Emergency: California’s Oroville Dam Spillway Near Failure, Evacuations Ordered

Breitbart ^ | Feb 12, 2017 | Joel B. Pollak1

[janetjanet998]

The California Department of Water Resources issued a sudden evacuation order shortly before 5 p.m. Sunday for residents near the Oroville Dam in northern California, warning that the dam’s emergency spillway would fail in the next 60 minutes.

The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.

[EarthResearcher333]

The Forensic analysis team's report could be viewed as an extremely sensitive situation as DWR's reputation could be tied to any negative conclusions. The most difficult task of the team would be gathering internal information regarding the Human Organizational Factors (HOF) that may have contributed to the failure(s).

Having a good glimpse of the engineering patterns and decisions made (we are nearing 4,000 posts), there is a great deal of evidence of definite culpability (should have known & fixed prior). This situation will require a very experienced level of HOF background skillsets in one or more of the Forensic team members. This situation will also require a tremendous degree of character to face these potential truths regardless of the consequences (careers, image, PR, funding risks, etc).

One immediate conflict is that the team members are being compensated (paid) by DWR. Wherever the report is headed, the ultimate truth to everything will come out. Thus, there will be a spotlight on any potential "influences" that may seem to appear in a Final Forensic Report.

I do not envy Mr France's position...Just like the knight in the movie "Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade" said, "choose wisely".

[PavewayIV]

Thanks for the interesting link on the old local mines, Ray76. Why, if I can still lift a pickaxe when I retire at 80...

[EarthResearcher333]

DWR Organizational Ethics? - Severe Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception? - On the Record Examples from DWR officials in Press Releases, Town Halls, to the Press, and Testimony in State Legislative Hearings 2017

Today, Honesty & Integrity in Ethical Leadership with Organizations has been intensely studied after tragic outcomes in "unethical entrenching" of a "shadowy side permeating within" organizations such as ENRON, Lehman Brothers (housing crash), and others. Negative influences of "power, privilege, deception, inconsistency, and irresponsibility" have been found over time to compromise organizations leading to the ultimate consequences of Human and Organizational Factor (HOF) misconduct, or a subtle loss of accountability of the rigors of the "execution of a profession to the standards of excellence".

Studies have concluded that "a crisis of trust" will develop as an outcome. Indeed, many recent media articles have been highlighting the widespread mistrust that has developed between the public and DWR.

This Post documents the most severe examples that is classified in Organizational Ethics as very serious ethical behavior "sign" inside of an organization. Complete falsehoods were stated in testimony to Legislators in a State Legislative Hearing and to the media by a top qualified DWR representative. Since the Spillway Blowout Failure Crisis, DWR has had town hall community meetings, many press briefings, interviews, and including Testifying at a State Legislative Hearing in Sacramento. When it came time to answer very important issues on serious matters, top representatives of DWR have exhibited answers that directly conflict with engineering integrity. To boldly deny facts from their own repeated DSOD inspection report findings, in front of the public in town halls, in interviews to the press, and even in Testimony to Legislators in asking critical questions at a State Legislative Hearing, can only be classified as a serious degree of Engineering Incompetence or a Serious degree of Engineering Deception. It's either one or the other.

Below are these critical examples from top DWR officials spanning April 27 to June 18 - Severe Engineering Incompetence or Calculated Engineering Deception. These examples involve press release statements, media quotes, town hall statements, and State Testimony involving DWR's Erin Mellon, Christie Jones, a DWR engineer (at Apr 27 town hall), and Dave Gutierrez. (Erin Mellon, Communications Manager, Natural Resources Agency - Christie Jones, Deputy Director of Statewide Emergency Preparedness and Security for DWR - Dave Gutierrez, DWR Chief of Division of Safety of Dams and Advisory Consultant).

Critical Deceptions 1 & 2. Engineering Incompetence or Engineering Deception - (1) April 27, 2017 DWR engineer states at a town hall that the Green Wet Area is "it's a natural spring". (2) May 2, 2017 Christie Jones states that the Green spot is from rain "When the rain falls, the grass grows. There is no leak in the dam". FACT CORRECTION Evidence: MULTIPLE DSOD reports note that the seepage is from the reservoir. Not from rain, not from a natural spring. Here is one of multiple DSOD report examples where DSOD identifies counterdicting facts with photographs and with notation. (see deception 3 for further evidence in Catholic Online article markup)

Critical Deception 3: Engineering Incompetence or Engineering Deception - (3) May 4, 2017 Erin Mellon DWR Press Release regarding the "Green Spots" - now stated to be from rain water. (story is changing from "its a natural spring").

