Rawle is no political philosopher if he thinks that the American republic is founded on a doctrine of the right to revolutionize at pleasure, i.e., without offering to the examination of the decent opinion of mankind arguments resolving to the laws of nature and of nature's God. The text you and your allies cite is tiresomely familiar, and fails to make the distinction between the alleged legal right to secession and the genuine natural right to revolution.
The relevent distinction is between unilateral withdrawal from the compact under terms of the compact (called "secession" and absent from the Constitution and all genuine political communities), and withdrawal from the compact according to the natural right of self-government, i.e, of revolution.
The simple question is whether there was any national sovereignty at all. If there was, there existed a national political community, an act of a national people, and accordingly an arrangement that only an act of the national people could terminate legitimately. The Constitution includes a procedure for amendment, which would be a legal method to accomplish so fundamental a change as the departure of a component part.
If you deny that there was any national sovereignty, then I do not dispute the legal right to secession. I think this much the strongest ground for secessionists, albeit still completely false. At least it avoids the incoherence of the claim that it is legitimate for a portion of a compacting community to withdraw from the compact at pleasure.
But, pace Professor Rawles, the argument that a state can simply secede from a genuine national sovereignty is incoherent. It is particularly incoherent if based on the 10th Amendment -- because if a person is a citizen of both the United States and, say, Virginia, he certainly, by the 10th Amendment, retains as much right to retain his citizenship on the United States as the state of Virginia retains the power to leave the United States. If there is any genuine, even if partial, national sovereignty, then the citizens of the states retain the right to remain members of that national community and no power reserved to the States can override this power.
So there's your argument. And please notice that it depends on the premise that there is some national sovereignty. If you deny this premise, then please let's have that discussion, and not the implausible debate over whether a compact can be annulled at pleasure by any of its participants, particularly at the expense of others. If Professor Rawles has any texts to cite on this issue, beyond the ones so frequently posted already, please present them.
And, by the way, Harvard is . . . . a pit of deconstructionist, anti-intellectual, passion-driven mind-goop. And I suspect we probably agree about that. Your source may be an excellent scholar. I was just suggesting that it's a bit silly to expect respect for the anonymous credential "Harvard Professor" given that the reigning doctrine there today is that truth is a silly myth.
Stop right there. I don’t believe Mr. Rawle made any mention of ‘revolution.’ We are speaking English, are we not? Do specific words have specific meanings, in your opinion – or do they not?
...without offering to the examination of the decent opinion of mankind arguments resolving to the laws of nature and of nature's God.
Tell us, my friend: shall we be governed by law, or by “decent opinion?” Shall our government be bound by written, constitutional law, or by “the laws of nature and of nature's God?” What say you?
The text you and your allies cite is tiresomely familiar, and fails to make the distinction between the alleged legal right to secession and the genuine natural right to revolution.
Once again you are conflating “secession” and “revolution.” To justify that position, you must first prove secession unconstitutional. Have at it...
The relevent distinction is between unilateral withdrawal from the compact under terms of the compact (called "secession" and absent from the Constitution and all genuine political communities)...
So, you disagree that all “powers not delegated...nor prohibited....are reserved?” By all means, assist us: show us precisely where the Constitution ‘delegates’ or ‘prohibits’ the right of secession.
...and withdrawal from the compact according to the natural right of self-government, i.e, of revolution.
And we are, by now, quite familiar with the assumption underlying your argument: ‘secession = revolution.’ Unfortunately for you, the equation is dependent upon an exclusion of secession from protection under the specific terms of the Tenth Amendment. And for secession to be excluded from such reservation, it must necessarily have been previously “delegated” or “prohibited” – which it was not.
The simple question is whether there was any national sovereignty at all. If there was, there existed a national political community, an act of a national people, and accordingly an arrangement that only an act of the national people could terminate legitimately.
“National sovereignty?” Perhaps this will help:
“Sovereignty is the highest degree of political power, and the establishment of a form of government, the highest proof which can be given of its existence. The states could not have reserved any rights by the articles of their union, if they had not been sovereign, because they could have no rights, unless they flowed from that source. In the creation of the federal government, the states exercised the highest act of sovereignty, and they may, if they please, repeat the proof of their sovereignty, by its annihilation. But the union possesses no innate sovereignty, like the states; it was not self-constituted; it is conventional, and of course subordinate to the sovereignties by which it was formed. Could the states have imagined, when they entered into a union, and retained the power of diminishing, extending, or destroying the powers of the federal government, that they who "created and could destroy," might have this maxim turned upon themselves, by their own creature; and that this misapplication of words was able both to deprive them of sovereignty, and bestow it upon a union subordinate to their will, even for existence? I have no idea of a sovereignty constituted upon better ground than that of each state, nor of one which can be pretended to on worse, than that claimed for the federal government, or some portion of it. Conquest or force would give a much better title to sovereignty, than a limited deputation or delegation of authority. The deputations by sovereignties, far from being considered as killing the sovereignties from which they have derived limited powers, are evidences of their existence; and leagues between states demonstrate their vitality. The sovereignties which imposed the limitations upon the federal government, far from supposing that they perished by the exercise of a part of their faculties, were vindicated, by reserving powers in which their deputy, the federal government, could not participate; and the usual right of sovereigns to alter or revoke its commissions.”
