But I don't think that this changes the basic thrust of my argument that when such practices become widespread, it is dysfunctional. Even among chimps, deception of one's mates is limited to specific circumstances like this, and done occasionally, not as a matter of course. When it becomes the norm, and deception is constant and present in most or all aspects of daily interaction, then society breaks down, and the group suffers, along with all the individuals in it.
I still say that by definition, an evolutionary process cannot be dysfuntional. But even if it were in some sense, the basic thrust of my argument is still that we don't regard what chimpanzees do as morally wrong, even if they were to wipe their entire species out deceiving one anaother. If Eichmann was just as much a product of evolution as chimpanzees, then he was no more wrong than they in deceiving those he regarded as his opponnents. My point is that a culturaly normative moral system that evolves and changes relative to cultures does not give an adequate accounting of what we both viscerally perceive as the hideously and murderously cruel, despicable, immoral acts of Adolph Eichmann.
Cordially,
Well, okay. I still say that once we define extinction as "bad", then things that could lead us to it are by definition, dysfunctional. So there ;)
But even if it were in some sense, the basic thrust of my argument is still that we don't regard what chimpanzees do as morally wrong, even if they were to wipe their entire species out deceiving one anaother.
And...? The point is that we construct something resembling a rational case against it. We don't have to worry about things like "morally wrong" - the whole point was that concepts like "morally wrong" are vague and squishy and based on someone's notion of what God says. The whole point is to replace "morally wrong" with some other concept of wrong that is based on things like reason and logic. Who cares if we think what they do is morally wrong? We can pretty clearly see that if they were to do that, it would be bad because it could lead to some outcome that we consider to be bad itself.
It's about something closer to obective truth than just "God says so." Sure, we can't account for it in terms of moral wrongs, but I'm bailing out of the notion of moral wrongs and searching for something better in the first place, remember?
If Eichmann was just as much a product of evolution as chimpanzees, then he was no more wrong than they in deceiving those he regarded as his opponnents.
Let's look at it from another perspective for a moment. Suppose I were able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that God does not exist - nevermind that I can't, assume I could for a moment. And you, despite your fervent belief that God exists, had no choice but to admit to the truth of what I was saying - you accepted that there was no God, and there never was a God. Suppose that were to come to pass for a moment, even though it's pretty unlikely. In such a case, would you also change you mind about Eichmann? If I showed you that there was no God, would you also conclude that what Eichmann did was perfectly fine, and okay? Would you do it yourself? Or, if not on such a massive scale, would you take the non-existence of God as a reason to plug that neighbor kid who likes to drive past your house at 3AM with the stereo pounding?
If there were no God at all, would you suddenly think that what Eichmann did was A-OK? Would you behave that way yourself? Why or why not?
My point is that a culturaly normative moral system that evolves and changes relative to cultures does not give an adequate accounting of what we both viscerally perceive as the hideously and murderously cruel, despicable, immoral acts of Adolph Eichmann.
I tend to think they would both explain how such things arise, and how we should prevent them from arising, and how we can deal with them if they do. I suppose we'll just have to disagree. ;)