Posted on 02/12/2017 4:26:47 PM PST by janetjanet998
Edited on 02/12/2017 9:33:58 PM PST by Admin Moderator. [history]
The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.
Can’t find a thing about last night’s meeting. Nothing, nowhere.
https://www.facebook.com/OrovilleNewsOnly4firesAccidentsEventsCrimes/videos/804204806417254/
The first guy up unloaded on DWR. Was asking for empaneling a grand jury for indictments on what has occurred. Had much more to say (he had a prepared statement & it wasn't a question). Hard hitting statement...the crowd clapped after he finished.
Second person up (lady) asked about the FERC relicensing delay that others have asked for (Congressman & other sources) until the analysis comes out (Failure analysis) - She asked if DWR was going to agree to delay the relicensing under these conditions.
Dave Gutierrez answered that they will follow what FERC does/decides (i.e. it's up to FERC on the progression of relicensing).
Have to run right now.... (btw- the first part of the meeting was an electronic presentation of the Feb to now series of events and the construction process + agencies involved along the way - strictly an engineering form of a presentation (mainly given by Dave Gutierrez)).
I'm surprised the press doesn't have any coverage out yet..
That first comment was at about -1:46:30.
Final comment of first speaker: “Perhaps real consequences will make a real difference.”
The comment about "terrorists" tied to the operators of the dam -i.e. to which the people were more concerned about - came up again.
There were some that were somewhat conciliatory to DWR on the repair efforts and all that DWR & Kiewit was doing (they appreciated the efforts).
There is an official DWR youtube recording of the full meeting that has a better camera angle. The Facebook video had the camera operator swiveling the shot back and forth between the front table (DWR panel) and the public microphone further back in the crowd. Sometimes you can't see who is answering on the DWR panel. (btw- the FERC relicensing question was answered by another DWR engineer - not Dave Gutierrez as posted above).
DWR youtube video of June 17 Oroville community meeting (construction repair progress + Q&A session)
Very disappointed that the local Drive-By Media hasn’t reported on the meeting.
July 19, 2017 5:00 AM
Oroville dam repairs would benefit from multibillion-dollar ballot measure
By Jim Miller
jmiller@sacbee.com
With California’s drought fresh on voters’ minds, a longtime water activist is asking their approval for a veritable wish list of water and other environmental projects costing billions – from fixing Oroville Dam’s cratered spillway to improving the watershed of the Tijuana River.
As is the case with many borrowing measures that go before voters, interests that stand to benefit from some of the projects will be asked to underwrite campaign costs – a situation one expert said poses an “inherent conflict.”
The $8.4 billion proposal is the product of Gerald Meral, the former deputy secretary of the state Natural Resources Agency. He said the proposal would build upon Proposition 1, the $7.4 billion water bond passed by voters in 2014, and help carry out the California Water Plan, a blueprint for developing and managing the state’s water supplies.
snip
Read more here: http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article162290093.html#storylink=cpy
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/the-state-worker/article162489153.html
July 19, 2017 11:58 AM
He’ll lead California’s water department as it rebuilds Oroville Dam, restricts groundwater
By Adam Ashton
aashton@sacbee.com
A longtime Sonoma County water manager and environmental advocate is in line to lead the state Department of Water Resources, Gov. Jerry Brown announced on Wednesday.
Brown appointed Grant Davis, the general manager of the Sonoma County Water Agency, to be the next director of the state water department.
Davis’s appointment follows a long search for a new director at the department. It was led for six months by former acting director Bill Croyle, who retired this month.
If confirmed by the state Senate, Davis will lead the department as it rebuilds the damaged emergency spillway at Oroville Dam and carries out new restrictions on groundwater pumping.
Davis has been a proponent of the groundwater pumping restrictions, telling a reporter in 2014 that groundwater pumping had been shown to sink farmland in the Central Valley and increase the risk of saltwater creeping into underground basins in other parts of the state.
snip
Read more here: http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/the-state-worker/article162489153.html#storylink=cpy
This Grant Davis guy sounds like another leftist political hack. I have a feeling that he’ll be another one to put some odd fish’s well being ahead of that of the people that pay his inflated wage.
