMRAAMs wouldn't be able to lock on to Gen 5 aircraft regardless.
What really makes your points moot, though, is that there are active plans to do exactly what we've been discussing:
The Air Force is reportedly interested in adopting the Boeing upgrade [F-15s carrying 16 AMRAAMs], and in the meantime has also developed a new datalink pod for the F-15 that allows the older fighter to receive targeting data from the F-22. In theory, non-stealthy F-15s could fly behind F-22s and F-35s during an air battle, firing missiles at targets that the stealth fighters detect while evading detection themselves.http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-air-forces-master-plan-outgun-china-15145
There was another article more specifically about the F-15 being used in that role but I'm having trouble finding it. The AF is also looking at B-1s and even B-52s for the "missile truck" role.
In your first post to me you said you couldn't think of "any" modern conflicts where fighters were authorized to shoot beyond visual range. If you are using actual shots and kills as your evidence of whether US fighter pilots are allowed to shoot BVR, I'm afraid you're going to have to go all the way back to the first Gulf War to start building your data, because we really haven't faced much of an air threat since. The last AMRAAM kills were BVR shots against Yoguslavian Mig-29s in 1999. Since then, we've added F-22s, F-35s and the AIM-120D to the inventory, and all of our fighters have a much more robust capability for poitively identifying aircraft without using visual ID. I'm not going to discuss the intricacies of how we currently gain a positive ID beyond visual range, but if you think the DoD is investing billions of dollars in long range missiles, stealth fighters and advanced datalink capability with the intent of requiring its pilots to fly to a visual merge before they can shoot, you would be wrong.
Regarding AMRAAM tactics, how it is employed largely depends on the threat. But the best analogy I can offer is, if you are equipped with a sniper rifle that has a longer range than any of the weapons your target is carrying, you don't sneak inside the range of his weapons to try to kill him with a knife. In short, AMRAAMs are employed to maximize their potential of killing the bad guy while minimizing your potential of being killed by the bad guy. And I think you are under the assumption that an AMRAAM can't lock on to a fifth generation fighter. I didn't conveniently ignore that fallacy. It's simply a false assumption on your part.
Regarding your magazine article link...see my opening paragraph. You can choose your information sources. I wouldn't expect you to take my word as fact either. But fortunately, the military doesn't base its tactics and shot doctrine on rumors published in The National Interest online blog. And you "conveniently ignored" the fact that the article is focused on the B-52 and B-1 being used as "arsenal-planes" carrying weapons that have not been defined. The most likely role they would play would be in dropping long to medium range stand off ground attack weapons that would target enemy assets identified by the incredibly complex passive sensors used in our stealth aircraft. It is the article's assumption that the same idea could be used in an air to air environment. I don't know who David Axe is, but based on his other articles, I think it is extremely obvious he has never been a fighter pilot, and I would be surprised if he's even ever actually served in any military profession. He's a journalist. Good for him.
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