U.S. Must Identify State Sponsors

The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., have sent shockwaves across the nation. While international Islamic terrorists organizations linked to Osama bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida group remain the top suspects, some have suggested nations opposed to U.S. global hegemony may also have been involved. Historically, international terrorism has needed state sponsorship in order to be successful. But such involvement would be tantamount to declaring war on the United States, and although the suspect list is long, there is little evidence at the moment that singles any one country out.

The attacks on New York and Washington achieve a number of objectives for the perpetrators. On a strategic level, they demonstrate the vulnerability of the United States. In one fell swoop, the sophisticated and well-coordinated operation paralyzed New York City and the U.S. financial sector, sent the nation's government spiraling into chaos and struck terror in the hearts of the American public. Such a feat, accomplished with only four airline hijackings, is almost impossible to comprehend and will impact U.S. defense and foreign policy for decades to come.

By immobilizing the U.S. financial sector, the strike threatens to push a nation, already suffering from a downturn, into recession. This will have ramifications for U.S. influence throughout the globe. It could also damage U.S. markets abroad as well as numerous other nations with economic ties to the United States.

Understanding the impact of the attack is important for identifying likely suspects. There is good reason to suspect international terrorist organizations linked to Osama bin Laden's umbrella group, Al-Qa'ida. More important, however, is the question of which, if any, states might also have been involved.

Historically, international terrorist organizations tend to seek government support. State sponsorship is necessary for a variety of reasons. Most important, governments can provide access to the target country that would otherwise be difficult. By using a diplomatic passport, a suspected terrorist could enter a country unnoticed. States can also construct cover identities that may be fraudulent but are undetectable to other nations and can provide secure communications within a target country, since diplomatic pouches aren't normally open for inspection.

There are numerous nations that have ample motive for assisting in the recent attack but only a few that have means and opportunity as well.

Topping the list of potential state sponsors are Afghanistan and Iraq. Ruled by the radical Islamic Taliban, Afghanistan has harbored Saudi-born dissident bin Laden for years. The Taliban is trapped in a seemingly endless conflict with the opposition Northern Alliance, which receives support from the United States, Russia and Iran and has several reasons to want to cause critical damage to the United States.

Washington launched missile strikes against the Afghan government following its implication in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Perhaps even more importantly, U.S. opposition has kept Afghanistan a pariah state, limiting international support.

Afghanistan, however, has limited diplomatic access to the United States as long as it continues to provide bin Laden with safe haven. Support for such an extensive operation as seen today would seem far beyond the Taliban's capabilities.

Iraq, another strong suspect, also has reasons to want to strike a blow at U.S. hegemony. The country, which is still suffering from U.N. sanctions, would benefit significantly from a U.S. decision to redirect its focus on homeland defense and reduce its commitments abroad.

Iraq's involvement would be aimed at reducing U.S. air strikes against the country. But the fact that Washington probably long ago penetrated Iraqi operational capabilities in the United States, including any and all diplomatic traffic, makes the possibility that such an operation was carried out without any advance warning less than likely.

Other Islamic nations such as Libya, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria all have reasons to want to see the United States damaged, but none are likely suspects. Libya, a chief supporter of international terrorism in the past, has little to gain and everything to lose from such an act. Even though it suffered from U.S. air strikes in the late 1980s, Tripoli isn't likely to risk European investment at a moment when it is poised to regain international trust. Syria also has no desire to further U.S. reliance on and support for Israel, and that is just what this attack -- if it were indeed committed by Islamic terrorists -- has done.

Pakistan does not have any strong reason to risk U.S. retaliation or its position in the international system. There are several radical Islamic groups operating in the country, but few would have access to the diplomatic avenues necessary for facilitating such an attack.

Sudan, implicated in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, has blatantly attempted rapprochement with the United States while curbing fundamentalist Islamic activity in country. Moreover, given the historical relationship with bin Laden, who lived in Sudan as a guest of the government prior to fleeing to Afghanistan, the United States has likely also penetrated its diplomatic traffic as well.

Each of these nations may have a reason to see the United States suffer, but few are willing to actually go to war. And there is no doubt that if these attacks were even tacitly approved or facilitated by a national government, they are tantamount to a declaration of war.

Today's attacks were very successful, and the perpetrators will want to stay alive long enough to enjoy their victory. Given the history of previous investigations such as the embassy bombings in Africa, the organizers of today's attacks, and their sponsors, aren't likely to be identified any time soon. Washington will likely, for now, continue to focus its attention on the sub-national terrorist groups based in the Middle East, and especially Afghanistan.