All, a very hard hitting and thorough Failure Analysis Report released by Prof Robert Bea today (CCRM). Has New information from DWR documents that have not been made public. Tons of info in the report. Will have to give out in "pieces" as going through it..
Appendix A has the "walk through" forensics, analysis, & evidence photographs on exactly how the spillway self-destructed starting at the "hole" Feb 7, 2017. It was "destroying" itself from each spillway pour over the years since its construction. Lots of pictures including of the original construction. Astonishingly, DWR Field Engineer was accusing a contractor of abusing (actually following a real spec) a specification requiring strong excavators to dig as deep as they could as a method to ensure that there were no "clay seams" or "heavy weathered rock (soil-like)" - leaving a strong competent rock. The DWR Field engineer directed the contractor to "only dig to grade". This mean't that essentially - level it to "grade" regardless of what is below.
DWR's Geological engineering report showed the known big clay seams and soil like rock area of the blowout failure location. They never dug this out. They poured the spillway right on top of this clay like soil base foundation. Said that "tests" were performed where "anchor bars" would be satisfactory in "clay seams" and in "the worst foundation available".
July 20: Failure Analysis of the Gated Spillway - Full Report: link:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
= = ORGANIZATIONAL ROOT CAUSES (clip summary from Appendix A):
The Oroville Dam Gated Spillway failure – self-destruction was preventable. Over decades, there were many opportunities for DWR, DSOD, and FERC to recognize and investigate serious issues that could have led to effective remedial measures. Evidence documented in this Forensic Root Causes Analysis reveals the significant extent in decades of opportunities for DWR Engineering and Maintenance, DSOD, and FERC to detect and investigate severe anomalies.
The lack of recognition of the significance of the severe issues revealed in this report, from the beginning of the construction of the spillway to present, reveals the systematic failure of these organizations to identify and rectify critical components of the Oroville Dam Gated Spillway to the required level of the required Operating “Standard of Care” and thereby violating the First Principle of Civil Law [20]: “imposing risks on people if and only if it is reasonable to assume they have consented to those risks.”
The breakup failure of Oroville's Main Spillway was the direct result of DWR, DOSD, and FERC decisions, actions, non-actions, and lack of "combined functional competency".3 The spillway was destroying itself from within from each flood control spill operation (erosive foundation degradation, anchorage degradation) and the progression of aging (corrosion) in the flawed drain design in chronic cracking in the slabs. This was an Organizational and Regulated Failure.
Perhaps the greatest failure was the deficiency of insuring the operational structural integrity, and the spillway's ultimate Safety and Reliability based on inspections and analyses of inspection results performed by DWR, DSOD, and FERC. This Root Causes investigation indicates that one of the critically important issues was the persistent inability of these responsible and accountable organizations to determine ‘accurately’ what was ‘Safe’ and ‘Fit-For-Purpose.’ The available DWR – DSOD and FERC spillway Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair documentation contain repeated references to spillway components that were thought to be ‘Safe’ and ‘Fit-For-Purpose’ when no ‘proof’ was provided to validate and substantiate those critically important conclusions.4
The failure of DWR Engineering, and Operations & Maintenance which allowed thousands of feet of drains to become inoperable; documented non-functional by photographs, noted "drain repair" in construction bids, and contract awards. Yet, the thousands of feet of inoperable spillway drains, in critical "steep slope" sections of the spillway's pre-blowout failure area, remained for years, even though DWR’s original Spillway Design documentation specifically required (Report Section D. Spillway, page D-25): ”The areas of maintenance to be checked include a yearly inspection of the under drains to see they have not plugged.”5
Given the evidence of the findings in this report, the Oroville Spillway was destroying itself over time until the weakest section would finally give way. This engineering situation was completely preventable. Recognition, Remedial Action, Correction, and the ultimate restoration of the spillway's structural integrity should have resulted many decades ago, especially when U.S. Bureau of Reclamation was warning dam owners of the dangers of sub-slab voiding and penetrating water flow risking the powerful Stagnation Pressure failure modes [14].
