Australia's Collins class enters calmer waters

After years of controversy and design and platform problems, Australia's Collins-class submarines appear to be finally turning a corner. Ian Bostock reports.

Five years behind schedule and between A$800 million and A$1 billion (US$408m and US$510m - December 2001 prices) over budget, the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) Collins-class diesel electric submarine (SSK) programme has clearly been through many difficulties in recent years. Some of the problems the class was experiencing were exacerbated by inaccurate local media reporting and widespread 'bad press'. Yet while there is some distance to travel before all areas of concern are addressed to the RAN's satisfaction, the Collins class finally appears to be entering calmer waters.

To gain a perspective on the Collins-class programme it is necessary to look back at the elements that have contributed to the controversy surrounding the A$5.1 billion project. The selection of the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) as the preferred tenderer for the New Submarine Project (Project Sea 1114), and subsequent contract signature on 3 June 1987, marked a milestone for Australia's naval shipbuilding industry and capabilities. Never before had such an ambitious undertaking been attempted, with six 3,000-tonne submarines to be built in Australia. The acquisition of a vessel with European design origins was also a departure from the 20th-century reliance on UK and US naval combatants.

Based on the Kockums Type 471 design, with a then-Rockwell combat system, the Collins class was intended to be a quantum leap in capability over the in-service UK-designed and -built Oberon-class SSKs, which had proven themselves highly effective vessels. Sea 1114 began life as an ambitious venture, its construct leaving little room for error for such a high-risk equipment acquisition programme.

However, from 1996 onwards, as the boats left ASC's yard at Osborne, South Australia, and the RAN began to put them through their paces at sea, problems emerged. Essentially, the vessels could not "perform at the levels required for military operations".

A report commissioned in early 1999 by then Minister for Defence John Moore, was aimed at bringing to light the deficiencies plaguing the Collins class and recommending solutions. The McIntosh-Prescott report found the following:

- excessive leakage around the propeller-shaft seal, especially at depth, on lead boat HMAS Collins. A new seal, which achieves a leakage rate five times better than the specification requires, was subsequently designed and is now installed in all six vessels;

- the fuel system proved to have unwieldy arrangements to separate the compensating seawater from the fuel oil in the tanks and was not easily managed by the submarine's engineering crew. As a result, seawater entered the diesel engines, causing inefficient combustion (and possibly vibration), corrosion of fuel injectors and pumps, and eventual seizure of pistons in cylinders. The fault limited the endurance of the submarines below the specified target depth;

- due mainly to seawater entering the fuel-management system, the Collins' three 18-cylinder Hedemora diesel engines proved unreliable and "far from robust". So much so that, from the delivery of HMAS Collins in 1996 to that of HMAS Farncomb in October 1998, over 750 defects were recorded against the engines. They suffered continual ancillary equipment failures, including broken pistons and gear trains, seized fuel injectors and fuel pumps, broken rocker arms and generator couplings, and a damaged crankshaft. Oil consumption was excessive. Other problems included poor engine layout design, poor quality control in manufacture of components and assembly, and poor subcontractor support;

- acoustic deficiencies were confirmed on RAN acoustic test ranges. At the time of the report, unresolved noise issues included the operation of some onboard equipment, the propeller and flow characteristics of the hull. The propeller was found not to meet the specified cavitation requirements of the contract. Furthermore, the propeller was excited by disturbed flow due to inappropriate fin and casing shapes. Additionally, the metal in which the propellers were cast (Sonoston) proved unfit for the purpose: fatigue failure (cracking) resulted. The propeller on HMAS Collins needed to be replaced completely. A Collins-class propeller was sent to the US Navy (USN) Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), Newport, Rhode Island, to look at ways of addressing these issues. Fibreglass modifications have since been made to the fin and the hull;

- severe vibration was experienced on the attack periscope at moderate speeds when operating below periscope depth. Focusing problems were experienced in both the attack and search periscopes when changing magnification; and

At the heart of the Collins' shortcomings was the performance of the combat system. The original combat system was "severely restricted" in its ability to undertake classification, track management and weapons control, notes the report. "Basically, the system does not work, the quality of information from individual sensors has been compromised and their display on screen is inferior to that of the signals actually processed," cites the report.

"Relatively routine interrogation of targets causes failures in the displays, and inordinate delays occur in bringing multiple sets of information together in the manner planned. The number of targets that can be dealt with at one time is far less than specified or required. In fact, the tracking, classification and display of targets is less effective than on the Oberon class."

