I can't imagine what more could be done to stop shenanigans. Anybody could check that posted tally with the tally from the memory stick when it got downtown.
Unless there's a way that the memory stick could've been pre-hacked to throw a certain percentage of votes to another candidate, it looked pretty well guarded. That would be risky since the paper ballots are locked in a secure, guarded container. The only way to improve it would be a Back to the Future move. When I was a young voter, those ballots were hand counted at the precinct with anyone who wanted to do so watching.
With these paper ballots, a hand count would be possible, but at this point who knows how secure those ballots have been?
FWIW, I'm glad I worked as a county poll worker for election day. It's nice to have been part of the process first hand. One soon realizes that greater safeguards lead to greater complexity and that doesn't solve any more problems than it creates. The only solution is an honest respect for the importance of the integrity of elections, and we're a long way from there.
JMHO....my mind is using the keyboard to get these thoughts in place.
“Unless there’s a way that the memory stick could’ve been pre-hacked to throw a certain percentage of votes to another candidate, it looked pretty well guarded. “
That is exactly how the youtube video shows it done. For some stupid reason, some of these reader machine include the actual software to do the counting ON THE MEMORY MODULE. If a pre-hacked memory module is substituted by a crooked poll worker, deliver person, or whoever has physical access, the results on the tape can say whatever they want regardless of what the paper ballots said.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JkKdJoWG3qQ
They put through 6 NO ballot and 2 YES ballots, but the tape shows 7 YES and 1 NO. The total count is correct, but a predetermined percentage is applied to the total to get the breakdown they want.
The only way to guard against this would be to have a master copy of the correct memory module and a device to verify each machine’s module is a byte-for-byte match to the master. If it isn’t, the the box needs to have all its ballots reprocessed through an untampered counter.