= = end clip summary from Appendix A
Pictures and text from Appendix A.
Fig. B.16. DWR Official Final Geology Report Spec 65-09 specifies that the Spillway slabs were built upon a layer of "compacted clayey fines". Original drawing number IF262 detail is enhanced for readability as the original is faded. This drawing conflicts with the HYD-510 spec that the slab be emplaced fully upon a continuous seam of rock (or backfill concrete in subgrade areas). Note: This report is not publicly available. This base image is from the report to reveal that the foundation of the spillway had a highly erodible layer of clay built into the design. This is a design flaw that reveals how the "progression" of voiding, piping, and high volume of under-slab water flow developed over time. Not shown in this drawing is up to the 45 deep layer areas (full blowout failure region) of erodible soil-like material (clay-clayey and highly erodible rock) to where large voids could form beneath the spillway in time.
Fig. B.17. Dispute arose between original specifications intended to excavate the spillway to strong fresh rock or strong weathered rock. Specification stated: "Excavation for the chute shall be to fresh or moderately weathered rock that cannot be further removed by heavy duty power excavating equipment." DWR Field Engineer intervened and directed the contractor to only "excavate to the grades shown on the drawings". The contractor was following specifications to where any poor foundation material would be backfilled with concrete to "grade level".
This report statement infers that DWR believed the contractor was using this specification in a desire for the additional pay of $30 per cubic yard of concrete in backfill work. This DWR Field Engineer intervention "orders", in contrast to the accuracy of the "specifications" in excavation, is evidence that a financial decision was a basis to not excavate to strong competent rock. If this "intervention" by DWR Field Engineer had not occurred, it may be possible that the large seams of highly erodible soil-like foundation material would have been fully repaired to competent backfill of concrete. The DWR Field Engineer's "intervention" evidences that a serious flaw was introduced that was a primary cause for the instability and the subsequent "blowout failure".
Fig. B.21. DWR Final Geology Report Spec 65-09 denotes the foundation geology of the subgrade quality of foundation material that the invert concrete chute was constructed upon. The Seam (marked as a series of "S"'s) follows the dashed line seam in Fig. B.10. This drawing reveals the same foundation structural integrity transition region of the quality of the foundation material as in the blowout failure erosion images in Fig. B.10 and Fig. B.11. This geologic report drawing identifies that DWR was aware of the type of foundation material at this future blowout location. DWR BOC report Memorandum No. 1 notes that "Compacted clay is also a term sometimes used to describe highly weathered rock."
Fig. B.20. DWR Final Construction Report FCR 65-09. Critical Design Flaw linked to blowout failure. DWR reveals that the spillway foundation will include anchor bars emplaced in "clay seams". This evidences that DWR was allowing the slab design to have anchor bars to function from the "worst foundation available". This would include poor foundation materials such areas of clay and areas of soil-like highly erodible extensively weathered rock. The blowout failure area reveals this type of material (poor foundation materials). This evidences the non-ability of the anchor bars to maintain the integrity of anchorage in these clay and soil-like foundation materials. These materials are highly erodible in subsurface slab water flow. Scouring erosion would remove these seams of materials rendering a significant loss of pounds per square inch in anchorage strength of the anchor bars.
Fig. B.18. DWR Final Construction Report Photo No 4632, noting "Chute foundation in vicinity of Sta. 27+75, 20'L. Compacted, clayey fines cover most of the rock." Photograph confirms construction technique identified in DWR Final Geological Report Spec 65-09 where a "compacted clayey fines" layer was identified as a fill layer under the slab to facilitate irregular base rock or irregular highly weathered rock surfaces (see Fig. B.16).
Fig. B.11. Blowout Failure slabs located at a transition zone of higher integrity anchorage stability slabs verses slabs emplaced on poor anchorage stability based slabs above "soil-like" erodible foundation material (incompetent rock).
