Posted on 08/15/2002 10:49:53 PM PDT by Mohammed El-Shahawi
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/rosenbergjul_aug01.asp
I wonder what her relationship is to Cuban interests? I wonder if her theories flared up about the time one of our congressmen pointed out that Cuba has an active biowarfare program, and about the time Jimmy Carter went to Havana to tour a suspected plant... but Carter ended up standing outside of it looking like a fool and never saw the inside- as if he would know what to look for anyway.
...WHY did Former Chr-Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral CROWE endorse an in trouble BILL CLINTON for the Military Vote that ended up putting him over the top in 1992...
...in exhchange for a 10-15% stock share in an American Anthrax producing Company...?
54 posted on 6/20/02 5:26 PM Pacific by ALOHA RONNIE
By JACK DOLAN And DAVE ALTIMARI
Courant Staff Writers
Posted January 20 2002
Lab specimens of anthrax spores, Ebola virus and other pathogens disappeared from the Army's biological warfare research facility in the early 1990s, during a turbulent period of labor complaints and recriminations among rival scientists there, documents from an internal Army inquiry show.
(*My note : Notice that the recent media hype revolves around an incident which occured roughly ten years ago. TEN YEARS AGO. I don't know about you, but I find the likelihood that someone miffed about an Egyptian researcher is going to hang onto anthrax spores of varying or unknown quality, and other pathogen samples, for TEN YEARS in the hopes of one day using them to frame the Egyptian. What I AM concerned about is that the security was lax back then, and what I am even more concerned about is that I seriously doubt that security improved in the ten year period since, when security in EVERY OTHER part of the armed forces and government was becoming increasingly lax. *)
The 1992 inquiry also found evidence that someone was secretly entering a lab late at night to conduct unauthorized research, apparently involving anthrax.
(*My note: TEN YEARS AGO. How many people have been in there since? *)
A numerical counter on a piece of lab equipment had been rolled back to hide work done by the mystery researcher, who left the misspelled label "antrax" in the machine's electronic memory, according to the documents obtained by The Courant.
(*My note : How many American-born, educated research scientists accustomed to working with anthrax are going to misspell it? I'm not even sure a foreign doctor with experience with anthrax is going to misspell it, even if they're in a hurry. This sounds more like someone who is outside of the field, or new to it. *)
Experts disagree on whether the lost specimens pose a danger. An Army spokesperson said they do not because they would have been effectively killed by chemicals in preparation for microscopic study. A prominent molecular biologist said, however, that resilient anthrax spores could possibly be retrieved from a treated specimen.
(*My note; But with the lax security, it seems kind of pointless to try to work with something that is 'maybe' useful when you can simply obtain any number of samples which are useful as-is. Which 'prominent molecular biologist' wouldn't let you quote him or her making a statement like that? Were they worried that others would scoff that useful material can be obtained after treatment and irradiation, which is apparently part of the treatment process? It sounds highly unlikely that any useful material can be obtained from a fully treated sample- I'd be embarassed to say that in front of my colleagues, too. So why say it? The 'prominent molecular biologist' is (a) not a prominent molecular biologist,' or he or she is (b) a 'prominent molecular biologist' who doesn't want to be named making an error others would notice , or (c) anthrax really can be obtained from a thoroughly treated sample, or (d) the 'prominent molecular biologist' doesn't know they irradiate samples. I don't know, because I am not a biologist, molecular or otherwise, but I'm just paranoid about unnamed sources. I also note that so far, the only things known by the press to be missing are these tiny samples on slides intended for study under the microscope, and not vials of the stuff. )
In addition, a scientist who once worked at the Army facility said that because of poor inventory controls, it is possible some of the specimens disappeared while still viable, before being treated.
(*My note: I can believe this. In my experience, security is never too tight, but I am admittedly surprised that these are evidently the only things missing. I am concerned that even after ten years, things probably had not changed at that lab. What have recent inventories turned up? When was the last inventory? When was the last inventory prior to the early nineties one? *)
Not in dispute is what the incidents say about disorganization and lack of security in some quarters of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases - known as USAMRIID - at Fort Detrick, Md., in the 1990s. Fort Detrick is believed to be the original source of the Ames strain of anthrax used in the mail attacks last fall, and investigators have questioned people there and at a handful of other government labs and contractors.
