[Presidential Decision Directives - PDD]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1994 TO:
ANTHONY LAKE (1FL/WW)
SANDY BERGER (1FL/WW)
NANCY SODERBERG (GrFl/WW)
LEON FUERTH (Room 298)
BOB BELL (Room 386)
NICK BURNS (Room 386)
RICHARD CLARKE (Room 302)
EILEEN CLAUSSEN (Room 365)
BOB FA WER (Room 227)
RICHARD FEINBERG (Room 361)
MORT HALPERIN (Room 383)
DAVID HERRINGTON (Room 203)
MARTIN INDYK (Room 351)
WILL ITOH (GrFl/WW)
KRISTIE KENNEY GrFl/WW)
ALAN KRECZKO (Room 348)
SANDY KRISTOFF (Room 493)
ROBERT KYLE (Room 227)
BILL LEARY (Room 392)
BOB MANZANARES (Room 399)
DAN PONEMAN (Room 380)
JIM REED (GrF1/WW)
JEREMY ROSNER (Room 375)
STANLEY ROTH (Room 493)
RICHARD SCHIFTER (Room 330)
TARA SONENSHINE (Room 487)
DON STEINBERG (Room 499)
GEORGE TENET (Room 300)
JANE WALES (Room 494)
JENONNE WALKER (Room 368)
NEAL WOLIN (lFL/WW)
From: TOM ROSS
Subject: President Clinton Signs PDD Establishing "U.S.Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."
Attached for your information are copies of Mr. Lake's press briefing announcing the Clinton Administration's policy on reforming multilateral peace operations and an unclassified document outlining key elements of the policy.
Attachments
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release
STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY
President Clinton Signs New Peacekeeping Policy
May 5, 1994
On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive establishing U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. This directive is the product of a year-long interagency policy review and extensive consultations with dozens of Members of Congress from both parties.
The policy represents the first, comprehensive framework for U.S. decision-making on issues of peacekeeping and peace enforcement suited to the realities of the post Cold War period.
Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. However, as the policy states, properly conceived and well-executed peace operations can be a useful element in serving America's interests. The directive prescribes a number of specific steps; to improve U.S. and UN manaqement of UN peace operations in order to ensure that use of such operations is selective and more effective.
The Administration will release today an unclassified document outlining key elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.
# # #
Clinton Administration Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
(PDD 25)
Bureau of International Organizational Affairs,
U.S. Department of State,
February 22, 1996
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25). The President signed this directive, following the completion of extensive consultations with Members of Congress. This paper summarizes the key elements of that directive.
As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.
The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:
1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support -- both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops. To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.
2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves. To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations. The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revoluntary War, including in Operation Desert Storm. The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations. The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and command and control capabilities.
5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations. The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component. The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York.
6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations. The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the American people.
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (AS SPECIFIED IN PDD 25, MAY 1994)
Introduction: The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy Serious threats to the security of the United States still exist in the post-Cold War era. New threats will emerge. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats. When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use. UN peace operations cannot substitute for this requirement. (Note: For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to cover the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts.) Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can also provide a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability.
During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only in the few cases when the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In the new strategic environment such operations can serve more often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and create global burden-sharing for peace.
Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where such agreements have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices has, in many cases, helped facilitate lasting peace. UN peace operations have served important U.S. national interests. In Cambodia, UN efforts led to an election protected by peacekeepers, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the end of a destabilizing regional conflict. In El Salvador, the UN sponsored elections and is helping to end a long and bitter civil war. The UN's supervision of Namibia's transition to independence removed a potential source of conflict in strategic southern Africa and promoted democracy. The UN in Cyprus has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights has helped preserve peace between Israel and Syria. In Former Yugoslavia, the UN has provided badly-needed humanitarian assistance and helped prevent the conflict from spreading to other parts of the region. UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq, coupled with the peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border, are constraining Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors. Need for Reform
While serving U.S. interests, UN peace operations continue to require improvement and reform. Currently, each operation is created and managed separately, and economies of scale are lost. Likewise, further organizational changes at UN Headquarters would improve efficiency and effectiveness. A fully independent office of Inspector General should be established immediately. The U.S. assessment rate should be reduced to 25 per cent.