Fig. B.10. Initiating Failure Hole location reveals a deep seam of highly erodible foundation material (incompetent rock) that is many feet deeper than the grouted 5 foot deep slab anchor bars. Angle of seam inferred by dashed line. Image reveals the nature of why the "hole" location and the full 178 foot wide seam area was a structural problem area. The upslope "soil-like" foundation material is in a transition zone between the incompetent rock and the competent rock (downslope from the dashed line). Thus, the "communicating" slab forces through the load transfer bars would have experienced a differential in structural integrity or stability.
More information from newly released Failure Analysis Report released July 20, 2017 (CCRM, Prof Robert Bea et al).
Human and Organizational Factor Failures (reference info link. note: link within report as reference link):
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnWDRhODdRM3RLM1k
= = = Report clip from reference link:
Contained are 53 Reference documents, reports, communications, and evidence that provides an operational and engineering perspective into the organizations and relationships with DWR - DSOD - FERC which spans a period from the present to over twenty years in time.
To the observant, skilled in the knowledge of High-Reliability Systems & Engineering, the discovery of this summation of operations, managment, maintentance, inspections, and engineering evidence would provide the basis for great concern.
Just as High-Reliablity Systems, such as an aircraft require an infrastructure of "known" reliable performance and maintenance, so too must a High-Reliability System, such as a Major Water Works Dam must operate. An aircraft, that could transport 200,000 passengers in one flight, could not tolerate a "flat tire" or "running your engine out of oil" mentality. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 tragically lost all lives aboard in a high altitude plunge crash on January 21, 2000 from a stripped nut in a jackscrew assembly to the horizontal stabilizer. Failure Analysis and maintenance process review of the design by the NTSB and FAA inspections retraced a series of subtle missteps that occurred which ultimately led to the tragedy.
The FAA discovered deficiencies that were missed in Inspections that should have caught early warning sign. Ultimately, it was found that systemic problems were identified by the investigation in the oversight of maintenance programs, including inadequate staffing, its approval process of maintenance intervals, and the ultimate certification requirements. Even the engineering designers of the MD-83 aircraft had not considered the single point of failure (complete internal thread strip loss) in what was considered a redundant threaded control assembly.
In the case of all of the High-Reliability System components that comprise the workings of Oroville's Spillway's and the Dam itself, there cannot be a tolerance or an attitude of nothing less than accepting the responsibility of the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, even to the last detail.
These documents reveal an operational, engineering, and organizational "system" that is introducing grave risk. The parallels to the MD-83 Flight 261 systemic issues are greatly similar, but with a much more extensive level of top-down to bottom-up lack of awareness of the ultimately greater and widespread risks. The permeation of serious issues are so systemic that no inspection system or process could assure the elimination of failure. The root of this systemic permeation is the foundational lack of effective expertise required to fully understand and operate a High-Reliability System.
= = = end clip
See link for pictures, more HOF information and HOF references/issues/examples.
Appendix A of the main report goes into extreme detail of Human and Organizational factors. Details High Reliability organizational systems/methods used successfully by the FAA, Boeing, and other high reliability entities.
Main Report:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
= = SFGate Article clip:
State water resources officials and federal regulators caused the failure of the Oroville Dam spillway in February by ignoring long-established guidelines and neglecting their duty to manage risks and detect flaws, a scathing report by a Berkeley engineering expert concluded Thursday.
Robert Bea, a professor emeritus of engineering at UC Berkeley, said in his analysis of the causes of the spillway failure at the nation’s tallest dam that the “progressive deterioration” of the chute could have been prevented if proper procedures had been followed.
“The gated spillway was managed to failure” by the California Department of Water Resources and the Division of Safety of Dams and “regulated to failure” by theFederal Energy Regulatory Commission, said Bea’s report, issued by the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management.
Bea and Berkeley colleague Tony Johnson blamed “long-term continued use of these inappropriate standards, guidelines, procedures and processes” over several decades.