A senior RAN source close to the New Submarine Project told JNI that, while the human-machine interface was more "user-hostile" than user-friendly, the combat-system design itself was probably ahead of its time.

"Remember that the functional specifications were drawn up by the RAN and we wanted a lot of things that were technically probably not feasible at the time. They were shooting for the stars, but it crashed and burned," he said. "One of the things that was problematic on the old combat system was the ability to change displays on the seven multifunction common consoles. That produced a huge technical problem that was almost irresolvable, and [Rockwell] built layers upon layers of very complex software, which added to the complexity until in the end it was just so slow and cumbersome that it became unworkable."

Behind the various technical and design shortcomings that beset the class were a series of commercial and contractual constraints and managerial inadequacies. These included: the structure of the contract; a focus on adherence to input specification rather than a performance requirement; poor co-ordination of activities at various levels; inadequate risk-management procedures; inadequate routine reporting; the unsuitability of a fixed-price contract; and the inadequacy of the 5% contingency (10-15% being the private-sector standard). This figure was originally around 12% but was later reduced to keep the total project cost below A$4 billion and ensure its passage through parliament.

The majority of the structural- and platform-related deficiencies have been resolved. The only significant one that remains, according to Cdre Paul Greenfield of the Defence Matériel Organisation (DMO), then Director General Submarines, is that surrounding excessive snort noise.

"I don't think we've got all the technical solutions for that yet," says Cdre Greenfield. "It's a very, very complex issue and there's nowhere in the world we can go for support or help. No one operates such huge diesel engines pumping out so much power and energy. The Americans can't help us with that, the British can't help anymore, nor the Germans or the Swedes. So we're working with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and industry to keep on going and find a solution."

To offset the combat system and design deficiencies, the RAN embarked on an augmentation programme to provide a measure of operational capability for the fleet through the provision of 'Limited Capability Enhancements'. Intended to be only an interim measure, the initiative to 'fast track' the upgrade of two submarines was approved in late 1999. Delivered to the RAN in December 2000, HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean were upgraded at a cost of A$266 million. Work undertaken included:

addressing the issues related to noise signatures; various improvements to the platform (hull, fin and casing) and some systems; fixing problems with the propellers, periscopes and communications mast; improvements in training; and the introduction of a number of personnel initiatives.

The augmentation, conducted under the auspices of Project Sea 1446, also developed interface gateways to bypass deficient software areas on the existing combat system, and to act as a new 'connector' between sonar sets, crew and weapons, re-scoping system specifications to remove the technical difficulty and high-effort/low-priority items. Along with NUWC (whose input was around 16%), Australian small-to-medium enterprises provided the technical expertise and facilities for the platform and combat system augmentation.

Lead boat HMAS Collins was the forerunner for the augmentation programme, acting as a 'test boat' of sorts. Collins received a trial fit of the combat system enhancements only. Of the six boats, four will have a level of the platform improvements, but only Dechaineux and Sheean will have the combat system enhancements. The government has approved the platform improvements for all six boats in due course. Rankin, the last boat to be launched, has had the platform improvements incorporated at build stage.

Commodore Michael Deeks, Commander of the Australian Navy Submarine Group, notes that the augmentation of Dechaineux and Sheean has increased their ability to handle onboard information flow and that human-machine interface is considerably improved. System reliability has also improved. September 2000 trials at an acoustic range in Alaska indicated that improvements in hull shape and flow noise (and therefore noise signature) had been achieved.

Improved powerplant reliability has also been a key element in achieving a modicum of operational capability for the submarines.

"We were suffering from lack of reliability that was therefore impacting on our ability to trial fully other aspects of the submarines' capabilities. Having improved the reliability of the engines, we've now been able to operate the submarines more widely in, for example, tropical waters. We've been able to do some work with special forces and other things that have been taken aboard now that we can spend more time at sea," Cdre Deeks said.

While the augmentation to the combat system produced an operationally more suitable outcome, it was never intended, built as it was on and around the existing combat system, to have a service life of much more than three years. In this light, it was decided to bring forward the mid-life replacement of the combat system planned under Sea 1439, a project originally established to facilitate the long-term planning of upgrades to the submarines' combat system and other systems. The new combat system would be configured with less integrated architecture and would use more robust commercial-off-the-shelf equipment that could be replaced independently as technology advances.