FACT CORRECTION Evidence: re deception 3 - Catholic Online Article evidence with markup notes highlighting the engineering conflicts and lack of engineering competency in DWR's statements.

Critical Deception 4: Engineering Incompetence or Engineering Deception - (4) May 11, 2017 DWR Chief of Division of Safety of Dams and Advisory Consultant Dave Gutierrez denies any large trees next to spillway. (Legislative testimony as reported by Valerie Price: "Holding up a sheaf of papers with many stick on dividers, Gallagher states that “tree roots” were “plugging up the drainage pipes,” and that each of the dividers marked a place in the reports where the problem of trees growing too close to the Main Spillway had been listed. When asked if there was a process for cutting the trees, and specifically trees that were growing nearest to the drains, in areas where the inspectors had reported blockage, Gutierez answered that he was unfamiliar with the reports. He stated that inspectors would require that trees be removed, especially if they were growing near the drains. Gutierez denied that any large trees were growing near the drains, and he asked that the Committee wait for the forensic report. Gallagher asks, “Did we ever go check the drains?” Gutierez answers, “Not that I know of,” and he repeated his denial that any trees were growing near the drains. Gallagher tells him there are documents and photos showing the trees, and that “trees take a long time to grow,” implying that neglect of standard inspection and maintenance have been ongoing for years.

Biography of Dave Gutierrez noting his B.S. in Civil & professional engineering qualifications and expertise in Dam Safety operations including Chief of DSOD for many years - Identifies the criticality of the competency & specifics of the questions asked by Representative Gallagher and Dave Gutierrez's denial.

PROOF that Dave Gutierrez should have been well aware of the trees and tree root problem as identified SIX days earlier by the Independent Forensic Failure Analysis Team

PROOF & FACT CORRECTION 1 of 2 Evidence that Dave Gutierrez was grossly incorrect in denying the existence of large trees next to the Spillway (2010 and 2015 photographic evidence & DSOD report identifying the need to remove Large Tree).

PROOF & FACT CORRECTION 2 of 2 Evidence that Dave Gutierrez was grossly incorrect in denying the existence of large trees next to the Spillway (2010 and 2015 photographic evidence & DSOD report identifying the need to remove Large Tree).

Critical Deception 5: Engineering Incompetence or Engineering Deception - (5) June 18, 2017 DWR Chief of Division of Safety of Dams and Advisory Consultant Dave Gutierrez outright states to SFgate reporter Kurtis Alexander "You can’t even find clay pipes anymore,” (inferring obsolete material, clay pipe vs PVC). FReeper Abb contacted reporter Kurtis Alexander & confirmed that others had contacted Kurtis noting that Mr Gutierrez's statement was false. FReeper abb also identified a list of modern day manufacturers of high quality VCP clay pipe used around the world due to its superior qualities.

PROOF & FACT CORRECTION 1 of 4 Evidence that Dave Gutierrez was grossly incorrect in his statement to the press that "You can't even find clay pipes anymore".

PROOF & FACT CORRECTION 2 of 4 Evidence that Dave Gutierrez was grossly incorrect in his statement to the press that "You can't even find clay pipes anymore".

PROOF & FACT CORRECTION 3 of 4 Evidence that Dave Gutierrez was grossly incorrect in his statement to the press that "You can't even find clay pipes anymore".

PROOF & FACT CORRECTION 4 of 4 Evidence that Dave Gutierrez was grossly incorrect in his statement to the press that "You can't even find clay pipes anymore".

[Repeal The 17th]

Inflow/Outflow web-page is down.

http://cdec.water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/queryF?ORO

http://www.isitdownrightnow.com/cdec.water.ca.gov.html
Cdec.water.ca.gov is DOWN for everyone.
It is not just you. The server is not responding...

[The Westerner]

Thank you for this forensic report. Any homeowner knows the damage tree roots cause when they grow into drain pipes. It’s shocking that no one from top on down insisted that the trees be cut down and drain pipes inspected. Shocking also to see photos of the darker green grass on the dam. How many individuals over how many years evaded the question: “is there a crack in the dam and should’t we eer on the side of caution by starting with that premise?”.

ER, I hope the man in charge of the investigation studies this thread, if he’s aware of it.

[EarthResearcher333]

I can assure you that there is very much an internal scrutiny paid to this forum, to experts writing reports, and any other sources writing investigative articles.