(*My note: the 'Ames Strain' has been sent around the world, for many years. It came from Texas originally and was named after an Iowa lab. What has been the security level at all of the many places this strain has been, not just this one lab? What I want to know is why this 'Ames Strain' is specific to this one lab and who says it is. I want to know if the two basic kinds of anthrax used in the mail - the 'dog food' textured stuff and the 'highly refined stuff,' which came in two waves of mailing and possibly three, are considered identical samples of the same 'Ames strain.'Is the only difference in their treatment to deal with static (silica was added, I believe) or are they different in other ways,, perhaps even being different strains? *)
It is unclear whether Ames was among the strains of anthrax in the 27 sets of specimens reported missing at Fort Detrick after an inventory in 1992.
(*So really, we have no 'smoking gun,' because we haven't even gotten proof that the Ames strain was among the missing. We don't know if the Ames material came from this missing lot in the ONE YEAR, TEN YEARS AGO that was inventoried, or if it came from some other year... and so far I'm not even convinced it came from this lab. *)
The Army spokesperson, Caree Vander-Linden, said that at least some of the lost anthrax was not Ames. But a former lab technician who worked with some of the anthrax that was later reported missing said all he ever handled was the Ames strain.
(*Strictly out of curiousity, how does the person know that it was 'his or her' stuff that is among the missing samples? And if it was, wouldn't that make him or her a suspect for losing the stuff in the first place? How does the reporter know that the unnamed person was a lab technician, much less one who worked in this lab back then? Did these unnamed individuals find the reporter, or did the reporter find them? And if our security is so bad that we released the names of employees at the lab (which seems to be the case), is it not possible that other people, perhaps even terrorists or other governments, can find such people too and make offers to them for information or pathogen material, to be sent elsewhere and used in ways not known to those who sell it? *)
Meanwhile, one of the 27 sets of specimens has been found and is still in the lab; an Army spokesperson said it may have been in use when the inventory was taken.
(*Was the 'found' specimen anthrax or just one of the many other samples of other 'diseases'? Not all 27 were anthrax. In fact, we don't know that ANY of them were the Ames strain; we have only the word of the unnamed lab technician, and the reporter's assertion that the lab technician worked on the same missing samples and not on samples which are still accounted for. *)
The fate of the rest, some containing samples no larger than a pencil point, remains unclear. In addition to anthrax and Ebola, the specimens included hanta virus, simian AIDS virus and two that were labeled "unknown" - an Army euphemism for classified research whose subject was secret.
(*The other samples may not have survived the treatment process, and so are likely useless. Some of the midding slides may simply have been lost of they were treated, since the person doing the research may have been careless thinking they weren't viable anyway. But if some were slipped by without treatment, then whoever slipped them by did so for a reason and now has 26 or fewer samples of viable pathogens, some of which are likely worse pathogens than anthrax. And if they have something worse, then they know what they are doing and they either selected these pathogens for specific reasons, or were just stealing samples for resale and not too careful. Some theorize that the suspect was a person who just wanted to elevate concern about the dangers of biological agents, and used anthrax with that intention and not with the intention of killing as many people as possible. What would a person like that want with ebola? The hanta viris isn't anything special- that can be obtained so easy it isn't funny. So why take a broad selection of material if you know what you are looking for? Either the missing material's variety indicates a random loss of slides, or whoever was swiping them was just taking whatever he or she could lay their hands on, for resale. And strictly out of curiousity, were any of those missing samples the West Nile Virus? *)
A former commander of the lab said in an interview he did not believe any of the missing specimens were ever found. Vander-Linden said last week that in addition to the one complete specimen set, some samples from several others were later located, but she could not provide a fuller accounting because of incomplete records regarding the disposal of specimens.
(* Fuller? Hmmm. How many slides are in a 'specimen set?' Are we looking at 27 SETS, then? And evidently it wasn't uncommon to dispose of some specimens, since there are records f disposal. So it is possible that all of this is just a frantic look at things which may simply have been chucked. People WILL be less careful if the specimens are used only once and then disposed, instead of having to account for samples after research by gathering them back into a set to ship back. If people had to do that, and the materials were checked in by a person qualified to identify each specimen to be as labeled, then we would know who lost the stuff and when.*)
"In January of 2002, it's hard to say how many of those were missing in February of 1991," said Vander-Linden, adding that it's likely some were simply thrown out with the trash.
(*That's what is sounds like to me. Without yearly inventories, there's almost no way ot tell if this loss is 'normal' or not, or if this was one lost sample in 91, two in 90, one in 89, three in 88.... so when was the last inventory? Are inventories only taken when there is a change in command? *)
Discoveries of lost specimens and unauthorized research coincided with an Army inquiry into allegations of "improper conduct" at Fort Detrick's experimental pathology branch in 1992. The inquiry did not substantiate the specific charges of mismanagement by a handful of officers.