Four potential combat system suppliers submitted their proposals during the second half of 2000: Thales; Lockheed Martin; Raytheon; and STN Atlas Elektronik. In evaluating the bids, it became apparent early on that the STN Atlas Elektronik bid, based on the company's Integrated Sensor Underwater System (ISUS), was the preferred technical solution. The strong pedigree of the ISUS - fitted to numerous SSKs in service with around six navies worldwide - was a strong selling point of the German system. The other shortlisted system, by Raytheon, was based on the Command and Control System (CCS) Mk 2.

However, with contract award from the Australian Department of Defence to STN Atlas Elektronik imminent, the government cancelled outright the Sea 1439 tender process. Instead they opted to work more closely with the USN (and, by necessity, US industry) in developing a Replacement Combat System (RCS) based on a later version of the CCS Mk 2.

Despite the spectre of a legal challenge from the preferred Sea 1439 tenderer, the DMO stated that if, for any reason unbeknownst to the project team, the government could not accept the recommendation of the STN Atlas Elektronik solution, the DMO would, for probity reasons, have to terminate and restart the tender process with a new set of rules.

The 'core' of the RCS will be what the RAN describes as a new version of CCS Mk 2, coupled to the STN Atlas Elektronik CSU90 55 sonar-processing system and the existing Thales Underwater Systems (TUS) Scylla sonar arrays. For the Collins class, an RCS solution will be provided through work generated by an Integrated Project Team involving the DMO, NUWC, Raytheon, STN Atlas Elektronik, TUS, ASC and Sonartech Atlas.

The schedules laid down by the yet-to-be-finalised equipment acquisition strategy will be recommended to government following the completion of the Initial Design Study in the first quarter of this year. Pending government approval, it could be around three years before the first RCS-modified submarine is ready for sea trials. However, outgoing Minister for Defence, Peter Reith indicated in November 2001 that the combined effect of the delays and additional work to develop and install a satisfactory combat system in the first boat may see this date slip a further two years, some five years behind the original schedule. Reith put the additional cost of the delays, the augmentation programme and extra work required at between A$800 million and A$1 billion.

While the DMO concedes that one option for installation of the RCS would be to fit it into each boat as it comes into its refit cycle - an option that would take six years for six boats - it will seek to carry out the work outside the refit cycle to achieve a full operational capability in the shortest time possible.

Cdre Deeks sees the transition between the old combat system and the RCS as critical in achieving a cost-effective outcome and reduced installation time. With old and new combat systems running, the RAN will have to double its training effort and facilitate increased maintenance.

"If we can come up with a strategy that allows us to be comfortable with the new combat system in one boat or perhaps in a shore-based facility and attain a level of confidence on it, we can make the transition to all six boats fairly quickly," he said. "That might mean that we slow down the initial part of the installation process, but then once we go, we go quickly and get the whole fleet."

Another casualty of the decision to work more closely with the USN on submarine matters was the project to acquire a new heavyweight torpedo for the Collins class - Sea 1429. A considerable way along its own acquisition schedule, Sea 1429 had moved to identify possible suppliers of the new torpedoes, shortlisting the USN's Mk 48 ADCAP, STN Atlas Elektronik's DM2A4 and the Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei Black Shark.

A Statement of Principles (SoP) signed between the RAN and the USN last September will now see collaborative development of the Mk 48 ADCAP torpedo to meet the requirements of both navies' submarine fleets. It is understood that improved interoperability, training, and ease of upgrade of the torpedo and associated systems were the primary reasons behind selection of Mk 48 ADCAP for the RAN.

The SoP also obliges both countries to jointly develop projects resulting in software updates for a 'common combat system', with the intent being to maximise convergence on software improvements. From these initiatives it is hoped that a USN/RAN common baseline submarine combat system will be realised, resulting in significant cost savings and improved interoperability for both parties.

The SoP will involve the exchange of research findings and pertinent data and analysis on submarine matters of common interest to both navies. The RAN will have access to USN submarine technology and operations, infrastructure and facilities such as ranges, utilities and laboratories. Both the RCS and ADCAP projects will be managed in parallel.

The final RCS solution that is likely to be adopted by the RAN for the Collins class will be a system unique enough to meet requirements, but flexible enough to enable straightforward future upgrade or technology insertions. Changes to the base CCS Mk 2 will largely be driven by the RAN's submarine operator community.

