Posted on 05/31/2002 3:19:53 AM PDT by Cincinatus' Wife
CARACAS - Luis Miquilena is 84 years old, a communist party founder and political godfather to leftist President Hugo Chávez. But to many Venezuelans desperate to oust Chávez and disarm a dangerous crisis, he might be their savior.
A relative centrist in Venezuela's profoundly polarized politics, Miquilena is quietly marshaling votes in the National Assembly for a constitutional reform that would force early presidential elections and replace Chávez.
He is just three votes short of the simple majority required, and the proposal is likely to be officially submitted in the next few weeks, said Alejandro Armas, an Assembly member from Miquilena's Solidarity Party.
But Miquilena is in a race against mid-level military officers threatening another coup against Chávez, who was toppled briefly, April 11-14, unless Chávez renounces his leftist ''revolution,'' his authoritarian ways and his incendiary rhetoric.
''We must push hard and give the military a signal not to despair,'' said Armas, 63, a banker. ``We need to hurry, or there will be a coup.''
Chávez has appeared chastened since April 14, opening talks with the opposition, firing unpopular ministers, accepting legal reforms that he once rejected and even criticizing some of his hard-line backers, popularly known here as ``Taliban.''
But many opponents say he is only trying to buy time to strengthen his rule and insist that his removal from office is the only solution to one of Venezuela's worst crisis in four decades of democratic rule.
EARLY ELECTIONS
The foes have proposed several variations on the same theme: amend the 1999 constitution to shorten Chávez's six-year term to four years, which would permit a recall referendum and new elections next year. Chávez's six-year term is now set to expire in 2006.
Enter Miquilena, a wily pragmatist who resigned as interior minister in January, publicly saying that he needed a rest but privately telling friends that for all of Chávez's rhetoric on behalf of poor Venezuelans he has done little to help them.
''A real revolution is making the subway work,'' he declared after a shoot-out during a massive opposition march April 11 left 17 dead and led angry military officers to demand Chávez's resignation and to detain him.
FEW SEATS
Miquilena's party holds only four of the 79 opposition seats in the 165-member Assembly, against 83 Chávez supporters and three independents, according to most opposition head counts.
But his leftist pro-Chávez credentials make him the perfect man to lure away moderate Chavista Assembly members willing to dump the president because of the passions he incites undermine the socialist policies that they support in this oil-rich but grindingly poor nation -- ``Chavismo without Chávez.''
Those same credentials, however, make some Chávez opponents wary of Miquilena. ''The fact that people see him as a moderate is a sign of our desperation,'' said Robert Bottome, publisher of the VenEconomía weekly.
Miquilena declined Herald requests for an interview.
A former Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driver, Miquilena got his start in politics in a truckers' union and led the communist Proletarian Revolutionary Party in the 1940s and '50s, when he was jailed for seven years by dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez.
He remained active in leftist parties and when Chávez, then an army lieutenant colonel, was thrown in prison after a failed 1992 coup attempt against President Carlos Andrés Pérez, Miquilena became a frequent jailhouse visitor until his pardon in 1994.
Bringing books to Chávez in prison and engaging him in lengthy talks to ''expand his political horizons,'' the two developed ''a father-son relationship,'' Armas said.
ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT
Miquilena persuaded Chávez to run in the 1998 elections, which he won by a landslide, and was elected president of the 1999 constitutional assembly. Chávez named him interior minister in 2000 despite allegations that Miquilena had channeled juicy government contracts to friends and business partners.
But Miquilena and Chávez slowly became disenchanted with each other, and in January Miquilena was replaced by Col. Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, an unconditional Chavista.
Moderate foes of Chávez say the attempt to cut short the presidential term might help ease the nation's crisis -- if the president embraces it as a chance to show his lingering popularity among the poor who make up the vast majority of Venezuela's 24 million people.
''The government needs to relegitimize its role, get some fresh air and avoid a confrontation that would lead to bloodshed,'' said Francisco Arias Cárdenas, a former Chávez ally who ran against him in 2000.
COUP RUMORS
But hard-line critics insist that only Chávez's removal will resolve a crisis that has been generating almost daily coup rumors in the United States' third-largest oil supplier.
Despite high oil prices, the economy is expected to shrink 2 to 3 percent this year, foreign and domestic investments have dried up, 40 percent of all factories are shut and half the workforce lacks full-time jobs, Bottome said.
''Even with a dialogue with the opposition, this government has no chance of moving ahead,'' Armas said. ``That is not enough at this point . . . The situation now demands much more -- new elections.''