(*I heard about it, something to do with a rubber camel, but as far as I can tell this is just heresay. The stories did indicate a high level of immaturity on one side, and thin skin on the other. *)
But a review of hundreds of pages of interview transcripts, signed statements and internal memos related to the inquiry portrays a climate charged with bitter personal rivalries over credit for research, as well as allegations of sexual and ethnic harassment. The recriminations and unhappiness ultimately became a factor in the departures of at least five frustrated Fort Detrick scientists.
(*My note: But is any of this really unusual for federal employees? Unfortunately, no. The really good people work for private industry- the people who can't hold jobs in private industry because of immaturity, irresponsibility, poor language skills, poor performance, or laziness frequently go into government service because its many rules and its union shields them from being held responsible for anything they do. And the few good people in the government are at the mercy of every whiney, immature, and irresponsible person there is if they don't write CYA memos about EVERYTHING they do. Even then, they are always at risk of offending someone ... and getting backstabbed.*)
In interviews with The Courant last month, two of the former scientists said that as recently as 1997, when they left, controls at Fort Detrick were so lax it wouldn't have been hard for someone with security clearance for its handful of labs to smuggle out biological specimens.
(*I can believe this... so we know that from 91 to 97 things were very lax and that there could be a great deal more missing than we know. A lot of people could have been in and out of that lab in that time period. And this probbaly remained true right up into 2001. *)
Lost Samples
The 27 specimens were reported missing in February 1992, after a new officer, Lt. Col. Michael Langford, took command of what was viewed by Fort Detrick brass as a dysfunctional pathology lab. Langford, who no longer works at Fort Detrick, said he ordered an inventory after he recognized there was "little or no organization" and "little or no accountability" in the lab.
(*My note: Did the Col. leave the lab out of frustration in 97 too, or for more conventional reasonslike retirement or reassignment? And why couldn't a colonel resolve the issues? Because he couldn't touch or discipline the civilian employees, perhaps? Because he didn't want to risk offending the gods of political correctness in a climate already rife with lawsuits? Particularly not wanting to risk his own retirement? Did security improve at all after the audit?
"I knew we had to basically tighten up what I thought was a very lax and unorganized system," he said in an interview last week.
A factor in Langford's decision to order an inventory was his suspicion - never proven - that someone in the lab had been tampering with records of specimens to conceal unauthorized research. As he explained later to Army investigators, he asked a lab technician, Charles Brown, to "make a list of everything that was missing."
(*He suspected the records had been tampered with but was unable to prove it...at least not to the satisfaction of our PC government... yet we have Rosenburg claiming she knows who the culprit is.*)
"It turned out that there was quite a bit of stuff that was unaccounted for, which only verifies that there needs to be some kind of accountability down there," Langford told investigators, according to a transcript of his April 1992 interview.
(*My note : Was Col. Langford able to enact new security measures or was he hindered? Did he try or just let it be with the inventory? *)
Brown - whose inventory was limited to specimens logged into the lab during the 1991 calendar year - detailed his findings in a two-page memo to Langford, in which he lamented the loss of the items "due to their immediate and future value to the pathology division and USAMRIID."
Many of the specimens were tiny samples of tissue taken from the dead bodies of lab animals infected with deadly diseases during vaccine research. Standard procedure for the pathology lab would be to soak the samples in a formaldehyde-like fixative and embed them in a hard resin or paraffin, in preparation for study under an electron microscope.
Some samples, particularly viruses, are also irradiated with gamma rays before they are handled by the pathology lab.
Whether all of the lost samples went through this treatment process is unclear. Vander-Linden said the samples had to have been rendered inert if they were being worked on in the pathology lab.
But Dr. Ayaad Assaad, a former Fort Detrick scientist who had extensive dealings with the lab, said that because some samples were received at the lab while still alive - with the expectation they would be treated before being worked on - it is possible some became missing before treatment. A phony "log slip" could then have been entered into the lab computer, making it appear they had been processed and logged.
(*Would Dr. Assaad tell us which of the samples would customarily not be rendered inert before arriving at the lab and which would not be? Was there a SOP or did they just wing it? *)
In fact, Army investigators appear to have wondered if some of the anthrax specimens reported missing had ever really been logged in.