According to Cdre Deeks, the end product "will be what we want and it will continue to be adaptable. We're laying that groundwork now. I'm confident that we will have sufficient access to be able to either modify what's already there or overlay our own particular requirements on it. Software these days is so flexible and so adaptable that the system managed by the USN will do the job that will allow us to develop a system that will look a bit like the American system but will be unique to Australia. What I'm seeing is looking like it will achieve the aim."

Any discussion concerning the future of the Collins-class boats must also take in that of ASC, for the two are inextricably linked. As a shipyard, ASC has capabilities that are not found anywhere else in Australia. With the sale of the now government-owned yard pending, ASC still enjoys a comparative advantage in submarine building and support over other yards that may compete for submarine refit or upgrade work.

Despite its commercial position, ASC retains a vast amount of information relating to the entire Collins-class programme in its computer systems - from business systems to parts lists.

"They know where every pipe goes. They have information on every weld and every test on every weld, every weld x-ray, every non-destructive test, quality-control testing records, special rigs and equipment, and highly specialised testing, electrical, design and engineering personnel," said Cdre Greenfield. "All the things necessary for the follow-on support of the submarine fleet over its life-of-type."

As for the submarines themselves, many within the RAN believe the vessels are only just beginning to realise their full potential. Areas where the class has exceeded requirements include the boat's underwater manoeuvrability, habitability and the Integrated Ship Control Management and Monitoring System (ISCMMS), a software-based vessel-management system that has proven to be a success by all accounts, despite it being one of the higher-risk areas of the project. The Collins' ISCMMS, which grants the submarine a 'fly-by-wire' capability, remains the only fully automated submarine control system in operation worldwide. Monitoring some 2,500 signals from various onboard systems, vessel control is achieved via a keyboard, push button and joystick. This permits a significantly reduced crew compared to the Oberon boats (43 versus 65).

Developed by DSTO in co-operation with ASC, the Collins' anechoic tiles coating the hull are another success story and are understood to far exceed the RAN's requirements for reducing sonar reflectivity. Made from rubber composite, the tiles also reduce radiated noise from inside the submarine. An adhesive specifically developed by DSTO and an interlocking mounting system ensure that few, if any, tiles are lost, thereby maintaining the integrity of the vessel's low sonar reflectivity.

Although based on a Swedish formula, the steel used in the Collins-class boats has been sourced and produced in Australia. Local construction of the submarines has, according to the RAN, taken the welding of high-strength steel in Australia to new and higher levels.

"From a quality viewpoint, the welding carried out by Australian welders at ASC has a rework rate of between 0.1 and 0.3% against an industry standard of 3%," states the RAN. It is noteworthy that welding problems have only been experienced in two sections of Boat 01 - these being the only sections fabricated in Sweden. The quality of the welding carried out in Australia has resulted in a weld weight saving of around 10%.

Prior to the Collins submarine programme, Australian industry involvement (AII) in defence projects rarely exceeded 15%. The initial goal for the New Submarine Project was 60%. This increased to 70% at contract signature stage. The current level of AII stands at around 72%.

Operationally, the submarines have performed well, despite only two boats working with a passable combat system. In late July 2000 HMAS Collins, exercising with the USN off the coast of Hawaii, conducted a successful live firing of a UGM-84 Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missile, achieving the test objectives. June 1999 marked the first firing of a live warshot Mk 48 Mod 4 torpedo from a Collins-class boat (HMAS Farncomb). Conducted against a destroyer hulk, the result was a one-shot kill. Other boats of the class, such as the unaugmented HMAS Waller, have performed well during naval and joint military exercises such as 'RIMPAC 2000' and 'Tandem Thrust 2001'.

As for additional capabilities, the RAN is likely to show interest in providing the Collins class with the ability to fire a tube-launched version of the Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile. Such a capability may be considered in conjunction with, or in place of, certain land-strike missions currently undertaken by the Royal Australian Air Force's F-111 strike aircraft fleet. Operationally, the Collins class can perform all the tasks that its highly capable predecessor could, but with less crew. Speed is higher, sustainability is greater, recharging requires less time, and submerged endurance and depth are increased, as is the depth at which weapons can be fired.

With the majority of reliability issues and platform and design deficiencies now resolved, it is perhaps appropriate to leave the last word on the perceived future of the Collins class to the McIntosh-Prescott Report, which continues to provide guidance for the remainder of the New Submarine Project. "The Collins class has the potential to be an extremely potent, strategic and tactical defence asset for Australia, and should serve the country well and retain a technical edge, with periodic upgrades, for decades."

A win-win for both the USN and the RAN.

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