John Taylor of Caroline, New Views of the Constitution of the United States, 1823
“I have no idea of a sovereignty constituted upon...worse [ground], than that claimed for the federal government.” Please note the title of Mr. Taylor’s book: views such as yours were considered “new” in 1823 – they were not the views of those who ratified the Constitution three decades earlier.
The Constitution includes a procedure for amendment, which would be a legal method to accomplish so fundamental a change as the departure of a component part.
Which clause, exactly, would you amend? Don’t be bashful: tell us which article, section, and clause specifically prohibits secession.
If you deny that there was any national sovereignty, then I do not dispute the legal right to secession. I think this much the strongest ground for secessionists, albeit still completely false. At least it avoids the incoherence of the claim that it is legitimate for a portion of a compacting community to withdraw from the compact at pleasure.
By all means, refute Mr. Taylor’s arguments. Convince us that “the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are” NOT “few and defined.” Prove, in the face of the Tenth Amendment, that “those which are to remain in the State governments are” NOT “numerous and indefinite.” Quote the records of the constitutional convention, and demonstrate that a national rather than a federal government was to be established by the Constitution. It is your argument, my friend, that is “completely false.”
But, pace Professor Rawles, the argument that a state can simply secede from a genuine national sovereignty is incoherent.
“National sovereignty?” Mr. Hamilton proposed the establishment of “national sovereignty” at the constitutional convention – it was considered and rejected. Mr. Randolph also proposed a “national sovereignty” – his plan was also considered, and also rejected. In the words of John Taylor:
“Now [the States] are told that the devil, thus repeatedly exorcised, still remains in the church.”
Go to the records of the convention – show us precisely where and when a “national sovereignty” was established.
It is particularly incoherent if based on the 10th Amendment -- because if a person is a citizen of both the United States and, say, Virginia, he certainly, by the 10th Amendment, retains as much right to retain his citizenship on the United States as the state of Virginia retains the power to leave the United States. If there is any genuine, even if partial, national sovereignty, then the citizens of the states retain the right to remain members of that national community and no power reserved to the States can override this power.
“He certainly, by the 10th Amendment, retains as much right to retain his citizenship on the United States?” Not “by the 10th Amendment,” my friend: even our current high court justices won’t buy that one. The Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the people of the several States, not to “the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole:”
“...(W)here the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it.
”These basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which declares that all powers neither delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the States -are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.- ... the Amendment does make clear that powers reside at the state level except where the Constitution removes them from that level. All powers that the Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the States are controlled by the people of each State.
”To be sure, when the Tenth Amendment uses the phrase -the people,- it does not specify whether it is referring to the people of each State or the people of the Nation as a whole. But the latter interpretation would make the Amendment pointless: there would have been no reason to provide that where the Constitution is silent about whether a particular power resides at the state level, it might or might not do so. In addition, it would make no sense to speak of powers as being reserved to the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole, because the Constitution does not contemplate that those people will either exercise power or delegate it. The Constitution simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation.”
Mr. Justice Clarence Thomas, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 1995
Note the language of the Tenth Amendment: powers are “reserved,” indicating that they remain exactly where they were. There was no ‘aggregate’ people of the United States at the time of the ratification – they could not, therefore, ‘reserve’ anything. Your argument is specious.
So there's your argument. And please notice that it depends on the premise that there is some national sovereignty.
You seem to be confused: it is your argument that is entirely dependent upon the destruction of State sovereignty, and the ‘construction’ of a national sovereignty.
If you deny this premise, then please let's have that discussion, and not the implausible debate over whether a compact can be annulled at pleasure by any of its participants, particularly at the expense of others.
Once again, you are confused: the exercise of a reserved power or right hardly constitutes an ‘annulment:’ your argument presupposes that the exercise of such power or right is prohibited by the compact. In other words, you are presenting a ‘circular argument:’ secession is unconstitutional because secession is unconstitutional. Congratulations.
If Professor Rawles has any texts to cite on this issue, beyond the ones so frequently posted already, please present them.
Perhaps you could begin with the ratification documents of New York, Rhode Island , and Virginia, each of which explicitly reserves the right of secession. You may also wish to review St. George Tucker’s discussion of the 12th proposed amendment (our Tenth Amendment) in his Blackstone’s Commentaries of 1803. If you are unable to locate the documents in question, I will provide quotes – as I have on numerous occasions in the past.
And, by the way, Harvard is . . . . a pit of deconstructionist, anti-intellectual, passion-driven mind-goop. And I suspect we probably agree about that.
Actually, I would suggest that ‘facts are facts.’ It matters not to me whether they are presented by a Harvard professor such as Dr. William Gienapp – or a professor of law at Yale, such as Dr. Robert Bork.
;>)