[okie01]

"To judge from the excerpt quoted, the author may be a little harder on the military that they deserve."

McMaster carved up the JCS for playing games of their own with LBJ, trying to use his indecision to feather their own nests. I've often wondered what this did to McMasters' career...

The JCS was never, it appears, completely honest with LBJ -- shaving their projections and expanding their goals to fit his political exigencies and confident that, if they went along, they'd eventually get what they wanted -- a real commitment and bigger budgets.

Of course, as with Clinton, Johnson encouraged the promotion of sycophants. He wanted generals who agreed with him. He didn't want generals who were honest...

That Johnson and MacNamara earned a full measure of blame was no shock -- though, their exercise of power was far more craven and self-serving than I'd imagined. That the JCS did its share of damage was surprising to me. By McMaster's standards, the JCS failed not only the country, but the military services for whom they bore responsibility. More than anything, the book really serves as a critique of the JCS during this period. A major, you might say, was advising the brass: Never again!

An outstanding account that clarifies so many things...

[thucydides]

Very interesting comments. Ultimately though I think responsibility falls on the CinC. The chicaneries of the generals and admirals would naturally take place in an environment where the president wanted to be told what he wanted to hear, and would promote officers who did it. If there was no leadership at the top, naturally the service chiefs would continue the normal practice of jockeying for budget relative to the other services, etc. The author is obviously disappointed that none of the officers had risen above these things, but what could they have done with such a president, other than simply resign?