The Forensic team is "tipping their hand" in where they are heading in interviews of John France in recent news articles. The vulnerability I see in the Forensic Team is in their Human and Organizational Factors depth of knowledge and expertise (you can review their resume's published by DWR).

From my past experience, when there is a weakness in a touted "team of experts", there is a tendency to "second guess" what the real "top experts" will publish. This leads to "fishing". Simply, the team can be placed in a position where they are "in over their heads".

Extreme politics can also interfere with a "team of experts" in being able to freely investigate and communicate with other "top experts".

Once, Bechtel Corp ordered a top appraisal group to not speak to me, as I had covered so many dimensions of law, physics, engineering dynamics, and other factors to where Bechtel wasn't going to get what they wanted. The top appraisal group wanted to cooperate and get up to speed on the mutual issues that were validly identified. But this was stopped. (Bechtel settled to my terms in the end).

I suspect that DWR is applying the same type of hard pressure to the Forensic Team. You can sense the "broad brush" wording of answers from John France. It is almost like sending out a "flurry" of trial balloons. You never see this in a true hard nosed investigation that is going to reveal critical organizational failures including calling out specifics in contributors.

Another "sign" that the Forensic team is having a particular challenge in pinpointing the spillway failure is that they are revealing their involvement with the Utah test model. $277,000 was given to this Utah group to build a scale model with various modifications to the proposed new spillway shape and design. Included in the test runs are experiments that the Forensic team are interested in getting data from.

The first problem with this is that the model doesn't scale to the full size spillway dimensions. The second major problem is that the Forensic team has to get the real answers to how deep the chasms were that eroded under the failed drains area in the blowout failure region. To get these real answers means that people would have to admit what they knew and did. If the Forensic team is "Blocked" from this information (yes there are ways to do this), the Scale model testing & potential results would be useless (a big "red herring" that becomes the central core to an enveloping report to wrap around).

If I were on the Forensic Team, and I was given an order not to speak to outside experts or resources to augment any HOF expertise, I would politely resign. This outcome would be better than "going along to get along" and end up failing yet again the public that the professionals in the dam engineering community should be committed to in Safety to the level it should be - High Reliability Systems managed by the excellence of the profession this demands.

[abb]

We’re hearing over and over about the “new and improved” design and construction of the replacement Flood Control Spillway (FCS). No doubt it will be.

But the fact remains the old FCS served reliably for 50 years, and was operated at least once with a much greater flow than was occurring this past February when the structure failed.

In January, 1997, the FCS was operated at a peak rate of 160 thousand ft3/sec with no apparent issues. So something changed in the interim. That’s what must be found out.

http://cepsym.org/Sympro1997/Roos.pdf

[EarthResearcher333]

It didn't take long for the BOC to pinpoint the failure location at station 33+00. (March 17, 2017 BOC report). Quote: "These photos show that the failure was initiated at the hole at the left side of the chute near station 33+00"

That exact area is where all of the photos show DWR maintenance trucks at a repeated fix "seam" area where patching/cutting/filling/repairs were done for the full 178 foot width of the invert chute.

Two side drains also were non-functional to the left and right [offset] of this repeated "fix" area (each side drain services a 200ft section of one half of the invert).

It shouldn't take rocket science to quickly identify the O&M DWR's maintenance & contractor "fix" work done in this failure location to get the answer to the blowout.

In fact, the glaring answer has been sitting for months at the bottom of the spillway. They were "deep void filling" in the foundation chasm erosions deeper than the anchor bars. There isn't a spillway in the world that could survive the complications from this fatal repair decision.

Oh, and all of the clogged non-function drains... They too would have been an issue for deep void filling as (1) the drains would "drop" from the deep foundation erosion, (2) the void filling now has "open" drain pipe that facilitates grout plugging, including migration to the longitudinal drains.

Pretty easy way to neutralize 35,600 sq/ft of slab "drains" area. The pressurized underflow water would then have a field day in eroding the frangible areas of the foundation (leading to more "void filling").

Again, doesn't take rocket science.

But, exposure of this would be very damaging to DWR. They face forfeiture of FEMA funding and Lawsuits from their water customers in denial of paying the 25% if someone comes out and speaks the truth. I'm not holding my breath on the Forensic team on this info coming out.

When DWR officials deny the obvious in a State Legislative Hearing, when they refuse to answer other technical questions, and then they say "wait until the Forensic Analysis Report comes out", what does that tell you?"

btw- Operating the chute intermittently in years in the past, including the 160kcfs 1997 operation, makes the blowout failure even more dramatic as it was just under 55kcfs. The spillway was designed for 296,000 cfs max operation with a factor of safety on top of this. So the 160kcfs is just about half its rating. And the 55kcfs is 18% of its rating (not including factor of safety).