Since it is in our interest at times to support UN peace operations, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities and to make operations less expensive and peacekeeping management more accountable. Similarly, it is in our interest to identify clearly and quickly those peace operations we will support and those we will not. Our policy establishes clear guidelines for making such decisions.
Role in U.S. Foreign Policy UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.
While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First, U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to exercise U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.
In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interest uppermost. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes.
It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.
I. Supporting the Right Peace Operations
i. Voting for Peace Operations
The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations, generally, as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. The U.S. will continue to urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations. The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:
-- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
-- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
- International aggression, or; - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
-- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
-- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
-- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
-- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and mandate appropriate to the mission.
-- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
-- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.
These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.
ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations
The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:
-- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
-- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
-- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
-- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
-- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled;
-- Command and control arrangements are acceptable. Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:
-- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
-- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
-- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.
Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
II. The Role of Regional Organizations
In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities. When regional organizations or groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement, U.S. support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.
With respect to the question of peacekeeping in the territory of the former Soviet Union, requests for "traditional" UN blue-helmeted operations will be considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors previously outlined (e.g., a threat to international peace and security, clear objectives, etc.). U.S. support for these operations will, as with other such requests, be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and established UNSC criteria.
III. Reducing Costs
Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995. The Administration remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system. In particular, the U.S. is working hard to ensure that new and on-going peace operations are cost-effective and properly managed. Towards this end, the U.S. is pursuing a number of finance and budget management reforms, including:
-- immediate establishment of a permanent, fully independent office of Inspector General with oversight responsibility that includes peacekeeping;
-- unified budget for all peace operations, with a contingency fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment;
-- standing cadre of professional budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans;
-- enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund to $500 million, using voluntary contributions;
-- Required status of forces/mission agreements that provide preferential host nation support to peacekeeping operations;
-- prohibit UN "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations;
-- revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a 3-year average of national income and rationalize Group C so that higher income countries pay their regular budget rate.
Moreover, the U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to contain costs of UN peace operations once they are underway.
IV. Strenghening the UN
If peace operations are to be effective and efficient when the U.S. believes they are necessary, the UN must improve the way peace operations are managed. Our goal is not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively. At present each UN operation is created and managed separately by a still somewhat understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is duplicated. Moreover, the UN's command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement. Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already underway, would make a positive difference.
A. The U.S. proposals include the reconfiguration and expansion of the staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to create:
-- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operation;
-- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, mange a 24 hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments;
-- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
-- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating member nations. This system would enable the UN to request price and availability data and to order materiel from participating states;
-- Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success;
-- Small Civilian Police Cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training. B. To eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission has been authorized, the UN should establish:
-- a rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new mission;
-- data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
-- trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations;
-- modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments.
C. Finally, the UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.
D. Consistent with the specific proposals outlined above, the U.S. will actively support efforts in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to redeploy resources within the UN to enable the effective augmentation of the UN DPKO along the lines outlined above. In addition, the U.S. is prepared to undertake the following, primarily on a reimbursable basis:
-- detail appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel to DPKO in New York in advisory or support roles;
-- share information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods;
-- offer to design a command, control, and communications systems architecture for the Operations Division, using commercially available systems and software;
-- offer to assist DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
-- offer to help design the database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
-- offer to help design the database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO, for inclusion in the database, of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. U.S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those capabilities, if asked by the UN;
-- detail public affairs specialists to the UN;
-- offer to help create and establish a training program, participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities for training purposes.
V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces
A. Our Policy: The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
There is nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding the command and control of U.S. forces. U.S. military personnel have participated in UN peace operations since 1948. American forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the President determines it serves U.S. national interests.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military personnel have begun serving in UN operations in greater numbers. President Bush sent a large U.S. field hospital unit to Croatia and observers to Cambodia, Kuwait and Western Sahara. President Clinton has deployed two U.S. infantry companies to Macedonia in a monitoring capacity and logisticians to the UN operation in Somalia.
B. Definition of Command: No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.
C. Definition of Operational Control: It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement will be carefully considered.
Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational control, a foreign UN commander cannot: change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.