= = end clip more at link:
Engineering expert blasts management failures at Oroville Dam
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Berkeley-expert-blasts-management-failures-at-11303908.php
= = SacBee article clips:
One of the country’s foremost experts on catastrophic engineering failures released a new report Thursday on the troubled Oroville Dam that asks a disturbing question: Is the country’s tallest dam leaking?
State dam managers have insisted for months that there’s no problem, and that persistent green wet spots near the top left abutment of the nearly 770-foot-tall earthen dam are nothing more than natural vegetation growth caused by rainfall.
In response to persistent questions about the wet spots since the February spillway crisis, the Department of Water Resources even has a section of its website devoted to the wet spots. The agency says they’re “caused by rainfall on the face of the dam, allowing vegetation to grow,” and that the spots have been there since before the reservoir was first filled in the late 1960s.
“Oroville Dam is sound and safe,” the website reads.
But in his 124-page report, Robert Bea of the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management at UC Berkeley says he led a team of 14 volunteers, including a group of retired state dam safety and water officials, who reviewed historical photos, videos, and state and federal inspection reports and concluded that something more serious may be going on.
The report warns that the dam may be “facing a breach danger from a serious and a dangerous form of a slow-motion failure mode” from persistent leaks in the main dam, perhaps caused by internal shifting of dam fill. The report notes that the sensors embedded in the dam to detect such problems quit working years ago.
. .
Bea’s report doesn’t just sound alarms about potential leaks. It also points to possible problems with the dam’s main spillway that may loom hundreds of feet above where a massive crater formed in the concrete chute in early February. The hole in the spillway set off of a chain of events that eventually led to the two-day evacuation of 188,000 people living below the dam.
The authors say they have evidence of broken and cracked “anchor tendons” that help support the structure that raises and lowers the spillway gates, allowing for water to gush down the chute. The report says two 50-year-old steel anchor tendons have already failed and DWR has data showing that 28 more have “crack indicators” in the steel. There are 384 of the anchor tendons in total, the report says.
= = end clips more at link
Catastrophic engineering expert asks: Is Oroville Dam leaking?
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article162801773.html
Main Report:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
This thing was literally an accident waiting to happen.
Degradation of the Spillway from Flaws, Decisions, Maintenance over Time
California Department of Water Resources (DWR) Final Construction Report FCR 65-09 [13] and DWR Final Geology Report C-38 [12] reveal that DWR constructed the spillway with serious design flaws that led to a significant structural integrity loss over time, and which ultimately resulted2 in the blowout failure seen on February 7, 2017. Included in these critical design flaws were decisions made by DWR Field Engineers to restrict contractors from following design specifications [15] to excavate to sound competent rock or remove incompetent rock and soil and fill the voids with concrete, thus constructing large parts of the invert chute concrete on highly erodible foundation materials.
The following sequence of developments evidences the answer to the 1969 to 2017 comparison photograph of critical changes to the spillway over time - changes developed by operational flood control releases:
1. DWR Field Engineer restricts contractor from following excavation specifications to competent rock. (Fig. B.17). Thus, large and deep seams of clay or highly erodible soil-like material remain - open to deep erosion - open to forming large voids, and open to significant degradation of slab anchorage upon future spillway operation.
2. DWR Geology Engineering design changed from the original HYD-510 and Bulletin 200 design drawings [15] (noted as emplaced upon rock or base concrete) to the change to allow emplacement upon a layer of clayey "fines" before pouring the spillway concrete slabs. (Fig. B.16) [12, 13].
3. DWR used compacted clayey material (fines) to level the irregular subsurface rock grade (Fig. B.18). This material was highly erodible from subsurface water flow. In addition, the degraded and erodible ‘incompetent rock’ (Fig. B.10 and Fig. B.11) was not excavated and backfilled with concrete as required by the spillway design.1
4. Construction used wide amounts of side drain "round gravel filter rock" next to drain pipes forming a larger area of loss of slab structural integrity - thus contributing to the consistent pattern of drain line cracks in slabs above drain lines in conjunction with the flawed design of emplacing the drains within the slab causing a "thinning" the slab thickness dimensions (Fig. B.19, Fig. B.12).