(*Am I missing something here? If they are known to be missing, doesn't it stand to reason that they were logged in? If they had never been logged in, how would you know they are missing? And who are these 'army investigators'? *)
When an investigator produced a log slip and asked Langford if "these exist or [are they] just made up on a data entry form," Langford replied that he didn't know.
(*My note: Were these investigators from back in 92 or are these current investigators? Is this info from old documents about the inventory or new? They could ask Lab Technician Charles Brown. Did he just do the inventory based on paper records or did he physically go around and count samples? And if he counted actual specimens, did he just read the label on the slides or did he physicaly put them under a microscope to make sure the ones labeled 'ebola' hadn't been swapped for the flu? Did he rephotograph the samples and sign them to provide a solid record of what he saw? I doubt it. *)
Assuming a specimen was chemically treated and embedded for microscopic study, Vander-Linden and several scientists interviewed said it would be impossible to recover a viable pathogen from them. Brown, who did the inventory for Langford and has since left Fort Detrick, said in an interview that the specimens he worked on in the lab "were completely inert."
"You could spread them on a sandwich," he said.
(*Well, you HOPE so; and that is probably true, these are very tiny samples and the treatment process would leave even fewer viable spores.*)
But Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a molecular biologist at the State University of New York who is investigating the recent anthrax attacks for the Federation of American Scientists, said she would not rule out the possibility that anthrax in spore form could survive the chemical-fixative process.
(*My note: Is this the same 'prominent molecular biologist' who apparently didn't want to be quoted on that earlier comment in the article?')
"You'd have to grind it up and hope that some of the spores survived," Rosenberg said. "It would be a mess.
"It seems to me that it would be an unnecessarily difficult task. Anybody who had access to those labs could probably get something more useful."
(*Possibly true... did anyone ever do an inventory of the other possible sources?*)
Rosenberg's analysis of the anthrax attacks, which has been widely reported, concludes that the culprit is probably a government insider, possibly someone from Fort Detrick.
(*My note: Gee, she really went out on a limb on that one, although the current scrutiny of Ft. Deitrich may be nothing more than an effort to eliminate it as the most likely source, to be blunt. That's usually how you do investigation- try to narrow the possibilities in the hope that what remains will make it easier to reveal the culprit. Montes, the Cuban spy who called the Cuban director of intelligence from a Washington phone right after 9/11 was a 'government insider,' too. That doesn't mean the office she worked in - antiterrorism I believe- was spying on the US. It meant that Cuba was. We want to know who the anthrax MAILER was... if the person who mailed it was the person who cultured the anthrax, and if that person was the same one who obtained the samples from the main source, or if he or she was given the samples by yet another party to use directly or to return, or bought the samples from a party, etc. We want to know if someone paid the mailer to do the amiling, too. Just finding out who obtained the first sample doesn't tell us who grew it, mailed it, or why. And it certainly doesn't eliminate a foreign country like Cuba, Iraq, or Iran or even the hijackers, who could have purchased the samples from one of the immature government employees just as the spy Aldrich Ames's info was purchased. Iraq doesn't have to purchase the Ames strain, though- it and other countries' labs were sent the stuff in a specimen set of other pathogens from what I understand. And if other countries had some samples of the stuff- who's to say how good their security is? Anyone, anywhere in the world, can grind up specimens as Rosenburg says, just as easily as some lab tech.*)
The Army facility manufactured anthrax before biological weapons were banned in 1969, and it has experimented with the Ames strain for defensive research since the early 1980s.
Vander-Linden said that one of the two sets of anthrax specimens listed as missing at Fort Detrick was the Vollum strain, which was used in the early days of the U.S. biological weapons program. It was not clear what the type of anthrax in the other missing specimen was.
(*My note: Hmmm. We had 27 sample sets. ONe set appears to have been found. That leaves us with 26 sets with various pathogens. According to the above paragraph, only two of those sets was anthrax, and one of those sets was the Vollum strain. There were two other sets labeled as 'unknown.' So we have three possible sets from which anthrax may have been obtained, and only one set which was definitely anthrax but not neccessary the Ames strain.*)
Eric Oldenberg, a soldier and pathology lab technician who left Fort Detrick and is now a police detective in Phoenix, said in an interview that Ames was the only anthrax strain he worked with in the lab.