D. Fundamental Elements of U.S. Command Always Apply: If it is to our advantage to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command still apply. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as the UN commander. Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the UN, if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. The U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered.
There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital concern. Questions of legality, mission mandate, and prudence will continue to be worked out "on the ground" before the orders are issued. The U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other member states to streamline command and control procedures and maximize effective coordination on the ground.
E. Protection of U.S. Peacekeepers: The U.S. remains concerned that in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace enforcers may not have adequate protection under international law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they should be accorded protections identical to those afforded prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as experts on mission for the United Nations, and thus are entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are immediately released to UN authorities.
VI. Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations
Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.
The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force. These missions have been considerably more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S. and the UN are only now beginning to change sufficiently the way they manage peace operations. The expansion of peacekeeping operations without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range of peace operations effectively, when it is in our interests to do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt. It is no longer sufficient to view peace operations solely through a political prism. It is critical also to bring a clear military perspective to bear, particularly on those missions that are likely to involve the use of force or the participation of U.S. combat units. Thus, the Department of Defense should join the Department of State in assuming both policy and funding responsibility for appropriate peace operations. We call this policy "shared responsibility."
A. Shared Responsibility: DOD will assume new responsibilities for managing and funding those UN peace operations that are likely to involve combat and all operations in which U.S. combat units are participating. The military requirements of these operations demand DOD's leadership in coordinating U.S. oversight and management. Professional military judgement increases the prospects of success of such operations. Moreover, with policy managment responsibility comes funding responsibility.
DOD will pay the UN assessment for those traditional UN peacekeeping missions (so called "Chapter VI" operation, because they operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) in which U.S. combat units are participating, e.g. Macedonia. DOD will also pay the UN assessment for all UN peace enforcement missions (so callled "Chapter VII" operations), e.g. Bosnia and Somalia. State will continue to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping missions in which there are no U.S. combat units participating, e.g. Golan Heights, El Salvador, Cambodia. When U.S. military personnel, goods or services are used for UN peace operations, DOD will receive direct and full reimbursement; reimbursement can only be waived in exceptional circumstances, and only by the President.
Our Shared Responsibility policy states: "Unless the President determines otherwise, at the request of one of the Principals:
-- The State Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those traditional peacekeeping operations (Chapter VI) in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the existing State Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account, and;
-- The Defense Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI operations in which there are U.S. combat units and for all peace enforcement (Chapter VII) peace operations. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the establishment of a new account within DOD established to pay UN assessments. Once such an account is established, DOD may receive direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, services, and troops to UN peace operations."
The Administration will submit legislation to Congress creating a new peacekeeping assessment account for DOD and implementing the shared responsibility concept. The legislation will stipulate that, in all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a given operation will be responsible for assessments associated with the operation. Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations.
In all cases, State remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York. DOD is responsible for military assessments and activities. NSC facilitates interagency coordination.
B. Reimbursements from the UN: Under the shared responsibility policy, and the proposed accompanying legal authorities, DOD would receive and retain direct reimbursement for its contributions of troops, goods and services to the UN. An important advantage will be to limit any adverse impact on DOD Operations and Maintenance funds, which are essential to the U.S. military readiness. As our draft legislation stipulates, the U.S. will seek full reimbursement from the UN for U.S. contributions of troops, goods and services. The U.S. will first apply reimbursements against DOD incremental costs. Any remaining excess after the Services have been made whole would be credited to DOD's proposed peacekeeping account when it is a DOD-led operation or to State's CIPA account when it is a State-led operation. The President may choose to waive UN reimbursement only in exceptional circumstances.
C. U.S. Funding of UN Peace Operations: In the short term, the Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding of UN peace operations. Moreover, the Administration will make every effort to budget for known peacekeeping assessments and seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation, assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies.
D. U.S. Training: The Armed Services will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD training programs. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.
VII. Congress and the American People
To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations. Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues. Specifically, the Administration will:
-- Regularize recently-initiated periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
-- Continue recently-initiated monthly staff briefings on the UN's upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peace operations.
-- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
-- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in UN operations.
-- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely basis.
-- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace operations.
-- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.
Conclusion
Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states -- crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.
------------------------------------------------------------------------ U.S. Department of State Publication Number 10161 Released by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs May 1994
