These political generals, these perfumed princes soundly in the pockets of the aero-industry and high tech vendors were determined to relegate the the A-10 to minor Air Guard units, primarily to allow for the obtaining of required flight time or, in the alternative, to give the airplane to the Army. If the latter, the AF officers flying the bird and the crews keeping it flyable were going to be given the option of changing services or changing aerial platform communities. Neither of these "Hobson Choices" would have been acceptable or feasible.
Of course, that would have put the Army back into the jet flying business, something both prohibited by law and anathema to AF brass. Such a move, even if permitted by Congress (itself a doubtful move), would have been a bad military decision of monumental proportions and even worse public policy.
Once the aircraft arrived in Saudi, the A-10 went on to prove itself a valuable low-intensity conflict weapons and killing platform. It isn't going to win any air-to-air victories although it will make hostile troop carrier or offensive choppers who venture out wish they'd stayed at the Officers Club drinking beer and enjoying a good cigar--or whatever our rag-headed enemy pilots do at their O clubs.
The A-10's loitering time and lethality will be among the most valuable tools in our armament inventory during the forseeable continuation of the asymmetrical hostilities in which we are now involved. The F-15, F-16, F-14 and F-18 along with the use of B-52s in their respective tactical roles (asymmetic conflict is blessed with few strategic targets) are excellent tools for interdiction and elimination of the enemy's ability to fight on the ground. Those high-performance fighters do the same for an enemy's inability to use the air. The A-10 in its vehicle and troop killing role at the van of the enemy's forces is the quintessential weapon to deliver the "in terrorem" effect that so effectively eliminates an opposing force's very important will to fight. A combat force lacking will and motivation is reduced to a large body of dead men walking.
A conflict in which the enemy is deprived of its supply and logistical pipeline, command and control, and is also information-starved cannot conduct orderly or efficient operations. Being thus reduced to essentially an isolated force of those combatants having to rely on only the fighting tools on hand, a morale and incentive killer like the A-10 quickly destroys any remnants of a disorganized and headless fighter's will. And, while this rapid reduction occurs much quicker in a van composed largely of conscripts such as the Iraqi regular forces, it will also occur in even the most dedicated and fervent ideological fighter over a relatively short time.
Faced with the knowledge that resupply, replacement and logistical support is not going to happen and that the on-coming force of Americans, British and other allies is well equiped, well fed, well led, not exhausted because of close battlefield delivery by tactical air and motor transport and possessed of close air support by A-10s and interdiction air forces, even the most zealous warriors will be rendered irrelevant and an ineffective fighting force rapidly. It's the Air Force A-10 (and Army offensive choppers) that become the force of dis-equalization and dis-proportion in that senario. Thus we have the realization of the admonition attributed to General George Patton about allowing the other poor SOB to die for his cause or ideology.
The A-10 modernization and battlefield enhancement program should be not only a net money saving efficiency, but also an always welcome net gain in lethality and extension of an airframe that has a cadre of well trained flight and ground crews as well as a proven and established training and operational syllabus.