(*My note: OK, so the previously unnamed lab technician is Oldenberg... who was so good at lab work he's now a police detective. So he worked with the Ames strain. Problem is, he wasn't the only lab tech, was he? What were the other lab techs working on? His samples, contrary to the earlier assertion in the article, were very likely not related in any way to the missing lab samples- if they were, people would be eyeing him up as the main culprit. And if this is all he said, the journalist reporting this has twisted his words in the earlier part of the article.*)
Late-Night Research
More troubling to Langford than the missing specimens was what investigators called "surreptitious" work being done in the pathology lab late at night and on weekends.
Dr. Mary Beth Downs told investigators that she had come to work several times in January and February of 1992 to find that someone had been in the lab at odd hours, clumsily using the sophisticated electron microscope to conduct some kind of off-the-books research.
This sounds like the person who was using the equipment was not familiar with it. In other words, it sounds like someone who was very new to the lab, someone from outside of the lab who wasn't supposed to be in such a place, or someone prone to making a lot of mistakes. It does not sound like an old hand in the lab with a great deal of experience with that particular microscope. It is possible that if you were a researcher who worked in another lab, and you wanted to do somethjing for a possible terrorist act, you would use someone else's lab and not your own, so there would be no evidence in your lab of the crime. The risk is that you would be discovered in a lab in which you didn't belong, but the worst thing which owuld happen to you is that someone might note it in your record, and you may have to throw away your plans. At that point there would be no other indication that you had committed a crime, certainly not terrorism.*)
After one weekend in February, Downs discovered that someone had been in the lab using the microscope to take photos of slides, and apparently had forgotten to reset a feature on the microscope that imprints each photo with a label. After taking a few pictures of her own slides that morning, Downs was surprised to see "Antrax 005" emblazoned on her negatives.
(*My note: Sounds like some lab tech, not a scientist. And not a lab tech familiar with the equipment or at least not one who believed his work was criminal. A lab tech would be experienced with the equipment and if up to no good would definitely check to make sure the thing was reset- unless he had been interrupted, which surely would have been noted by someone. The misspelling in very curious. Is it possible that back in 92 when this happened, that Mary reported this and asked some of her fellow lab personnel if they knew anything about the use fo the lab that weekend? Wouldn't this raise the curiousity of other lab prsonnel, who would wonder who among them would be working with anthrax of all things over the weekend, and wonder who among them would spell it 'antrax?' Would this knowledge not cast suspicioun on someone in the lab whose English was poor? Would this not make people wonder about the Egyptian or other people in the lab with known poor spelling skills? Add to it the news of the missing pathogen sets in the inventory and it is little wonder the atmosphere in the lab might become poisonous. *)
Downs also noted that an automatic counter on the camera, like an odometer on a car, had been rolled back to hide the fact that pictures had been taken over the weekend. She wrote of her findings in a memo to Langford, noting that whoever was using the microscope was "either in a big hurry or didn't know what they were doing."
(*This seems a good assessment. If using labs over the weekend wasn't uncommmon, a person familiar with the lab would be in no hurry to get through. Like I said, at that stage there wouldn't be a problem is a legitimate researcher was caught doing research, probably not even on anthrax. He would at most be disciplined a little, but at that point the stuff hadn't been used on anyone and no terrorism had taken place. So why rush? Whoever did it, though, was clearly up to no good, since he or she did bother to try to roll back the counter. But if they were familiar with that particular device, they would have reset the labeling. So it is possible that the person was in a hurry- because they were unfamiliar with the lab and they would draw attention if caught, even if they were dressed appropriately and had id. Had they done work in a lab where the microscope did not retain labeling information from one photo to the next, and so had forgotten to reset the label although they did know to roll back the counter? But if they were up to no good, why label it 'antrax' instead of just giving it a number alone- or labeling it 'e. coli,' so no one would know that it was suspicious? Maybe the person wasn't a pro. Id the photography digital? If not, who has the negative? *)
It is unclear if the Army ever got to the bottom of the incident, and some lab insiders believed concerns about it were overblown. Brown said many Army officers did not understand the scientific process, which he said doesn't always follow a 9-to-5 schedule.
"People all over the base knew that they could come in at anytime and get on the microscope," Brown said. "If you had security clearance, the guard isn't going to ask you if you are qualified to use the equipment. I'm sure people used it often without our knowledge."
(*My note: yes, but of all of those people, only ONE was known to go through the trouble of rolling back the counter. If it was common to use labs, people wouldn't care if anyone knew they had done so.*)
Documents from the inquiry show that one unauthorized person who was observed entering the lab building at night was Langford's predecessor, Lt. Col. Philip Zack, who at the time no longer worked at Fort Detrick. A surveillance camera recorded Zack being let in at 8:40 p.m. on Jan. 23, 1992, apparently by Dr. Marian Rippy, a lab pathologist and close friend of Zack's, according to a report filed by a security guard.