Here's another Stratfor piece from today.

U.S. Must Strike Back - But At Whom?
2355 GMT, 010911

By George Friedman

Sept. 11, 2001, will go down as one of those rare days when everyone remembers where they were when they heard the news. It is also a day that will change American behavior in fundamental ways.

Most of these changes we cannot yet begin to fathom. How does the air transport security system function in the wake of Sept. 11? How do the scars of the World Trade Center wreckage affect the psyche of Americans? How does the sense of vulnerability now in place translate into policy? That there will be consequences in these and other areas cannot be doubted, but it is impossible to see the outcomes clearly yet.

Other consequences, however, are more obvious and inescapable. We know someone planned and executed this attack and did so superbly. We know the United States will respond and will respond violently. But the central fact is that we actually do not know who attacked the United States today. The logical suspect is, of course, Osama bin Laden. He is certainly most commonly mentioned. It may well have been him. But there are problems with that assumption -- or with ascribing it only to bin Laden.

Bin Laden has been followed by U.S. intelligence for years. He has been under the highest scrutiny, with all necessary resources devoted to him. His movements have been tracked, his conversations monitored, his visitors noted. Or, even if this is not the case, bin Laden has had to assume -- along with everyone around him -- that this is the case. Therefore, the assumption would be made by any sensible operative that any operation in which bin Laden was complicit would be compromised.

There are, therefore, two possibilities. The first is that bin Laden directly authorized and planned the operation -- heedless of the risks involved -- and that U.S. intelligence committed an egregious act of omission by allowing the operation to go forward or, worse, by not knowing it was planned. The second possibility is that the operation was the act of someone other than bin Laden.

This does not mean that he was not indirectly involved in some ways. From all reports, bin Laden -- having studied the way in which Israelis decapitated and penetrated Palestinian movements in the 1970s and 1980s -- created a different sort of organization. It is one united in doctrine but with a diffused command and control capability. That means that groups could split off from the main organization and operate independently, without coordinating with the main group. It is our best guess at this moment that one of these groups, having split off quite a while ago and gone to ground, re-emerged and carried out the mission -- without any recourse to bin Laden himself.

This creates a strategic dilemma for the United States. In the past, U.S. policy on terrorism was to strike against the perpetrators. In this case it is not clear who the perpetrators are. In one sense, it could be said to be bin Laden. In another sense, bin Laden may not have had any knowledge that this was taking place. This would explain why U.S. intelligence had no early warning.

Clearly, the old U.S. formula -- which requires guilt and punishment -- does not work. It is impossible to identify the perpetrators. It is not impossible, however, to identify the locus of perpetration, if you will. Bin Laden may or may not have known, but he set in motion the process that ended in the worst one-day disaster the United States has known since the Civil War. As at Pearl Harbor, the issue was not which pilot or carrier attacked, but that the corporate entity of Japan bore collective responsibility.

Thus far the United States, following U.S. legal principle, has not been prepared to assign corporate responsibility where no formal corporate entity existed. That is what will change now. The United States will now, in effect, impose a corporate identity and strike against it. In all likelihood, that corporate identity will include the nation of Afghanistan, which houses bin Laden, but it will not be confined to it.

The normal U.S. response will be a low-cost air attack. This will be insufficient, if necessary. The real response will be to launch a covert war of annihilation against bin Laden and his allies. The model will be similar to the Battle of Europe, which followed the 1972 Olympic massacre of Israeli athletes. In that scenario, Israeli intelligence waged a systematic war of annihilation against a combination of Palestinian organizations.

The likely response of the United States will be to abandon the law prohibiting assassination by U.S. intelligence agencies, freeing U.S. special forces and intelligence services to hunt and kill -- and to be hunted and killed themselves. In this war, the combination of U.S. technical intelligence with U.S. Special Forces will provide a unique capability. The weakness will be human intelligence, something the United States has neglected.

One inevitable outcome of all of this will be a much closer strategic alignment between the United States and Israel, precisely because of Israel's superior human intelligence capabilities. We can therefore expect a high-low response of extremely sophisticated intelligence systems managing both advanced precision munitions and special operations.

One thing must be understood clearly. This is not a war that will end quickly, nor is it a war in which there will not be counterattacks. The opening salvo was just that -- an opening salvo. It will be followed by other attacks against both forces operating in the field and targets in the United States and abroad. Like Pearl Harbor, this is the beginning -- not the end.

George Friedman is the founder and chairman of STRATFOR.

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