The US Navy EF-18 Growlers fill this role. During the Iraq wars, the USAF insisted that the US Navy EA-6B Prowlers go in first to destroy or fry Iraqi air defense site. The USAF tries to hide; the Navy just dries their asses.
I remember reading how the retired EF-111A could shut off the lights of the whole east coast if it wanted to.
It wasn’t a matter of insisting; by the time of Gulf War II, the Pentagon had retired USAF EF-111 squadrons, and the EA-6B was the only option for escort jamming, before the advent of the E/A-18 Growler. The “Spark Vark” (EF-111) was very capable and actually more adept at escort/close-in jamming because it was faster and could keep up with fourth-generation strike aircraft. The EA-6B was optimized against a wider range of threats, and very useful in various jamming roles, even if it wasn’t quite as fast as the EF-111.
Jamming platforms are the classic low-density/high-demand asset. Getting rid of the EF-111 (without a replacement) was a mistake, but the Air Force was overruled by DoD, which gave the tactical jamming mission to the Navy.
And contrary to what the Swedes say, the ideal approach to beating the Russians (or any other peer/near-peer competitor is not electronic combat alone. Indeed, EC (or radio electronic combat, as the Russians call it) is an integral part of Russian military doctrine and tactics. The best way to overcome the Russkie threat is a combination of stealth, EC (including cyber), stand-off weapons, real-time intel integration, training and tactics, to name a few.
The Russian AF has little combat experience over the last 50 years, and they don’t have large force employment exercises like Red Flag, where all elements of air combat are exercised. Ditto for the Chinese. Technology is great, but if you’re not able to employ it optimally—and in a tactically advantageous manner—your chances for victory are greatly reduced.
“The USAF tries to hide; the Navy just dries their asses.”
Seems you know very little of USAF ECM programs.