Zack could not be reached for comment. In an interview this week, Rippy said that she doesn't remember letting Zack in, but that he occasionally stopped by after he was transferred off the base.
(*My note: Security was bad, then. Nut was he inside a lab using the equipment or just playing with Ms. Rippy? And how does his appearance on camera mean that 'apparently' it was Rippy who let him in and not someone else, or not the guard who let him in when he just said "I need to see so and so." *)
"After he left, he had no [authorized] access to the building. Other people let him in," she said. "He knew a lot of people there and he was still part of the military. I can tell you, there was no suspicious stuff going on there with specimens."
If you don't recall letting him in, and there is roof that you did, then you may not recall anything alse. There is no proof that you did, apparently, but since you 'don't recall,' it is clear that you weren't the type to refuse entry to anyone who wasn't authorized. If that had been me, no unauthorized people would get in, so I would know that I never let anyone in.
Zack left Fort Detrick in December 1991, after a controversy over allegations of unprofessional behavior by Zack, Rippy, Brown and others who worked in the pathology division. They had formed a clique that was accused of harassing the Egyptian-born Assaad, who later sued the Army, claiming discrimination.
(*My note: they were ACCUSED of forming a clique, and all of the allegations come from Dr. Assaad. He may be right, or he may just be scouting for his lawsuit.*)
Assaad said he had believed the harassment was behind him until last October, until after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
He said that is when the FBI contacted him, saying someone had mailed an anonymous letter - a few days before the existence of anthrax-laced mail became known - naming Assaad as a potential bioterrorist. FBI agents decided the note was a hoax after interviewing Assaad.
(*OK, someone mailed it... so where was it postmarked? We know the postmarks from the anthrax letters- what about the postmark from this one? How was it labeled? During that time the FBI received over 50,000 tips, or some such figure. Probably any arab with a scientific or aviation-related background had tips called or written in from neighbors. The suspicious part is that the letter was anonymous and that he was accused of bioterrorism before anthrax became an issue. Not that some of us didn't wonder about bioterrorism and truck bombings and bus crashes, and so forth long before the anthrax mailings. But his neighbors likely knew what he did for a living and they, and anyone curious about the 'antrax' lab incident in 92 might have suspected him too even if they weren't a part of the lab clique.*)
But Assaad said he believes the note's timing makes the author a suspect in the anthrax attacks, and he is convinced that details of his work contained in the letter mean the author must be a former Fort Detrick colleague.
(* He may be correct, or he may not be. What 'details' were in the letter? Were the details correct? Is it possible tht someone familiar with his work may have a legitimate reason to suspect he was linked to the missing samples? Was Dr. Assaad known to work weekends at the lab? And the person who wrote the letter only said he was a 'possible' bioterrorist. That's not the same a sclaiming to know- it may just have been someone who was suspicious of all foreigners or foreign born people. They might be guilty of prejudice but they may not be doing it for the purposes of framing the guy. If they wanted to frame him and had worked in the lab, they could have done so. *)
Brown said that he doesn't know who sent the letter, but that Assaad's nationality and expertise in biological agents made him an obvious subject of concern after Sept. 11.
(* And he's right. It would be prudent to double check everyone in our labs, particularly people of questionable origin and people who had recently had large shown signs of unexplained wealth, or who had made suspicious statements- if only to clear them.*)
Copyright © 2002, The Hartford Courant
In spite of this, I find things here to be based on some rather thin evidence- in this article repeated twice and rephrased to make it seem bulkier. If Dr. Assaad's letter really was just someone concerned over the lab, then all the other missing slides don't really amount to a hill of beans in the evidence pile. why? Because after the foul-ups and lost discs at Los Alamos years back, and all the lost laptops and so forth... I doubt very much that 26 sample sets lost over ten years ago is the worst security lapse of any of the labs, both US and foreign, which have had access to the anthrax strain.
OK, Montes wasn't in 'antiterrorism,' she was :
Then there was the Cuban spy at the Pentagon. Ana Belen-Montes was arrested just 10 days after the Sept.11 attack. The FBI felt they had to arrest her at that point because the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks made it important that she be taken out of circulation. U.S. agents already had the longtime Defense Intelligence Agency analyst under surveillance. They would have liked to have kept watching her for a longer period of time before making the arrest.
OK Silver!
What's the story here, gunnedah? I'd be interested in hearing about it.
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