[abb]

That may be the lever they use to keep the Oroville legislator (James Gallagher) quiet, just about the only person so far willing to seriously question DWR. They’ll tell him if we look to hard and find serious negligence, then Federal money dies up.

So they’ll put it to him this way: ‘Do you want the money, or the truth?’

[abb]

http://www.krcrtv.com/news/local/butte/natural-disaster-expert-presents-plan-to-make-oroville-dam-safe/566488498

Natural disaster expert presents plan to make Oroville Dam safe

Taylor Torregano

Posted: Jun 27, 2017 06:23 PM PDT

Natural disaster expert presents plan...

OROVILLE, Calif. - At a Butte County Board of Supervisors meeting Tuesday, U.C. Berkeley Professor Robert G. Bea presented his thoughts on the Oroville Dam spillway.

The natural disaster expert said he has a plan for what’s needed to make the dam safe for the next 50 years.

“We’re going to do it right and we ain’t leaving here until it’s done right,” Bea exclaimed to the group.

His solution lies in five ‘C’s: culture, cognizance, capabilities, commitment, and counting. Bea said the Department of Water Resources has failed massively at all five. “And that’s what makes me afraid,” he added.

For Bea, culture is having an operating group with the same beliefs, values, and reliability to do the right thing. Cognizance is the clear recognition of the major threat a failure to the dam would pose. Bea used his own PTSD from work during Hurricane Katrina as an example of this cognizance, referring to it as ‘constant worry.’

“It’s not pleasant, it affects my voice,” Bea explained.

This led him to the third ‘c’, having the capability of handling such responsibility, both in funding and experience.

“The one thing we’ve learned, and when I say we, I mean a worldwide community, about these big disasters that we’re having too many of them here in the U.S., is they’re people sourced,” said Bea.

Lastly, commitment and counting will ensure the dam is safe. “That’s commitment and right, means it is safe. Freedom from undue exposure to injury and harm. Prove it quantitatively, using validated techniques. No more of this b.s. of telling me ‘I think it’s safe,” Bea said to the group at the meeting.

Several members of the public agreed, saying they wanted a hand in making sure the five C’s are in practice.

“I really think having some kind of supervision where we can make sure that we have safety and that there is some accountability for that safety would be a really good thing,” said one Oroville woman who spoke during public comment.

Bea said hearing locals express those opinions was exciting. “I was sitting there going yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah! Because it’s the people who decide how safe is safe enough.”

The professor works for the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management at U.C. Berkeley. To read his most recent report on what he believes to be the root causes of the Oroville Dam spillway failure, click here.

[Ray76]

New DWR photos

Stay-in-place concrete forms are being constructed as part of the new concrete foundation on the lower chute of the Lake Oroville flood control spillway. Concrete will soon be placed around the forms. Under drains for the chute will be placed within drain rock inside the forms.

[abb]

http://amicoglobal.com/building-products/stayform/

[meyer]

That’s something I’ve never seen. But then again, I have almost no experience with concrete. It’s not my forte.

[meyer]

I’d love to see a diagram of how that all fits together.

[Ray76]

It must be blazing hot between the forms.

[EarthResearcher333]

Ironic to see PR DWR photo closeup with so many rust covered bars. You see only nice clean rebar in the upper spillway jig.

[Ray76]

Perhaps they’re temporary support for the forms.

[EarthResearcher333]

You are correct in that these are support for the forms. The rebar will become encapsulated in the pour and will remain. With DWR making technical information "secret", there is no easy way to assess the pending design (drain, gravel, RCC depth at this location, etc).

The comment regarding the rust on the rebar is relative to the expectation of a brand new shiny $274 Million spillway. It's an image perspective (i.e. public viewpoint).

Same goes for the haphazard mis-aligned curving of the upper horizontal rebar. Looks "slapped together" (i.e. public viewpoint).

[Ray76]

All those reasons are why I suspect it may be temporary, the forms remain but the rebar supports get removed. DWR text leads me to believe the area between the forms will be filled with rock. I guessing. I know nothing about concrete work except for some backyard projects.

[Deep Enough]

I’m guessing that rebar relates to the aerators in new chute design being modelled at Utah State

http://www.sacbee.com/news/business/article158205364.html

The position seems to be somewhat downstream from that shown in the Utah photos, but presumably they were testing various positions.