I suspect the first would not be relevant here because the USDOT regulations would only apply to those vehicles that are already under legitimate Federal oversight -- i.e., commercial carriers who cross state lines. And many concerns about the second are a bit overblown. I am all for Congress doing its job, but I can assure you that you don't want Congress to get involved in every single decision related to Federal oversight. I have no problem with Congress legitimately authorizing the Executive Branch to oversee areas that Congress simply doesn't have the expertise to deal with. You'd never have things like uniform road signs or a standard railroad gage in this country, for example, if Congress operated that way.
Hi Alberta’s Child. The situation is complicated and I decided not to make a long post trying to follow the tangents, especially since I haven’t arrived at a conclusion concerning the issue.
Regarding legitimate federal oversight of vehicles, one constitutional problem with Eisenhower’s interstate highway system is the following imo. Although the states did constitutionally authorize the feds to build postal roads (1.8.7) the states have never constitutionally delegated to the feds the specific power to build an interstate highway system.
In other words, and with all due respect to the family and supporters of the late President Eisenhower, Eisenhower first needed to encourage Congress to successfully propose a highway amendment to the Constitution to the states before building the thing imo, but which he did not do. The requirement for a highway amendment to the Constitution is evidenced by President’s Madison’s veto of a same-idea project proposed by Congress in 1817.
Veto of federal public works bill, 1817
Also, while Congress does have Commerce Clause powers (1.8.3), another possible constitutional problem concerning commerce and highways is this. I question the scope of 1.8.3 where vehicles that move commerce is concerned. This is because I see references to the legal term “contract of carriage.”
Contract of carriage
The question that legal contracts introduce to the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers is this. The Supreme Court had decided in Paul v. Virginia that Congress’s Commerce Clause powers to do not extend to regulating contracts.
4. The issuing of a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce within the meaning of the latter of the two clauses, even though the parties be domiciled in different States, but is a simple contract [emphasis added] of indemnity against loss." - Paul v. Virginia, 1869. (The corrupt feds have no Commerce Clause (1.8.3) power to regulate contracts.)
So because vehicles which arguably carry commerce under contracts which Congress may have no Commerce Clause control over, such vehicles moving commerce on a highway system which was arguably built outside the framework of the Constitution, I must question if Congress has the Commerce Clause power to require that such vehicles be equipped with speed-limit devices.
Corrections, insights welcome.