July 4, 2001 - Venezuela's Chavez in Deep Trouble ***One prominent foe - the most dangerous to Chavez, observers say - is Interior Minister Luis Miquilena, a former communist who has opposed some of his more radical ideas and may control more of Chavez's political party, the MVR, than the Chavez himself, Tamayo reported.
"Miquilena has become the focus of recent speculation that if Chavez becomes too troublesome, the MVR would switch to a ``Chavismo without Chavez,'' said Angel Alvarez, a political scientist at the Central University of Venezuela.
Such prospects have led Chavez to take steps to hang onto power at least until 2013, when by law he must step down.
The Herald said Chavez "is taking drastic measures to help revive and defend his ideology - steps that critics say are a prelude to a dictatorship much like his friend Fidel Castro's in Cuba."
One step is the resurrection of the radical Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement, or MBR, the group that backed his failed 1992 coup attempt. MBR is led by hardline former communist Guillermo Garcia Ponce. He has also allied himself with Venezuela's communists.
``We count on you, comrades,'' Chavez told communist supporters recently. ``The goal is clear: Smash the conspiracy and promote the revolution.''
Most ominous is the fact that MBR is being reorganized in the form of neighborhood groups, similar, Tamayo reports, to Cuba's infamous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.
Chavez's supporters say the neighborhood cells, a traditional communist tactic, are merely the base organizations of the national party.***
[Full Text] In March, Gen. Charles Wilhelm, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, broached the idea of a U.S.-run military outpost on Venezuela's frontier with Colombia, according to Venezuelan officials familiar with the discussions. The proposal was raised in private meetings involving Wilhelm, Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez and Chavez's national security advisers.
The U.S. rationale for the base would be to block the passage of Colombian guerrillas and drug smugglers into Venezuela. The sources said the United States wanted an American-run base as part of a string of outposts in countries bordering Colombia.
When that proposal was flatly rejected, the sources said, Wilhelm's delegation countered with a plan for a Venezuelan base that would involve American "military advisers" and hi-tech U.S. equipment, including a computer center, a satellite link, radar and other electronic hardware.
While the Americans would control the technology, Venezuelan officers would have free access to the compound, the sources said. An American source said Chavez agreed to give this second option "serious" consideration.
If approved by Chavez, the Venezuelan base would become one of a small network of U.S. listening posts around Colombia. Venezuelan sources said similar U.S.-supported outposts are in the works in Peru and Ecuador to Colombia's south and Panama to Colombia's northwest.
Venezuela, however, has the longest common border with Colombia, stretching some 1,000 miles from mountainous terrain near the Caribbean to the jungles of the Amazon Basin. The fifth country that borders Colombia is Brazil.
The base proposal accompanied Wilhelm's blunt assessment of the deteriorating situation in Colombia, according to the sources. The general argued that the Venezuelan base was needed because the Colombian army had failed to bring the insurgencies there under control. He said the Colombian conflict now was threatening to spill over into neighboring countries.
Retired Venezuelan Gen. Jose Antonio Olavarria said Wilhelm told Chavez that the Colombian army was unlikely to defeat the guerrilla forces that have been fighting for more than 40 years and now control many rural areas. Nor does the Pentagon think that a negotiated settlement between the guerrillas and Colombian President Andres Pastrana is likely.
As evidence that the guerrillas have no intention of accepting Pastrana's peace initiatives, the U.S. general cited the Colombian guerrilla role in the slaying of three American environmentalists who were on a scientific mission with the indigenous U'wa tribe in early March. Their bodies were found across the border in Venezuela.
A commando of the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia [FARC] admitted shooting the Americans for having "entered the U'wa region without authorization." FARC leaders, however, called the shooting an "error" and announced plans to try the commando for murder.
On March 17, at the end of his three-day visit, Wilhelm tempered his public remarks about the Colombian situation. In a press release, Wilhelm simply praised Venezuela's support for the peace process in Colombia. "After talks with President Chavez, I am convinced that Colombia has two friends [the United States and Venezuela] who are ready to help," the general said.
Though Chavez reportedly was giving a hard look at Wilhelm's information about the Colombian threat, some of Chavez's top aides dismissed Wilhelm's alarms.
"All this about guerrilla invasions is a lot of BS invented by the Americans to establish a base in our country," complained Interior Minister Luis Miquilena, a former Venezuelan guerrilla fighter himself. "We have plenty of resources to stop them [the Colombians] from crossing the border."
But Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel sounded at least sympathetic to Wilhelm's warnings. "We have very disturbing information which leads us to believe that the Colombian armed conflict tends to get more complicated [and] we have to take the firm determination to stop the contamination, but it is practically impossible to prevent certain Colombian violent manifestations from spilling into Venezuelan territory."
To demonstrate Venezuelan resolve against that spreading violence, Chavez himself donned a military uniform and traveled to the border. His message was that Venezuelan troops would take action to seal off the frontier against incursions by the warring Colombian factions.
But Colombian authorities are clearly suspicious of Chavez. They have accused Venezuela of granting sanctuary to Colombian guerrillas, especially in the western oil state of Maracaibo which is governed by a Chavez ally. Some Colombians charge that while Chavez is hosting peace talks and paying lip service to reconciliation, he is quietly siding with the insurgents.
These gripes escalated when Chavez declared himself "neutral" in Colombia's civil war and suggested that the FARC effectively had earned "belligerent status" which would enhance its standing with world governments. In retaliation, Colombia's President Pastrana canceled a border summit with his Venezuelan counterpart.
Raising tensions even higher, Colombia's right-wing paramilitary leader, Carlos Castano, threatened to chase rebels all the way to Caracas if Chavez converts "his country into a refuge for the guerrillas."
Foreign Minister Rangel countered that Venezuela would repel any Colombian incursions "be it paramilitaries, guerrillas or the Colombian armed forces."
On April 13, in testimony before Congress, Wilhelm confirmed that he spoke with Chavez about the security situation along the Colombian border and other U.S. concerns about Venezuela's oil reserves which account for the largest share of U.S. oil imports. But Wilhelm offered few details.
"We've watched with considerable interest the emergence of the new regime there," Wilhelm told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "Of course, Mr. Chavez rode into the presidency on the heels of a very, very strong popular mandate, and he's undertaken a very vigorous program of reform within Venezuela. From a security standpoint, he has made some rather significant changes in the way he is employing the armed force. …
"Our concern, however, and one that I expressed to him, was that this could not help but deduct from the forces that were committed on the border with Colombia. And in times past, Venezuela has mounted a most effective campaign to isolate the problems in Colombia from its oil soil. In fact, they have about 10,000 troops disposed along the border."
While worried about any cuts in those border forces, Wilhelm praised Chavez's strategy for integrating the military more thoroughly into Venezuelan society. That project, called Bolivar 2000, has the goal of correcting "some of the deficiencies in the infrastructure in the country [and] provides agricultural assistance right down into putting soldiers into the classrooms, which is all well and good," the general said.
During the March visit, Wilhelm's endorsement of the Bolivar 2000 project caught Chavez by surprise. The president's pet project sets up 40 "attention centers" throughout the country to hear about and tend to emergency problems of the sick and the poor.
Chavez's concern for the poor has buoyed his popularity, though many wealthier Venezuelans complain that the president is ignoring broader economic problems.
The Clinton administration apparently sees Bolivar 2000 and similar programs for the downtrodden as important to prevent the spread of leftist movements that offer more radical alternatives. The initiatives also are seen as a way to block narco-traffickers from gaining a broad national following simply by providing jobs. According to well-placed sources, the U.S. government hopes that a popular Chavez can help Venezuela avoid the danger of "Colombianization."
In the 1960s, the Venezuelan governments of Betancourt and Leoni followed similar social strategies. With windfall profits from the oil bonanza, those governments handed out money and favors, successfully countering Castroite guerrillas who asked the people to risk their lives in a revolution that held no guarantees of a better life.
By contrast, in Colombia, the drug cartels can easily outbid the government for the loyalty of Colombians seeking only a more comfortable life. The Colombian guerrillas have succeeded, in part, by challenging the inequities in the social-political structures.
Despite Chavez's political popularity and other pluses, his rise has worried Washington. In 1992, as a paratroop colonel, Chavez led an aborted coup against what he considered a corrupt Venezuelan government. He also made no secret that he admired Fidel Castro and sought the Cuban leader's friendship.
Because he had tried to overthrow an elected government allied with the United States and cozied up to Castro, the State Department treated Chavez as a pariah. In 1998, signaling U.S. displeasure with Chavez, the State Department rejected his application for a visa to travel to the United States.
The reason given was his role as a revolutionary who challenged a democratically elected government. At the time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described the snub as a matter of principle, not personal disapproval.