5. DWR allowed the slab anchors to be installed in clay seams. Anticipated that the anchor bars would work in the "worst foundation available". Did not take into account any water penetration from slab seams and scouring erosion of these areas of "worst foundation available". Anchorage thus reduced to a highly degraded ability to perform (or none). (Fig. B.20). Blowout failure area evidences that anchorage loss was a primary structural contributor to the failure.
= = end report clip
Main Report link - clip above from Appendix A:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
= = More from report:
Loss of Spillway Structural Foundation over Time
Due to the Design Flaws, Design Changes, Construction Flaws, and Flawed Field Engineering decisions, each flood control operation of the Oroville Spillway degraded the concrete spillway in its foundational and anchorage structural integrity. Penetrating water flows into and under the slabs created "scouring erosion" conditions to where the compacted clay "fines" layer was carried off through the course drain rock and out through the drains to the spillway. This same process eroded and transported fines deeper within the slab foundation to where voids formed (Ref. [17], Figs. B.3, B.4, B.5).
Continued flood control operational spills developed piping channels and voiding areas to where "void repairs" became necessary. As the foundation became less structurally sound, and the slabs had the design "flaw" of wide base "thin" zones from the upward emplaced drain pipe, cracks formed pervasively in the slabs (Fig. B.7, Fig. B.19) [1][16]. These near 5 linear miles of cracks above the drains (Ref. [16], Fig. B.1) created a significant increase in pressurized water flow penetration into and under the slabs, thus accelerating the piping erosion process. The 2017 Board of Consultants recognized a high water flow problem and noted: "The amount of drain water flowing from the pipe discharge openings along the spillway training walls seems extraordinarily large."[4]. The loss of spillway structural foundation developed over time due to the following:
1. Excessive Foundation loss from High Volume Scouring Under-slab Erosion [1]. The March 10, 2017 BOC report revealed that this serious issue of "void" formation has been "found and repaired in the past". Quoting the report: "It seems likely that piping of foundation material beneath the chute slab may be responsible for the voids that have been found and repaired in the past."
2. Evidence of Voids forming to 9+ feet deep. [17]. DWR maintenance repairs clogging drains by injecting deep void filling material (concrete/grout) to where drain sections became non-functional (up to 1,780 feet of drains broken that service 36,500 square feet of two spillway areas) Fig. B.2 - circled sidewall drains to a non-functional total 1,780 feet of drains. Thus forcing erosive flow deeper and re-routing the deeper channels to other areas beneath the spillway.
3. Excessive Drain Flow 'Jetting' from Sidewall Outlets signal Alarm in Spillway Slab Cracks & Poor Sealing of Slab seams (photograph of fire-hose "jetting" of sidewall drains) [16].
4. Excessive pressurized subsurface slab water flows. The DWR Board of Consultants (BOC) confirming the issue of the volume of the pressurized subsurface slab water flows in their March 10, 2017 BOC Memorandum No. 1 [4]. Quoting the report: "The amount of drain water flowing from the pipe discharge openings along the spillway training walls seems extraordinary large." "It appears also that the drains are collecting leakage through cracks in the chute slab and/or defects in the construction joints between the slabs. The drains appear to flow for some appreciable time after the gates are closed."
The DWR Oroville Dam Spillway Incident Forensic Investigation Team recognized these issues; from May 5, 2017 Memorandum [9] - items from list:
1. "16. Weathered rock and completely weathered rock that is soil-like material as slab foundation, without appropriate modification of the chute slab design, resulting in potentially erodible material beneath the slab and lack of foundation bond with concrete;"
2. "17. Less rigorous foundation preparation, resulting in lack of foundation bond with concrete."
3. "19. Insufficient anchorage, due to limited anchor development in the concrete, short anchor length, inadequate grouting or grout strength, and/or installation in weak foundation material."
= = end report clip
Main Report link - clip above from Appendix B:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
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