In 1998, Washington still nursed the hope that Yale-educated economist Enrique Salas Romer, a former state governor, could line up enough support from other political forces to defeat Chavez. Instead, Chavez won a landslide victory. The State Department had suffered an indirect loss.
Despite its nervousness, Washington recognized the 44-year-old Chavez as the duly elected president. In January, Chavez made a whirlwind victory tour of Europe and North America, including a White House meeting with President Clinton. Clinton invited Chavez to return for an official state visit by the end of February, after his inauguration.
But the U.S. government put the state visit on indefinite hold after Chavez made controversial statements that were seen as anti-democratic. Chavez raised eyebrows with his stubborn idea of scrapping the constitution which he claimed "aids and abets only the corrupt" and replacing it with "an original" constitution.
Some influential Venezuelans were unnerved, too, by his fondness for giving long messianic speeches on television. "All he wants is a free hand so he can establish the rules of an authoritarian if not despotic regime," claimed presidential runner-up Salas Romer.
The private sector complained that Chavez pays no attention to business concerns and goes overboard defending populist causes that make him a hero to the poor. In one case, squatters invaded private land and won the president's sympathy. He called them "poor devils who have no home nor place to cultivate a piece of land."
In an open letter to Chavez on March 27, economist Emeterio Gomez warned Chavez that as long as he failed to respect private property, no foreign investor will put money into Venezuela "no matter what other incentives you may offer."
Gomez added, "the country has come to an economic standstill and the government has yet to come forth with economic policies to work with."
Even some Chavez backers have chafed under the president's autocratic style. Jorge Olavarria, a former Chavez political adviser, resigned from a constitution-drafting committee, charging that Chavez "only wants to listen to himself." Only two aides -- Interior Minister Luis Miquilena and Defense Minister Raul Salazar -- are said to have enough courage to differ openly with Chavez.
But the vast majority of Venezuelans say they favor a president who puts them ahead of the business elite. A poll by MercAnalysis in the middle of March found that 78 percent of Venezuelans believe Chavez is on the right track. They also praised his concern for the poor.
On April 25, voters gave Chavez a an overwhelming victory in a referendum for convening a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Although turnout was light, about 90 percent of those casting ballots approved the Chavez initiative. One of his goals is to change the constitution to allow himself to seek a second term.
In another controversial initiative, Chavez has moved against the autonomy of the giant state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA. Chavez has denounced the company as a "state within a state" and demanded that it be "subordinate" to the government, positions that make the country's business leaders -- as well as U.S. officials -- nervous.
The prospects for the Washington-Caracas relationship remains uncertain for other reasons of foreign policy, particularly Chavez's sympathy for Cuba's Fidel Castro.
Foreign Minister Rangel complained that "at times there have been pressures" from U.S. officials trying to rein in Venezuela's foreign policy, especially its support for Cuba, Iran and China in United Nations votes on human rights issues.
"Venezuela doesn't allow itself to be pressured by anyone,'' Rangel told reporters.
Rangel's complaint prompted a message from President Clinton to President Chavez via Venezuelan Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy. Clinton's message was that the United States supports Chavez's public commitment to respect democracy.
But one well-placed Venezuelan source said Chavez also was receiving advice from Fidel Castro, who has known Chavez for a number of years. The source said Castro's advice was to "carry out the business you have to carry out with the U.S. but never get too friendly. ... To maintain a certain distance means more respect."
But some observers of the strained relations between Washington and Caracas see the current situation as only the latest chapter in a long history.
In the complicated U.S.-Venezuelan relationship, national differences are balanced against the Realpolitik U.S. need for Venezuela's oil and Venezuela's need to do business with the United States.
For decades, political tension has been a normal part of that bilateral relationship. Former diplomat Leopoldo Taylhardat noted that the two countries have survived many ups and downs since the discovery of Venezuelan oil reserves in the 1930s.
"Ours [the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship] has never involved a great romance and it is more like a marriage of convenience," Taylhardat observed. "But it is nevertheless a marriage and there are no signs that the convenience will disappear anytime soon."
Now, Washington wants Venezuela as an ally in a containment strategy against more radical political models for Latin America, particularly those represented by the powerful Colombian rebel movements.
How President Chavez responds to the proposed U.S. outpost could influence both the direction of the Washington-Caracas relationship and the political-military future of the northwest quadrant of South America. [End]
Tony Bianchi is editor of Venezuela Online News and Venezuela Oil & Energy at www.vzlanet.com.
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